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Burke W. Griggs

THE POLITICAL CULTURES OF IRRIGATION
AND THE PROXY BATTLES OF INTERSTATE
WATER LITIGATION
ABSTRACT
Groundwater depletion ignores the political boundaries of
western states, the legal boundaries of western water codes, and
the jurisdictional boundaries of western water federalism. In the
wake of the groundwater revolution, it is becoming apparent that
certain interstate lawsuits derive essentially from deeper
conflicts rooted in the clash between surface-water and
groundwater irrigation communities—and their respective
political cultures. The interstate divide may be yielding to the
hydrological divide.
This article attends to that deeper relationship between irrigation
agriculture and political culture across the Great Plains. Part I
provides a brief history of its surface-water irrigation
communities, to compose a recognizable image of their political
culture: one that is rooted in classical western water law and
cooperative water federalism, and depends upon interstate
compacts and federal irrigation projects. Part II surveys the
groundwater revolution and the distinct political culture it has
generated: one that doubts the merits of classical western water
law, and suspects the power of western water federalism.
Part III describes a revealing theater of the conflict between
these political cultures: the Republican River Basin. On the
surface, the conflict is a legal casus belli between sovereign
states. But beneath that conflict lies a deeper and more
intractable conflict, where interstate litigation becomes
recognizable as a proxy battle between surface-water and
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groundwater irrigation communities. How the states and the
United States resolve this deeper conflict may determine the
future of water federalism across the Great Plains—and the fate
of the rivers upon which its communities depend.
INTRODUCTION
Organized selfishness is more potent than unorganized
consideration for the public interests.
—Elwood Mead1
All farmers get their water from somewhere. In the East, water just falls
from the sky, but across the arid West, farmers must get it elsewhere. For centuries
it has come with difficulty from the West’s sparse and irregular river systems,
which depend upon variable, but annual, melt from mountain snowpack, local
precipitation, and reservoirs. Since the 1950s, however, most irrigation water has
come dependably from the ground, from shallow alluvial systems and deeper
aquifers, first in deceptively increasing volumes, but now in permanently
decreasing ones, as groundwater levels decline for good. The depletion of the
West’s groundwater is a national problem of high order.2 Geologists have sounded
alarms.3 Policy wonks have prescribed legal and technocratic solutions.4
Washington has sent emissaries asserting jurisdiction and money promising relief;
the West has welcomed the latter.5 Western politicians have issued platitudes and
published water plans.6 But obscured behind all of this credentialed, politicized,
and often-posturing expertise is a simple, hard, but useful fact: it matters a great
deal where western irrigators get their water.
It matters because the source of that irrigation water largely defines the
political culture of the community that depends on it.7 The relationship between

1. ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
QUESTIONS CREATED BY THE GROWTH OF IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN THE WEST 87 (1903).
2. See, e.g., Laura Parker, To the Last Drop, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 2016, at 86-111.
3. V. L. MCGUIRE, U. S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER-LEVEL CHANGES IN THE HIGH PLAINS
AQUIFER, PREDEVELOPMENT TO 2007, 2005-06, AND 2006-07, 1 (2009); LEONARD F. KONIKOW, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUNDWATER DEPLETION IN THE UNITED STATES (1900–2008), at 5 (2013);
Stephanie L. Castle et al., Groundwater Depletion during Drought Threatens Future Water Capacity of
the Colorado River Basin, 41 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 5904-11 (2014).
4. See, e.g., ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT (2009); THE WATER PROBLEM: CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES (Pat Mulroy ed., 2017).
5. For a recent rebuke of the federal emissaries, see Proposed Directive on Groundwater Resource
Management, Forest Service Manual 2560, 80 Fed. Reg. 35,299 (June 19, 2015). For federal subsidies
which retire farm ground from irrigation, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831–3835 (2012) (creating the Conservation
Reserve and Enhancement Program).
6. See, e.g., COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO’S WATER PLAN (2015); KANSAS
WATER OFFICE, A LONG-TERM VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF WATER SUPPLY IN KANSAS (2015).
7. See, e.g., WILLIAM DUBUYS & ALEX HARRIS, RIVER OF TRAPS: A NEW MEXICO MOUNTAIN
LIFE (1990); JOSÉ A. RIVERA, ACEQUIA CULTURE: WATER, LAND AND COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST
(1998) (describing the role which local, community-based acequias play in the political cultures of
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irrigation and political culture is an ancient one.8 Across the nineteenth-century
West, surface-water irrigation communities established most of western water law,
built (or had built for them) most of the West’s irrigation infrastructure, and framed
most of the legal and regulatory systems that still secure property rights in water.9
John Wesley Powell and Elwood Mead, two of the most influential proponents of
federal irrigation in the American West, believed that the relationship between
irrigation and political culture was as real as western aridity itself, and should guide
the development of irrigation projects on a basin-wide scale.10 During the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s, western states and the United States, largely through the Bureau
of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), built
dams, reservoirs and surface-water irrigation projects across the Great Plains.
These projects remained steadfast to Reclamation’s essentially technocratic vision
of rural society, where citizen irrigators would own modest farms organized around
the projects’ reservoirs, canals, and irrigated lands.11
Due to their basin-wide designs, these projects supply water to irrigators
in different states. The Corps built John Martin Reservoir in the lower Arkansas
River Basin of eastern Colorado, to assist in the management of long-established
canal systems constructed according to state law in both Colorado and Kansas.12
Within comparatively undeveloped basins such as the Republican River Basin
(Basin), the Corps and Reclamation built reservoirs such as Harlan County Lake to
supply the Bostwick Project, which straddles the Nebraska-Kansas state line.13
These surface water irrigation works depend largely on the governance structures
of cooperative federalism. The states protected both their respective water supplies
and their respective state law water regimes through the federalist medium of the
interstate compact. The United States built the projects, and provided important
technical and administrative assistance as well.
These irrigation projects also depend upon the rivers themselves; yet they
became operational during a pivotal period in western irrigation. Starting in the
1950s, the development of groundwater supplies across the Great Plains
fundamentally transformed agriculture in the region—and groundwater irrigators

Spanish-American communities in the Upper Rio Grande Basin in New Mexico and Colorado). See also
Reclamation literature cited infra note 132 and accompanying text.
8. See generally IRRIGATION CIVILIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Julian Haynes Steward
ed., 1955) (describing a collection of monographs exploring the relationship between irrigation and
society in ancient China and Mesopotamia, and pre-Columbian Peru and Mesoamerica).
9. See DONALD PISANI, FROM THE FAMILY FARM TO AGRIBUSINESS: THE IRRIGATION CRUSADE
IN CALIFORNIA AND THE WEST, 1850–1931 (1984); NORRIS HUNDLEY JR., THE GREAT THIRST:
CALIFORNIANS AND WATER: A HISTORY (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles,
California, rev. ed. 2001).
10. John Wesley Powell, Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States: With a More
Detailed Account of the Lands of Utah, in THE ARID LANDS, 33–36 (Wallace Stagner ed., repr., Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, rev. ed. 2004) (1879)); MEAD, supra note 1, at 41.
11. DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN SKIES: NATURE AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAN WEST
62 (1992).
12. Arkansas River Compact, ch. 155, 63 Stat. 145 (1949) (asserting that a major purpose of the
compact is to share in the benefits of John Martin Reservoir).
13. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BOSTWICK DEFINITE PLAN REPORT 5
(1953).
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developed their own distinctive political culture in the process. Groundwater and its
political culture have since assumed a dominant position across the Great Plains,
where as much as 90 percent of irrigation water comes from beneath the ground.14
That dominance has challenged and transformed western water law, threatened
western water infrastructure, and frustrated the regulatory systems of most western
states, regardless of their distinct water law codes. The groundwater revolution
promised emancipation from the governance systems of Reclamation projects and
the allocation limits of interstate compacts.15 Like many revolutions, it temporarily
made the past obsolete.16 But seven decades on, the revolution has produced a
revolution’s typical excesses, conjuring the real specter of permanent groundwater
depletion.17 Falling groundwater levels have crippled wells and dried up formerly
perennial streams across the Great Plains, desiccating Major Powell’s “arid lands”
even further.18
As pumping caused declines in streamflows, reservoir supplies, and
groundwater levels across the West during the 1970s, conflicts emerged between
states dependent on interstate water supplies. The effective governance of these
supplies by interstate compact administrations began to break down, and the
groundwater revolution ultimately forced a series of interstate “water wars”
litigated under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.19 Texas sued New
Mexico to restrain its excessive upstream groundwater pumping in the Pecos River
Basin, pursuant to the Pecos River Compact.20 Kansas sued Colorado to reduce
similarly excessive pumping in Colorado’s portion of the Arkansas River Basin,
pursuant to the Arkansas River Compact.21 And Kansas sued Nebraska twice, to do
the same in Nebraska’s portion of the Republican River Basin, pursuant to the
Republican River Compact (Compact). The first round of the Republican River
litigation had the effect of integrating groundwater pumping explicitly within the
Compact’s administration of those supplies, by accounting for depletions to

14. This figure is for Kansas. CHARLES A. PERRY, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EFFECTS OF
IRRIGATION PRACTICES ON WATER USE IN THE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICTS WITHIN THE
KANSAS HIGH PLAINS, 1991–2003, 1 (2006).
15. JAMES AUCOIN, WATER IN NEBRASKA: USE, POLITICS, POLICIES 39 (1984); see infra note 208
and accompanying text.
16. See generally CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1965) (characterizing
“uniformities” across the landmark English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions).
17. See Castle et al., supra note 3, at 5909–10.
18. Kan. Geological Survey, Major Perennial Stream Changes from 1961 to 2009, KAN. HIGH
PLAINS AQUIFER ATLAS, http://www.kgs.ku.edu/HighPlains/HPA_Atlas/Aquifer%20Basics/#Perennial_
Stream_Changes_1961_to_2009.jpg [https://perma.cc/DB3D-X9HN].
19. See e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983). The media overuses this metaphor, but
the Supreme Court depends upon it. The Court only accepts interstate water lawsuits if the “dispute
between States [is] of such seriousness that it would amount to casus belli if the States were fully
sovereign.” Id. at 571 n.18 (1983) (citing North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372–74 (1923), and
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519–21 (1906)).
20. See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983) (No. 65, Orig.); see also Texas v. New Mexico,
482 U.S. 124 (1987) (No. 65, Orig.). Litigation lasted from 1974 through 1990.
21. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (No. 105, Orig.). Litigation lasted from 1985 through
2009.
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streamflow.22 The second round enforced the Compact against Nebraska’s repeated
violations caused by excessive groundwater pumping.23 In all of these cases,
groundwater was held to be an integral part of the interstate water supplies
allocated under their respective compacts.24
Like the interstate lawsuits of the earlier period (1902–1945), these legal
wars pitted one state against another for sound legal reasons. The Constitution
assigns the litigation of interstate disputes to the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.25 The Court’s jurisprudence regarding interstate water
controversies makes clear that wronged downstream irrigators cannot fight wars on
their own; their parent state must fight them on their behalf.26 And the Court’s
interstate compact jurisprudence similarly makes clear that irrigators are bound to
the allocation limits imposed by interstate compacts, because those limits are
federal law and trump prior state-law water rights.27 Across both major periods of
interstate litigation, none of these textbook truisms are controversial; indeed, they
are wise and necessary rules of water governance, given the interstate nature of
basin-wide water conflicts.
Yet like water itself, wars over water do not respect legal boundaries, the
political boundaries of western states, or the jurisdictional boundaries of western
water federalism. In the turbulent wake of the groundwater revolution, it is
becoming increasingly apparent that certain interstate lawsuits derive essentially
from deeper internecine conflicts within the party states themselves; and these
conflicts are rooted in the intractable clash between surface-water and groundwater
irrigation and their respective political cultures. The interstate divide may be
yielding to the hydrological divide. The most fitting example of this problem is the
spate of litigation which has troubled the Compact since 1998—at the Supreme
Court, but perhaps more importantly, in the telling aftermath of the Court’s
decisions in those cases, as surface-water irrigators in both Nebraska and Kansas
have fought to protect themselves against Nebraska’s groundwater-driven Compact
compliance policies. Within this larger landscape, the interstate litigation becomes
recognizable as a proxy battle, part of a larger conflict between surface and
groundwater interests.
The Supreme Court decides interstate lawsuits as a matter of course, but it
does not necessarily resolve their underlying causes.28 There are defensible

22. Final Settlement Stipulation at 32-34, C1-C114, Kansas v. Nebraska, 123 S.Ct. 1898 (Apr. 16,
2003) (No. 126, Orig.) (accounting procedures established to evaluate the impact of groundwater
pumping on the states’ respective allocations).
23. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015).
24. First Report of the Special Master at 37, Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (Jan. 28, 2000) (No.
126, Orig.).
25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Interstate jurisdiction is exclusive. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
26. Colorado v. Kansas, 322 U.S. 708 (1944) (enjoining Kansas irrigation ditch companies from
prosecuting further their federal cases against Colorado ditch companies upstream on the Arkansas
River). However, the Court occasionally allows non-state parties to intervene in original actions. See,
e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 267–68 (2010).
27. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 108–09 (1938).
28. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117–18 (1907) (asserting the principle of equitable
apportionment but declining to so apportion the waters of the Arkansas River between Colorado and
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federalist reasons for such reticence. The Court is rarely willing to interfere with
the states’ state-law based interstate compliance regimes.29 However vaguely,
federal water law, especially reclamation law, largely defers to state water law.30
This default of deference in resolving interstate water disputes has allowed the
deeper conflict between surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities to
survive, which raises a serious problem. For the future of many interstate river
basins, especially Great Plains basins which depend principally on groundwater,
may not depend so much upon whether upstream states comply with their interstate
legal obligations, but rather upon how they comply with them—by reducing their
groundwater pumping, by reducing their surface-water diversions, by importing
water from somewhere else, or by some combination of all three. These choices
matter a great deal. They may determine the hydrological integrity of the rivers
themselves.
Who will make these choices? Across the Great Plains, the contrasts and
conflicts between surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities raise hard
but unavoidable questions about the public. What is this public: a regional, basinwide, and therefore interstate public? Is it a statewide public, and therefore
determined by political borders that are blind to the course of western drainages?
Or is it—at least at its most intensely felt level—a local public, and one limited to
those who hold water rights? For unlike natural resources such as hard-rock
minerals or oil and gas, water in the West is typically dedicated to the people as a
public resource, subject to the appropriation and beneficial use that create a private
property water right.31 And unlike other natural-resource use rights, such as timber
leases in national forests or grazing rights on federal land, most water rights are
state-law real property rights, insulated from federal jurisdiction.32 Water can thus
be the most public but the least publicly protected of all western resources.33 As
these irrigation communities continue their internecine conflicts within their federal
and state theaters, and western states make policy choices concerning how to
comply with their interstate water obligations, they are increasingly negotiating
among these competing and often divergent concepts of the public. The concept of
the public that prevails determines those policy and governance choices, and those

Kansas); see also Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 399–400 (1943) (declining to award relief to
Kansas).
29. Report of the Special Master at 112–19, Kansas v. Nebraska, 134 S.Ct. 981 (Nov. 15, 2013)
(No. 126, Orig.).
30. The nature and extent of this deference has been frequently litigated concerning Section 8 of the
Reclamation Act. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. §§
372, 383 (2006)). For useful commentaries on Section 8, see Amy Kelley, Staging a Comeback: Section
8 of the Reclamation Act, 18 U. CAL. DAVIS. L. REV. 97, 99–125 (1984); Reed Benson, New Adventures
of the Old Bureau: Modern-Day Reclamation Statutes and Congress’s Unfinished Environmental
Business, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 137, 158 (2011).
31. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-706 (2015) (dedicating all of the waters of the State of
Kansas to the public, subject to the rights of prior appropriation).
32. Id. § 82a-701(g).
33. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982) (describing, in a commerce clause case, the
state’s ownership of its waters as “a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people
that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource” (citations
omitted)).
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choices will in turn decide the future of rivers that—for now at least—still run
across the Great Plains.
Because these choices lie with the states and not the Supreme Court, we
must refocus our attention on the relationship between irrigation agriculture and
political culture across the Great Plains. This article is an attempt toward renewing
that focus. It surveys the way irrigation agriculture has created two distinct
communities and political cultures across the Great Plains: the older communities
based on surface-water irrigation projects which depend upon river flows; and the
younger communities based on groundwater pumping, whose connection to Great
Plains river systems is both hydrologically variable and legally contested.34 While
scholars and other experts have long studied the political culture of irrigation, they
have paid far less attention to this important distinction.35
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of surface-water irrigation
communities across the Great Plains, to compose a recognizable image of their
political culture. Between the 1859 Colorado Gold Rush and 1960 or so, these
communities developed first as private enterprises, and then as state and federal
projects. Concentrated in the river valleys and near the irrigation systems that made
their farms viable, they developed a political culture inseparable from the water law
they helped to establish, the water-related infrastructure they helped to build, and
the governmental largesse upon which they have long depended. Great Plains
surface water irrigation communities are clustered around their projects and
organized along corporate lines; they fully intend to be permanent. They are also
legally conservative communities: they generally perceive their interests as
compatible with the laws and regulations which protect their water supply, and they
have traditionally perceived these interests to be compatible with those of the wider
public. Likewise, the public has traditionally supported these communities, through
state laws giving them quasi-public powers and through the federal fisc, with funds
diverted, stored, released, and applied by Reclamation and the Corps.
Groundwater irrigation communities occupy a hydrological and legal
terrain that is markedly different than their surface-water counterparts. Part II of
this Article provides a survey of the groundwater revolution, to show how it
generated its own political culture across the Great Plains. Starting in the 1950s,
groundwater irrigation revolutionized Great Plains agriculture. Groundwater was
not burdened by the necessities and limitations which have long defined surface
water projects: their dams, reservoirs, canals, and laterals; their high capital costs;
their need for corporate coordination; and perhaps most importantly, the
longstanding structures of water rights, state regulation, and federal supervision.
Groundwater irrigators exploited these advantages, and in the process
have generated a distinct and powerful political culture, one that is also inseparable
from their water supply. They are dispersed across regional aquifers, rather than
nucleated around surface water projects. They are comparatively impermanent,
even as they are closely connected to their local economies, which are dominated

34. See supra text accompanying note 24.
35. For example, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A NEW ERA FOR IRRIGATION (1996); and
HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at 69–75, describing the political culture of miners during the California Gold
Rush.
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by the irrigation of feed crops for beef and dairy cattle. Because groundwater
irrigators depend upon their individual and legally independent wells, groundwater
irrigation communities are defined by a common aversion to regulation, rather than
by a common water-supply system. They are dubious, rather than defensive, about
the merits of established western water law. Perhaps most importantly, they are
pressured between two incontrovertible but incompatible facts—that of
groundwater’s present economic dominance, and that of its permanent depletion.
Protective of their individual access to water and of their local control over water
regulation, groundwater irrigation communities perceive their interests as distinct
and generally incompatible with state control, and as separate from the concerns of
the public beyond their own water neighborhoods. State governments, water
agencies, and the public have often returned the favor, by providing politically
unacceptable proposals to stem excessive groundwater pumping.36
Part III of this Article describes an especially revealing theater of the
conflict between surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities: the basin
of the Republican River, a quintessential Great Plains river whose tributaries and
mainstem gather groundwater supplies across northeastern Colorado, southern
Nebraska, and northern Kansas. Since the 1980s, the conflict has manifested itself
most prominently at the interstate level, as Kansas has twice sued Nebraska to
enforce the Compact. The first case (1998–2003) resolved that the states would
have to account for the effects of groundwater pumping on their respective
Compact allocations; and the states, with important technical assistance from the
United States, developed a groundwater model to calculate those effects and to
assist in Compact accounting.37 Kansas brought the second case in 2010, to enforce
the Compact against Nebraska’s noncompliance in 2005 and 2006. The Court
resolved that case by awarding Kansas monetary damages for Nebraska’s
noncompliance, but also by ordering a modification of the accounting that
Nebraska had sought; both Kansas and Nebraska could claim partial victories in the
interstate litigation.38
Yet to focus on the high level of Supreme Court litigation is to miss the
larger, lower, but more important legal landscape, one dominated by Nebraska’s
policy to comply with the Compact by subordinating its surface-water irrigation
communities to those which depend upon groundwater. Groundwater irrigation
communities in Colorado and Nebraska have taken control of the relevant water
law and policy in their portions of the Basin, largely to forestall forced reductions
in groundwater pumping. That policy has produced a situation where the political
boundaries between the compacting states have begun to matter less than the
operative legal and hydrological boundaries between surface water and
groundwater. Irrigators’ allegiances to their parent state are becoming less
important than their connection to their water supply.

36. See John C. Peck, Property Rights in Groundwater: Some Lessons from the Kansas Experience,
12 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 501, 505–06 (2002) (describing how political opposition to
sustainability killed the “two-pool approach” espoused by the Kansas Water Office in 2001).
37. Final Report of the Special Master with Certificate of Adoption of RRCA Groundwater Model
at 6–7, Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (Sept. 17, 2003) (No. 126, Orig.) [hereinafter Final Report].
38. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057, 1059–64 (2015).
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Threatened and vulnerable, surface-water irrigation communities are
looking beyond their state governments to find other means to protect themselves.
During the Supreme Court litigation, Nebraska surface-water irrigation interests
supported Kansas and its surface-water irrigators. At the same time, they have
engaged in multiple lawsuits against Nebraska to obtain relief from its compliance
approach, which they believe threatens their very existence. Reclamation has
consistently announced its disapproval of Nebraska’s approach, but it has yet to
defend its irrigation districts in court. Since the interstate litigation concluded in
2015, the Republican River Compact Administration (RRCA) has worked to
resolve some of the causes of the interstate dispute, but its peacemaking is
transforming the operation of the Compact itself. The Compact was originally
intended as a means to secure Reclamation irrigation and flood-control projects for
the compacting states, consistent with both the principles of cooperative federalism
and the purposes of Reclamation itself. Yet as groundwater pumping has
increasingly dominated the Basin, the states’ administration of the Compact has
taken a distinctly anti-federal turn, and the RRCA has achieved interstate comity
largely by opposing Reclamation. As a consequence, surface water irrigators within
the Basin, but especially Nebraska, find themselves caught between two hostile
parents: the state-law compliance policies of their parent states, which they must
obey, and Reclamation’s response to these policies, upon which they depend.
I. SURFACE WATER IRRIGATION COMMUNITIES AND THEIR
POLITICAL CULTURE
A. Western Peculiarity and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine
The political culture of Great Plains surface-water irrigation communities
begins with their claim to water, and that claim is rooted in a longstanding
sensibility about how westerners should govern their water supplies—primarily
through the prior appropriation doctrine. The doctrine combines the rule of capture
with the rule of priority. Under the rule of capture, a person who diverts and
captures unclaimed water from its source and puts that water to a recognized
beneficial use obtains a property interest in the use of that water, a water right.39 A
prior appropriation right may be severed from the riparian or other water-bearing
land from which the water is diverted, allowing the water to be used elsewhere.
Under the rule of priority, first in time is first in right. In dry years, there is no
equitable sharing of a water shortage—as there is in the eastern doctrine of riparian
rights—because this sharing would make all users so short of water that no one
could make productive use of his share.40 Rather, a senior water right receives its
full allocation before a junior right receives any. Prior appropriation rights can be
conveyed separately from appurtenant land, and the priority of the right transfers
with the conveyance.41

39. For an early explanation of the rule of capture applied to water, see Acton v. Blundell (1843)
152 Eng. Rep. 1223; 12 M. & W. 324 (Exch. Chamber).
40. Armstrong v. Larimer County Ditch Co., 27 P. 235, 237 (Colo. App. 1891).
41. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(g) (2015).
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This is not the place, and this place lacks the space, to provide an extended
history of the general doctrine.42 That is just as well. Most readers of the Journal
are probably familiar with the doctrine and with the longstanding debates over its
efficacy and worth.43 The doctrine also varies significantly in its application across
the Great Plains states, which undercuts the utility of an extensive treatment of the
general doctrine anyway.44 For the purposes of this article, three aspects of the
doctrine require emphasis.
First, the prior appropriation doctrine largely derives from the widely held
belief that the West was a peculiar place. Western territories were established with
the assumption that they would be best governed through the received AngloAmerican common law.45 With water, however, such a belief was turned on its
head. Prospectors entering the Sierra Nevada foothills of Alta California in the
1840s were soon understood to be entering a wilderness bereft of law, an act which
“was itself a breach of precedent. They left behind them much of the established
law of real property.”46
The peculiarity of the West’s natural conditions affirmed its historical
peculiarity, further undercutting Anglo-American legal precedents founded upon
received assumptions of plentiful, accessible water supplies. It is a well-known fact
that the West’s severe aridity effectively prohibits agriculture without irrigation;
the region’s meteorological and topographical conditions make matters worse.47 In
the mountains and their foothills, most annual precipitation falls as snow, which
typically melts into spring torrents too early for use during the West’s shorter
growing season.48 On the Great Plains, precipitation occurs mostly during the
growing season, but sporadically and variably, posing similar problems for making

42. For older surveys of the development of the prior appropriation doctrine, see MEAD, supra note
1 (a largely critical treatment from a water management perspective); SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS
IN THE WESTERN STATES (1905); for more recent surveys, see DONALD J. PISANI, TO RECLAIM A
DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1848–1902 (1992); 1 WELLS A. HUTCHINS,
WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 226–650 (1971); HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at
60–63.
43. See, e.g., David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws
and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States’ Role? 20 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3 (2001) (focusing on federal
environmental law and state law modifications to the doctrine); Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The
Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L. 37 (2002) (defending the utility of the doctrine
largely based on federal environmental law and Colorado state court decisions); Reed D. Benson, Alive
but Irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s Western Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.
675, 690–704 (2012) (discussing an assortment of state law cases).
44. Compare NEB. CONST. ART. XV, § 6 (1920) (explicitly espousing a use hierarchy and
protecting certain uses above others, a hierarchy which has been repeatedly enforced) and In re 2007
Administrations of Appropriations of Niobrara River, 820 N.W.2d 44 (Neb. 2012), with KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 82a-707(b) (appearing to state a use hierarchy, but repudiating it at the same time).
45. See e.g., Act of 1855, ch. 96, Kan. Sess. Laws 469; Act of Mar. 16, 1855, 1855 Neb. Laws 328
(adopting the common law of England in the territories of Kansas and Nebraska).
46. WIEL, supra note 42, at 2.
47. Powell, supra note 10, at 12–13; MEAD, supra note 1, at 14–15.
48. MEAD, supra note 1, at 48.
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effective use of the rains that do fall.49 Topographically, the West’s greatest water
supplies are stored in mountain snowpack distant from the lower, fertile, and more
temperate lands which are most amenable to cultivation.50
These historical and natural peculiarities raised hard and “novel
questions” for the courts, which struggled to apply the riparian doctrine to conflicts
growing out of the “peculiar enterprises in which many of the people of this state
are embarked”—most prominently placer mining, which required that water be
diverted away from streams and rivers and put to use elsewhere.51 In working these
water-intensive mining claims, usually beyond the reach of state and federal
authorities, miners had applied mining customs to water: the first to divert and use
water from a stream had an exclusive right to use that water, even if the site of that
use was distant from the point of diversion.52 These rules clearly conflicted with
common law riparianism, especially its requirement that water be used on the site
of its diversion, thus prohibiting severance of the water right’s place of use from its
point of diversion. Because the riparian doctrine frustrated the beneficial use of
water in much of the West, its legitimacy went increasingly unrecognized.
The combined force of these peculiarities eventually convinced the courts.
In 1855, the case of Irwin v. Phillips provided a convenient opportunity to do so.
Like earlier cases, it pitted a riparian landowner against a prior appropriator; but
because the conflict took place on public land, the California Supreme Court did
not consider itself to be constrained by riparian statutes nullifying the legal effect
of the miners’ customs.53 That opening allowed the court to give those customs the
sanction of the common law. Stressing a common law maxim—that “courts are
bound to take notice of the political and social condition of the country, which they
judicially rule”—the court then departed from common law riparianism. It held that
the right of the prior appropriator to divert water from a stream, convey it to
another site, and use it there was a superior claim to that of a rival whose land
bordered the stream, and who would otherwise have prevailed as a riparian owner
under the common law.54 As it had in Eddy v. Simpson, the court stressed “the
peculiar condition” of the mining camps and their legal customs, which recognized
and protected property rights in an orderly and fair manner.55 Just two years after

49. H.A. RICE & ROGER C. RICE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE RELATION OF THE KANSAS
WATER COMMISSION TO THE FLOOD PROBLEM OF KANSAS 9 (1918) (precipitation over the Kansas
portion of the Great Plains is of the “plains type,” which mostly falls during the growing season).
50. MEAD, supra note 1, at 70–71.
51. Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 253 (1853).
52. WIEL, supra note 46, at 2–4; HUTCHINS, supra note 42, at 164.
53. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855). This finding drew the accusation of judicial activism,
and the court later defended itself against this charge by explaining that taking judicial notice of local
customs was an established precept of the very common law the legislature had statutorily adopted at
statehood. See Conger v. Weaver, 6 Cal. 548 (1856).
54. Irwin, 5 Cal. at 146.
55. Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46, 48 (1857). The Supreme Court of the United States later agreed,
blessing the pioneers as “emphatically the law-makers, as respects mining, upon the public lands in this
State.” Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457–58 (1879).
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Irwin, the California Supreme Court stated that the doctrine had become “too long
settled to admit of any doubt or discussion at this time.”56
The confidence of such a judicial statement raises the second relevant
aspect concerning prior appropriation: it enjoyed the status of an established,
legitimate, and widely recognized custom and practice well before the courts
accepted it. Across the West, the prior appropriation doctrine rapidly attained the
status of official legal orthodoxy with similar rapidity. Federal mining legislation
enacted soon after the Civil War expressly protected water rights obtained under
the doctrine.57 The 1859 Gold Rush brought the doctrine to Colorado, where it soon
collided with pre-existing water doctrines, especially in the San Luis Valley, which
had been settled by Spanish-American and Mormon farmers irrigating from the Rio
Grande since the 1840s.58 Spanish and Spanish-American water law allocated short
water supplies according to need, rather than temporal priority.59 Mormon legal
customs assumed collective rather than individual rights to use water.60 In 1861, the
territorial legislature endorsed the principle of rotating water rights in times of
shortage.61 It also made water rights inseparable from the appurtenant land, raising
the same doctrinal conflict which had recently been resolved in California by Irwin
v. Phillips.62
Colorado enshrined the prior appropriation doctrine in its constitution at
statehood in 1876, protecting water rights so secured; but because the constitutional
provisions did not repudiate the earlier riparian doctrines, the potential for doctrinal
conflict remained.63 The claims of a riparian landowner (and appurtenant water
user) whose land patent preceded the diversion claims of a prior appropriator might
still prevail.64 Concerned to protect the water rights of irrigation companies secured
by prior appropriation, the Colorado Supreme Court repudiated riparianism in
1882.65 Specifically, it discredited the issue of doctrinal pluralism prior to 1861.
Prior appropriation was the exclusive rule in Colorado, not only because the state
constitution recognized it, but also because it had “existed from the date of the

56. Hill v. King, 8 Cal. 336, 338 (1857). Advocates for common law riparianism vigorously
contested Irwin. See Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136, 141–42 (1857). However, later cases failed to
overturn Irwin. See, e.g., McDonald v. Bear River Co., 13 Cal. 220 (1859); Logan v. Driscoll, 19 Cal.
623 (1862).
57. See, e.g., Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 51); Placer Act
of 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 218, (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 52).
58. VIRGINIA MCCONNELL SIMMONS, THE SAN LUIS VALLEY: LAND OF THE SIX-ARMED CROSS
219–224 (2nd ed. 1999).
59. MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY,
1550–1850, at 20–23, 147–64 (1996); see also JOHN O. BAXTER, DIVIDING NEW MEXICO’S WATERS,
1700–1912 (1997).
60. MEAD, supra note 1, at 42–44, 233.
61. Id. at 144.
62. See Act of Nov. 5, 1861, 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws 67, § 1; Act of Aug. 15, 1862, 1862 Colo.
Sess. Laws 48, § 13. Mead noted the 1861 laws that required water rights to be permanently fixed to the
lands where they were used; similar laws were adopted in Wyoming in 1876. See MEAD, supra note 1,
at 83.
63. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6 (1876)
64. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886).
65. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co, 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882).
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earliest appropriations of water within the boundaries of this state.”66 Conjectural
history proved to be as powerful in Colorado as it had been in California: in a
territory “without law,” each prospector “brought with him the principles of equity
and justice,” establishing the rules of prior appropriation, which later corporations
and settlers would eventually recognize.67 Influenced by these precedents, Kansas
recognized prior appropriation in 1876.68 Nebraska followed in 1889 and
incorporated the doctrine in its constitution by amendment in 1920.69
Ethnic conflict between Anglo-Americans and Spanish Americans, as well
as the cultural imperialism of Anglo-American common law, certainly played a
role in the triumph of prior appropriation, especially on the upper Rio Grande.70
That underscores the third relevant aspect concerning prior appropriation: a
powerful justification for the doctrine was that of reliance. The dominant irrigation
culture of the West in 1885 or so—Anglo-American surface-water irrigation
interests—had invested heavily in water rights secured under the doctrine, and had
constructed reservoirs and irrigation and delivery systems which depended on the
doctrine’s swift deployment during times of water shortage. Frank Trelease
memorably wrote that in the West, “priority is equity,” as opposed to the methods
of equitably apportioning short supplies under riparian doctrines.71 Wider notions
of fairness and the contemporary political context also played important roles,
supplementing the historical, meteorological, and topographical arguments for prior
appropriation. Given the politically powerful concerns about land and water
monopolies, appropriation rights became severable from land.72 Given the need for
diligence and concerns about speculation, water rights became subject to
abandonment.73
Yet there is that other equity, defined not as fairness but as capital
investment, which was arguably more compelling. Given the difficulty and expense

66. Id. at 446. For a fuller discussion of this apparent contradiction, see Gregory A. Hicks & Devon
G. Peña, Community Acequias in Colorado’s Rio Culebra Watershed: A Customary Commons in the
Domain of Prior Appropriation, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 387, 400 (2003).
67. Armstrong v. Larimer County Ditch Co., 27 P. 235, 237 (Colo. App. 1891).
68. Act of Mar. 4, 1876, ch. 58, 1876 Kan. Sess. Laws 153.
69. Act of Mar. 27, 1889, ch. 68, 1889 Neb. Laws 503; NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (1920) (“The
right to divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream for beneficial use shall never be denied
except when such denial is demanded by the public interest”).
70. See MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS & LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO 11–54
(1994).
71. Frank J. Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U. COLO. L.
REV. 347, 349 (1985).
72. DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 104–38 (2012). Mead opposed severability, on the
grounds that it promoted speculation and monopoly. See MEAD, supra note 1, at 290. For the parallel
problem of split estates in land and water rights, see infra text accompanying note 99.
73. SCHORR, supra note 72, at 116–17. Without appropriation and use, there is no industry, and so
the right disappears; this is the logic behind the so-called “use it or lose it” principle, which holds that
unused rights are forfeited or abandoned. See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 42-308 (2012) (rights not used
for three years forfeited). Modern abandonment statutes are less severe. See id. § 82a-718 (2015) (rights
not used for five years “without due and sufficient cause” deemed abandoned, but multiple and lenient
exceptions exist to prevent forfeiture); see also Frick Farm Props. v. Kansas Dept. of Agric., 190 P.3d
983 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
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of diversion works, the law needed to afford clear and immediate protections to
senior rights during times of shortage. Given the distance between upstream storage
reservoirs and downstream irrigation and municipal uses, storage rights and
irrigation ditches required legal protections and privileges.74 Buyers and sellers also
relied also on the very numeracy of prior appropriation. The priority date of a water
right transferred with its sale; and quantified diversion amounts provided (or at
least appeared to provide) values not necessarily available under the riparian
doctrine’s reasonableness approach.75 Courts could employ these numbers in
assessing damages for unauthorized or out-of-priority diversions; buyers and sellers
could use them (along with the priority of the right) to measure the right’s worth.
Constitutional provisions and statutory enactments did not introduce the doctrine
but rather recognized it, acknowledging its political and cultural authority, and the
imperative need to protect the property rights it had secured.
B. Irrigation, Disposition, and Reclamation
During the second half of the nineteenth century, surface-water irrigation
communities developed across the Great Plains. In Colorado, that development
began along the South Platte and the Cache la Poudre Rivers, assisted by favorable
conditions on the Front Range.76 In 1870, the Union Colony’s Greeley Irrigation
Company began its community irrigation system, which watered thirty thousand
acres along the Cache la Poudre. Similar projects developed along the South Platte
and Arkansas Rivers. By 1884, Colorado had developed more than a million acres
of irrigated land.77 In western Kansas, the five main irrigation canals on the
Arkansas River had been developed by the 1880s, irrigating approximately 65,000
acres.78 Surface-water irrigation communities also sprang up in the valleys of more
remote basins, such as the North Fork Republican River in Colorado, the South
Platte in Nebraska, and even the Cimarron River Valley in southwestern Kansas.79
Prior appropriation gained legal approval largely through a benevolent
view of how miners and irrigators created property rights in water beyond the grasp
of government.80 The disposition of the public domain over the same period reveals
a darker aspect to how claimants obtained water rights within government—
especially the federal government’s ham-fisted attempts to promote irrigation by
granting millions of acres of public land on unrealistic terms.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

MEAD, supra note 1, at 290-91 (discussing Nebraska).
Id. at 145–59 (describing quantifiability problems in Colorado).
Id., at 63.
Id. at 144.
JAMES EARL SHEROW, WATERING THE VALLEY: DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE HIGH PLAINS
ARKANSAS RIVER, 1870–1950, at 79–92 (1991). Irrigation districts in western Kansas and Nebraska also
enjoyed substantial legal privileges. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 27, 1866, ch. 57, 1866 Kan. Sess. Laws 124–
38; Act of Mar. 6, 1923, ch. 144, 1923 Kan. Sess. Laws 205; Act of Feb. 19, 1877, 1877 Neb. Laws 168
(classifying canals as internal improvements and granting irrigation corporations the power to condemn
rights of way).
79. See Erasmus Haworth, Underground Waters of Southwestern Kansas, in WATER SUPPLY AND
IRRIGATION PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY NO. 6, at 62–63 (1897).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 53–56 and 65–66.
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The first tranche of federal disposition acts did not concern water directly.
The Preemption Act81 and the Homestead Act82 provided for land patents to settlers
from the United States, while railroad disposition acts used railroad companies as
intermediaries.83 Irrigation was not a necessary condition for patents under these
acts; but land so obtained did enable homesteaders to secure water rights under
state law. Given aridity and federal incentives such as the Timber Culture Act
(1873), these federal acts indirectly promoted appropriation claims by increasing
the demand for water across the West.84
The second tranche placed irrigation at the center of federal disposition.
The Desert Land Act (1877) granted right of entry on condition of three years of
irrigation, but invited fraud by not requiring proof of actual cultivation.85 It set
arbitrary boundaries, enabling claimants to secure state law-based appropriation
rights in some states but not others.86 And it granted far too much land—640 acres
on top of the other claims available to the homesteader.87 This was far more land
than any settler could cultivate, much less irrigate. Speculation soon displaced
settlement, and fraud and failure delivered most holdings into the portfolios of
corporations. Ninety-five percent of the final proofs of irrigation and settlement
under the Desert Land Act were fraudulent.88

81. Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16; 5 Stat. 453 (1841) repealed by Land Revision Act of 1891, ch.
561, 26 Stat. 1095.
82. Homestead Act of May 20, 1862, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161–164, repealed by Act of Oct. 21, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2787.
83. See, e.g., WILLIS DRUMMOND, JR., Land Grants in Aid of Internal Improvements, in THE ARID
LANDS, supra note 10, at 178–95. In Kansas, grants to railroads amounted to more than eight million
acres, roughly halved between direct federal grants to the railroads and federal grants to Kansas for
subsequent transfer to the railroads—nearly one-sixth the area of the state as a whole. HOMER E.
SOCOLOFSKY & HUBER SELF, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF KANSAS 31 (2d. ed. 1988).
84. The Timber Culture Act of 1873, Pub. L. No. 42-277, 17 Stat. 605c, sought to humidify the
Great Plains by allowing settlers to obtain 160 additional acres on the condition that they plant trees on
at least 40 of them. It was sponsored by Senator Phineas W. Hitchcock of Nebraska, and predicated on
the belief that “as civilization extends westward, the fall of rain increases from year to year.” See Robert
Manley, Land and Water in 19th Century Nebraska, in FLAT WATER: A HISTORY OF NEBRASKA AND
ITS WATER 17 (Charles A. Flowerday ed. 1993) (quoting Samuel Aughey, a professor of natural
sciences at the University of Nebraska in 1873, and “Nebraska’s foremost scientific promoter”).
85. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377; see also 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2012). The act still defines
“desert land” as “all lands exclusive of timber lands and mineral lands which will not, without irrigation,
produce some agricultural crop,” a fact ascertained either by the sworn testimony of two credible
witnesses or the secretary of the interior or his designee. See 43 U.S.C. § 322 (2012). The vague and
ambiguous language made fraud inevitable and has been repeatedly ridiculed by all commentators.
86. See Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377; see also 43 U.S.C. § 322. While Colorado fell
within the Desert Land Act’s scope in 1891, Kansas and Nebraska never did, even though the western
regions of these two states have basically the same climate as eastern Colorado. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891,
ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1097.
87. After 1877, a patentee could use the Preemption, Homestead, Timber Culture, and Desert Land
Acts to obtain 1,120 acres—nearly two sections, more than half of that allegedly irrigated. Chastened,
Congress restricted the Desert Land Act to 320 acres and repealed the Preemption and Timber Culture
Acts. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1097.
88. MEAD, supra note 1, at 17; MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS
DISAPPEARING WATER 44 (New York: Penguin Books rev. ed. 1993).
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The Carey Act (1894) sought to reform these flaws. It made between one
and three million acres of federal land available to the western states on the
condition that the receiving state, whether directly or through private companies,
develop irrigation canals and works; the state would then sell off the irrigated land
in quarter sections.89 Unfortunately, it adopted the same arbitrary, state-line
boundaries as its infamous predecessor, the Desert Land Act, and likewise had no
provisions for constructing irrigation works in western states with less unclaimed
public land.90 The act sought to reduce speculation by requiring that water rights be
attached to the irrigated land, and it promoted better irrigation projects by requiring
the state to supervise their design and construction.91 These improvements had
limited success in Wyoming, Idaho, and Utah, but most projects failed because the
Carey Act’s reforming initiatives—especially its virtue of appurtenance—were too
costly.92 Irrigators faced mortgages that combined their land purchases with the
high costs of developing the irrigation project, and few could make their
payments.93
By 1900, most of the West’s land had been claimed—and thanks to the
laws of western water and federal disposition, more than ten times its water
supply.94 The federal disposition acts were predicated on a largely Jeffersonian, and
therefore a largely Lockean, vision of the pioneers as yeoman farmers, creating
society out of the desert wilderness through their individual industry, civic virtue,
and pluck.95 But individual initiative was almost never enough to produce viable
irrigation. As Mead described the Desert Land Act, “[i]f there was an independent
water supply for each 320 acres, or if every man’s canal could begin and end on his
own land, then this law would be an admirable institution;” but no such situation
existed.96 Corporate initiatives could and did work. They worked in the Mormon
colonies on the Wasatch Front in Utah, in the utopian cooperatives and irrigation
colonies along the Cache la Poudre in Colorado, and in irrigation projects without

89. See Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372, 422; see also 43 U.S.C. §§ 641–48 (2012).
90. The Carey Act excluded Kansas and Nebraska, but included Colorado. See 43 U.S.C. § 645
(2012). Colorado was allowed up to two million acres, including the treaty lands formerly held by the
Uncompahgre and White River Utes. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 645, 647; see also Act of Aug. 21, 1911, 37 Stat.
38-39; Act of Feb. 24, 1909, ch. 178, 35 Stat. 644; Act of Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2922, 34 Stat. 1056. Nevada
was allowed two million acres. See 43 U.S.C. § 645; Act of Mar. 4, 1911, ch. 285, 36 Stat. 1417.
Wyoming was also allowed up to two million acres. See 43 U.S.C. § 645; Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 200,
35 Stat. 347. Idaho was allowed up to three million acres. See 43 U.S.C. § 645; Act of May 25, 1908, 35
Stat. 577 (1908); Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 200, 35 Stat. 347. Arizona and New Mexico became eligible
for Carey Act grants in 1909. See 43 U.S.C. § 646; Act of Feb. 18, 1909, ch. 150, 35 Stat. 638.
91. 43 U.S.C. § 641.
92. MEAD, supra note 1, at 24–27. Mead’s optimistic view of Carey Act projects in Wyoming was
based on his appreciation for the state’s administrative regulations for water in general, which he largely
authored. Id. at 247–74.
93. Id. at 345. Corruption was almost certainly a factor in this distress. See Transcript of Remarks
of Spencer L. Baird, Attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation, at Conference of the Governor’s
Committee on the Appropriation of Water in Kansas, Topeka, October 16–17, at 6 (1944) (on file with
the author).
94. MEAD, supra note 1, at 145–59 (regarding Colorado).
95. SCHORR, supra note 72, at 156–57.
96. MEAD, supra note 1, at 22.
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such utopian ends.97 They worked in the handful of projects that succeeded under
the Carey Act. Yet on the whole, the success of these enterprises owed little to
federal acts of disposition.
Despite federal support, large-scale irrigation across the Great Plains faced
three difficult obstacles. The first concerned the legal structure of ownership: land
titles derived from the federal government, but water rights came from the states.
The result was a split estate, where one party, often an irrigation company, held the
water rights under state law, while another party, usually the homesteader or an
assignee, obtained the federal land patent.98 In contrast to those who promoted the
severability of a water right from its appurtenant land, Powell and Mead stressed
that split estates had promoted water monopolies and other speculative abuses, and
that successful irrigation required combining land titles with water rights.99
But overcoming this obstacle produced a second one: private irrigation
companies usually lacked the engineering and financial resources to build effective
irrigation projects, even under the Carey Act.100 Successful projects needed experts
to design and build them on a large and efficient scale, and they required financing
on a scale that could insulate irrigators from speculative pressures to sever their
water rights.101
The final obstacle was the doctrine of prior appropriation itself. It had
produced vague, mistaken, and grossly excessive claims to water, far more than
western streams could provide even in wet years.102 Because many reservoirs had
storage water rights that were junior to most of the irrigation rights on a steam,
prior appropriation made it difficult to store water in dry years, when it was most
needed and valuable.103 Lawyers and litigation discredited the doctrine’s founding
justifications—that it established clear and quickly enforceable property rights, and
that it was well suited to manage western waters for orderly irrigation.104 Yet by
1900, the doctrine was deeply anchored in state law, and millions of acres of
irrigated land relied upon it.
Driven by the belief that only federal supervision could resolve these
obstacles, Congress responded with the Reclamation Act of 1902.105 It made the
federal government, through the newly created Reclamation Service, the creditor,
designer, and builder of large-scale irrigation projects. Federal financing came from
a fund generated by the sale of public lands. The act directed the Secretary of the
Interior to survey, locate, and build irrigation projects and then open these
97. Powell, supra note 10, at 21. Mead stressed that the success of private irrigation projects in
Colorado and Utah was largely due to the favorable conditions of the Front Range and the Wasatch
Front respectively, which enabled irrigators to build small-scale projects at low cost. MEAD, supra note
1, at 63.
98. The potential conflict between federal and state law worried Mead as much as the split estate
itself. MEAD, supra note 1, at 62.
99. Id. at 22–23; Powell, supra note 10, at 53–55.
100. SHEROW, supra note 78, at 79–92; MEAD, supra note 1, at 310 (regarding Idaho).
101. MEAD, supra note 1, at 19, 27. See also infra text accompanying note 107.
102. Id. at 145–59 (regarding Colorado).
103. Id, at 169–71.
104. Id. at 299, 307.
105. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383
(2006)).
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improved public lands to settlement under the homestead laws. Resident farmers
would irrigate small tracts whose water supply was ensured by federal projects;
they would then repay the government for its investment at heavily subsidized
rates. Through this structure (which was also applied to private, already-settled
lands), Reclamation’s finance and design would resolve the problems of
undercapitalized and poorly designed projects. As for the speculative dangers of
severable water rights, the split estate, and prior appropriation, the act required
water rights for Reclamation projects to be fused with land and explicitly devoted
to irrigation.106 Supreme in finance, expertise, and law, Reclamation would
establish and protect irrigation communities across the West.107
That was the plan, at least; but Reclamation’s technocratic and federal
formula generated immediate opposition from western states. As both the
governance limitations and the water-management shortfalls of local and statebased systems had become apparent during the 1890s, irrigation experts had
divided into two general camps. The first camp consisted of what might be called
irrigation federalists, who generally championed Reclamation: Powell, Mead, and
Frederick Newell, the first chief of the Reclamation Service (renamed the Bureau
of Reclamation in 1923). Their advocacy for interstate, basin-based irrigation
projects undergirded bold federal claims both to unappropriated water supplies and
of federal jurisdiction during the first decades of the twentieth century. To protect
unappropriated water supplies for subsequent downstream use, the Department of
Interior (Interior) imposed embargoes against Colorado on the Upper Rio Grande,
against Wyoming on the North Platte River, and against Arizona on the Salt River,
preventing upstream water appropriations on the public domain.108 The second
camp, led by anti-federalists such as Delph Carpenter, understandably viewed these
federal water claims as invasions of the western states’ sovereign right to control
their water supplies.109
The conflict between federalists and anti-federalists played a critical role
during the seminal period of interstate water litigation between 1902 and 1945.110
106. Id. § 8 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. § 372 (2006)). In this regard, the Reclamation Act follows
the Carey Act, which also requires appurtenance: see supra text accompanying note 91.
107. Between politics and the realities of financing reclamation projects, the act has been regularly
and significantly amended. The standard legal discussion of the Reclamation Act is Amy K. Kelley &
Reed D. Benson, Federal Reclamation Law, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 41 (Amy K. Kelley
ed., 3d ed. 2015). See also Joseph Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study in Federal
Subsidy Policy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 13 (1965); Kelley, supra note 30; LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, FROM
RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABILITY: WATER, AGRICULTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE
AMERICAN WEST (1999); Benson, supra note 30.
108. DOUGLAS R. LITTLEFIELD, CONFLICT ON THE RIO GRANDE: WATER AND THE LAW, 1879–1939,
at 170–74, 183–87 (2008); see also Donald J. Pisani, State vs. Nation: Federal Reclamation and Water
Rights in the Progressive Era, in WATER, LAND AND LAW IN THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC
POLICY, 1850–1920, at 38–49 (1996).
109. See DANIEL TYLER, SILVER FOX OF THE ROCKIES: DELPHUS E. CARPENTER AND WESTERN
WATER COMPACTS 4–9, 75–76 (2003).
110. Relevant cases decided in this period include: Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907)
(representing a decision in litigation that lasted from 1902 through 1907); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S.
383 (1943); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (representing litigation that lasted from 1911
through 1940); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Nebraska
v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
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Indeed, while most of these suits were formally cast as conflicts between states, the
conflict over the federal government’s role in interstate water management figured
prominently. Consistent with Interior’s embargoes, Reclamation asserted the legal
right to all unappropriated water in the Arkansas River Basin during Kansas v.
Colorado (1902–1907),111 and made the same claim on the North Platte River
Basin as late as 1945, in Nebraska v. Wyoming.112 Understandably alarmed,
Colorado asserted sovereign ownership over all of the waters originating in the
state during the same period; moreover, it claimed, all of the waters of the Arkansas
River had been claimed by Colorado appropriators, leaving none for Kansas.113
Colorado made similar claims in Wyoming v. Colorado.114 Kansas made its own
uncompromising claim upon a different doctrinal basis: its riparian doctrine entitled
it to the full flows of the Arkansas River.115
The decisions in these cases made clear the Court’s powers to apportion
interstate rivers, but they produced uneven results. The Court’s 1907 assertion of its
powers to equitably apportion interstate rivers in Kansas v. Colorado did not
actually produce an apportionment decree.116 (Nor did its subsequent decision
regarding the Arkansas River in 1944.117) But the Court’s interstate application of
the prior appropriation doctrine in Wyoming v. Colorado (1922) did produce a
decree—to the great alarm of upper-basin states, especially in the Colorado River
Basin.118
To protect their waters from federal incursion by judicial apportionment
and from claims based on prior appropriation and development by downstream
states, western states negotiated early interstate compacts, most notably the
Colorado River Compact (1922) and the La Plata River Compact (1925).119 The

111. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 56 (1907).
112. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 611–12 (1945).
113. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 57 (1907); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 457 (1922).
For more on Colorado’s claims, see James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s
Claims to Water from the Colorado River—Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
290, 295 n.17 (2001); Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried,
Not Praised, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 725 (1996).
114. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 457 (1922).
115. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 57, 85, 98 (1907). Although western Kansas followed the
prior appropriation doctrine as early as 1876, recognized in Act of Mar. 15, 1876, ch. 58, 1876 Kan.
Sess. Laws 153, a state court decision in 1905 complicated Kansas’s claim. See Clark v. Allaman, 80 P.
571, 572–74 (1905) (noting the lack of understanding of the prior appropriation doctrine and declining
the legislative suggestion to broaden it).
116. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 117–18.
117. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1944).
118. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). For a discussion of the context in which the
Colorado River Compact was negotiated, see NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE
COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2d ed. 2009).
119. Colorado River Compact, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (negotiated 1921–22). That legislation
did not include the text of the compact it enacted; in this regard the Colorado River Compact is unique.
The text of the Colorado River Compact first occurs at 70 CONG. REC. 324–25 (1928). The Colorado
River Compact was the first interstate water allocation compact to be negotiated by the states, but it did
not become effective until 1929. See Boulder Canyon Project Act, 46 Stat. 3000 (1929). The first
interstate compact to gain congressional consent was the La Plata River Compact between Colorado and
New Mexico. See La Plata River Compact, ch. 110, 43 Stat. 796 (1925).
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Court’s decision in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. (1938)
clearly placed the states’ federal compact obligations over the claims of prior state
appropriation rights, affirming the power of state engineers to administer those
rights accordingly.120 Secured by the Court’s defense of the compact mechanism in
Hinderlider, western states entered into numerous interstate water allocation
compacts between 1939 and 1949.121 The Court soon stated its approval of that
mechanism: in 1943, it invited Colorado and Kansas to negotiate their longstanding
conflict over the Arkansas River “pursuant to the compact clause of the Federal
constitution.”122
The Court was less clear, however, on federal claims to unappropriated
water supplies.123 The Court’s reticence raised few problems, largely because
Reclamation did not have a substantial presence across the Great Plains for several
decades, aside from the North Platte Project in Wyoming and Nebraska (1905).
Indeed, the first three decades of the twentieth century seemed to make irrigation
less critical as Great Plains agriculture entered its second manic phase—the “great
plow up.” Steam- and gasoline-powered tractors, pulling deep plows and
mechanized farm equipment, vastly and recklessly expanded cultivated acreage
across the region. For a time, farming was both productive and profitable because
of an anomalous combination of unusually wet and temperate weather, high
wartime wheat prices, and the speculative excesses of the Roaring Twenties.124
The Great Depression and the disasters of the “dirty thirties” destroyed
that fragile anomaly, and brought Reclamation to the region as a whole. The “great
plow up” had destabilized Great Plains soils, which blew away during the Dust
Bowl era and buried farms during the Republican River flood of 1935.125 These
disasters, together with the security afforded by interstate compacts after
Hinderlider, motivated the states and Reclamation to plan a comprehensive system
of multipurpose reservoirs to supply irrigation water and control flooding. Local
boosters immediately embraced what Powell, Mead, and the Reclamation Act had
recognized a generation earlier: only federal means and power could build such
infrastructure. Unlike drainages such as the South Platte and the Rio Grande, where

120. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (holding that the
Colorado State Engineer could administer adjudicated state-law appropriation rights predating the La
Plata Compact (1925) to honor Colorado’s obligations under that compact).
121. Interstate water allocation compacts enacted in this period include the following: Rio Grande
Compact, ch. 151, 53 Stat. 785 (1939) (among Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas); Republican River
Compact, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86 (1943) (among Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas); Belle Fourche River
Compact, ch. 64, 58 Stat. 94 (1944) (between South Dakota and Wyoming); Upper Colorado River
Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949) (among Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming); Arkansas River Compact, ch. 155, 63 Stat. 145 (1949) (between Colorado and Kansas); and
Pecos River Compact, ch. 184, 63 Stat. 159 (1949) (between New Mexico and Texas).
122. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943).
123. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 611–12 (1945). The Court did not directly address
these claims, describing them in 1945 as “largely academic so far as the narrow issues of this case are
concerned.” Id.
124. See generally DONALD WORSTER, DUST BOWL: THE SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE 1930S (1979);
TIMOTHY EGAN, THE WORST HARD TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THOSE WHO SURVIVED THE GREAT
AMERICAN DUST BOWL (2006).
125. WORSTER, supra note 124, at 17.
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numerous private irrigation ditches predated the Reclamation Act, most of the
rivers of the Great Plains were relatively undeveloped. This fact encouraged
planners to consider the region’s river basins as a whole, unimpeded by the
complexities of extensive, preexisting irrigation projects and their water rights.
This situation was ideal for Reclamation’s focus on river basin planning and
accounting.126
The legal resolution achieved by interstate compacts, together with the
natural and man-made disasters of the Dust Bowl, produced a decade of
cooperative federalism, with federal water projects and state water planning
operating in tandem across the Great Plains. On the federal side, the most important
piece of legislation was the 1944 Flood Control Act, which planned the
development of the entire Missouri River Basin through a series of irrigation,
flood-control, and navigation projects.127 On the state side, the 1940s produced the
Republican River Compact of 1943 and the Arkansas River Compact of 1949.
These compacts established federal guarantees that the states’ water allocations and
Reclamation’s irrigation projects would be protected at the same time.128
Secured by the Compact and enabled by the Flood Control Act, private
irrigation districts expanded within the Basin, and Reclamation built new irrigation
districts during the following decades. See Figure 1. These are classic works of
civil engineering, built for irrigator-citizens who populate a recognizable
community of private farms within a federal irrigation project. Within the Basin
alone, federal money and expertise built nine dams and reservoirs and thousands of
miles of canals and laterals to subsidize—often at substantial cost—complex
irrigation and flood-control projects. The region had long been characterized by
demographic and natural extremes that militate against an enduring public—the
booms of original settlement and the “great plow up,” the depopulating droughts of
the late 1880s and the Dust Bowl, and finally the flood of 1935.129 Given this
tumultuous natural and demographic history, Reclamation’s projects promised a

126. REISNER, supra note 88, at 134–36. The general lack of large-scale hydropower opportunities in
most Great Plains projects distinguishes them from those in the Colorado and Columbia River Basins,
where Reclamation could use revenue forecasts from electricity generation to conceal the high costs and
comparatively low benefits of the irrigation projects. For the Columbia, see RICHARD WHITE, THE
ORGANIC MACHINE: THE REMAKING OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER (1996).
127. Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 663, 58 Stat. 887 (1944); 33 U.S.C. §§ 701–709c (2012). See MARIAN
E. RIDGEWAY, THE MISSOURI BASIN’S PICK-SLOAN PLAN: A CASE STUDY IN CONGRESSIONAL POLICY
DETERMINATION (1955); HENRY C. HART, THE DARK MISSOURI (1957); JOHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF
PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE POLITICS OF MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER (1994).
128. President Franklin D. Roosevelt vetoed the 1941 version of the Republican River Compact
because it contained language curtailing federal jurisdiction and did not “specifically reserv[e] to the
United States all of the rights and responsibilities which it now has in the use and control of the waters
of the basin.” H.R. DOC. NO. 690, at 2 (1942) (veto message). In this and earlier versions of the
Compact, the states had sought a declaration that the river was not navigable and thus largely immune
from federal jurisdiction. The states and Congress addressed the president’s concerns by adding Articles
X and XI to the Compact, which contain the specific reservations of federal rights, power, and
jurisdiction that he had demanded. Congress passed this version, and the president signed the amended
compact into law. See Act of May 26, 1943, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86.
129. Great Plains populations ballooned during the 1880s, briefly sustained by the unusually wet
years of 1879–1882 in Kansas and those of 1883–1885 in Nebraska. When these anomalies ended and
the law of averages returned, drought cut the population of western Kansas almost in half by 1897. See
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Figure 1: Republican River Compact Area and Irrigation Districts

RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA
209–11 (2011).
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stability predicated upon this allocated, engineered, and regulated water supply.130
Here and elsewhere, Reclamation projects also enhanced the water supplies of
preexisting irrigation communities, by providing supplemental storage and delivery
infrastructure. As a result, few surface-water irrigation communities across the
Great Plains could claim they were separate or independent from the public beyond
their boundaries—both the wider national public which largely financed their
irrigation projects, and the cooperative federalism which had built them in the first
place.131
C. The Political Culture of Surface Water Irrigation Communities
Compared to its projects farther west, such as those in the Colorado and
Columbia River Basins, but especially in California, Reclamation’s projects across
the Great Plains have received little attention, probably because they are not
stupendous. Sited in wide and shallow valleys, these projects serve comparatively
modest irrigation districts. This seems a mundane point, but given the conflicting
and sometimes hyperbolic judgments that Reclamation has provoked, some
earthiness might just be in order.132 Whether heroic or villainous, Reclamation built
irrigation communities across the Great Plains that have enjoyed a mostly stable
water supply for more than sixty years. For all of the political machinations that
went into their construction, these irrigation communities have largely endured at a
time when many rural communities are under significant pressure to survive.
This is not a mundane point. Compared to groundwater irrigation
communities across the Great Plains, surface-water irrigation communities have
existed a fairly long time, and their present state carries the stamp of the social and
civil engineering that made them possible. It is important, and fairly easy, not to

130. MEAD, supra note 1, at 35–36.
131. On the Republican River, the Frenchman Valley and H & R W Irrigation Districts were
integrated into the Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation District, a Reclamation project in Nebraska. See
About FCID, FRENCHMAN-CAMBRIDGE IRRIGATION DIST., http://www.fcidwater.com/about.html
[https://perma.cc/N5F6-EGF5]. Pre-Reclamation irrigation districts within the Arkansas River Basin
have also grown to depend upon federal irrigation and flood-control projects. These include the
Colorado ditch companies downstream from Trinidad and Pueblo Reservoirs and the Associated Ditches
of Garden City, Kansas, which have diverted water from the Arkansas River since the nineteenth
century. The Kansas ditches largely depend upon releases from John Martin Reservoir in Colorado—a
United States Army Corps of Engineers project operated in conjunction with the administration of the
Arkansas River Compact, ch. 155, 63 Stat. 145 (1949); see also supra text accompanying note 12.
132. That literature mostly reflects Reclamation’s largest and most ambitious (but sometimes
disastrous) projects. The writers include boosters and statist champions: BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, LAKE POWELL, JEWEL OF THE COLORADO (1965); MICHAEL ROBINSON,
WATER FOR THE WEST (1979); career apologists: HENRY J. TEBOW, MY LOVE AFFAIR WITH THE
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1985); academic critics: DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER,
ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (Oxford Univ. Press reprt. 1992) (1985);
LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, FROM RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABILITY: WATER, AGRICULTURE, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST (1999); WHITE, supra note 126; KARL BOYD BROOKS,
PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE DAMS: THE HELLS CANYON HIGH DAM CONTROVERSY (2009); crusading
journalists: REISNER, supra note 88, at 111–19; BLAINE HARDEN, A RIVER LOST: THE LIFE AND DEATH
OF THE COLUMBIA (rev. ed. 2012); and dark, but funny, novelists: EDWARD ABBEY, THE MONKEY
WRENCH GANG (Harper Perennial Modern Classics repr. 2006) (1975).
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romanticize these communities. But it is equally important, and less easy, to
recognize their distinct political culture, which has five principal characteristics.
First, surface-water irrigation communities such as those across the Basin
are still mostly recognizable as communities, clustered around their projects on a
local and visible scale. Reclamation’s visionaries wanted to build nucleated
communities composed of small holdings, irrigated and intensively farmed. As
Mead put it, “Where farmers live in villages, they are able to realize a happy
combination of town and country life, and to dwell under conditions which are
favorable to a growth of the best forms of civilization.”133 While not even Floyd
Dominy, the unrepentant, steamrolling commissioner of Reclamation during its
high imperial phase, could plausibly describe these districts as full of happy
villagers, they do remain largely populated by resident farmers.134 For most of the
twentieth century, the Reclamation Act required the owners of irrigated lands to
reside on those lands or nearby.135 They were also subject to the acreage limitations
of the homestead laws, which set a floor of 40 and a ceiling of 160 acres.136
The residency requirement and the acreage limitation sought to reverse the
nineteenth-century trend of social dispersion, where settlers’ desire to obtain as
much land as possible frustrated the formation of schools, churches, and social life.
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed that goal, to ensure that the
“enormous expenditure” for Reclamation projects “will not go in disproportionate
share to a few individuals with large land holdings. Moreover, it [the Reclamation
Act] prevents the use of the federal reclamation service for speculative
purposes.”137 These rules lasted for eighty years, until the abolition of the residency
requirement and significant relaxation of the acreage limitation in 1982.138
Nonetheless, surface-water irrigation communities across the Great Plains largely
remain residential, nucleated communities.
The Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District (KBID) is a representative
example. It supplies irrigation water to 244 owners of district lands, who farm
nearly 43,000 acres in north-central Kansas—an average farm is 176 acres. The
acreage limitations in the district applied until the Reclamation Reform Act of
1982, and Reclamation enforced them, requiring owners to sell their excess land.
The residency requirement also applied, as did Kansas laws forbidding the

133. MEAD, supra note 1, at 382–83.
134. Dominy was fully aware of the divide between the yeoman-farmer intentions of the
Reclamation Act and its subsequent abuses, especially in California. “Congress never faced up to
revising the law [the Reclamation Act of 1902 and the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982], so we ended
up watering private-land developers instead of subsistence farmers.” Tom Wolf, Mr. Dominy, Are You a
Hero or a Villain?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 26, 1998, http://www.hcn.org/issues/141/4583
[https://perma.cc/SW27-XDWB].
135. See Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 5, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. § 431
(2012)).
136. See id. §§ 3, 5. The acreage requirement was later relaxed to allow a married couple jointly to
claim 320 acres. See Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-684, 74 Stat. 732 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §
423h (2012)). Kelley & Benson, supra note 107, at § 41.03(a), n.84.
137. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 297 (1958).
138. See Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, §§ 204, 211, 96 Stat. 1263, 1265,
1269 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390dd, 390kk (2012)); see also Kelley & Benson, supra note 107, at §
41.03(c).
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corporate ownership of farmland; as a result, about half of the local residents still
farm their own land or district land owned by other local residents, or they are
retired from farming and live nearby.139 These numbers stand modestly in contrast
to the gaudy corruptions of California, where corporate ownership of farmland and
Reclamation’s neglect of its own laws have combined to distort the social vision of
the Reclamation Act beyond all recognition.140
Second, surface-water irrigation communities are organized along
corporate lines, where a corporate entity mediates between the water supply of the
district as a whole and the individual owners of irrigated land within the district.
This corporate structure characterizes both private irrigation companies, such as
those on the Arkansas River in Colorado and Kansas, and Reclamation districts,
such as the Bostwick Irrigation District on the Republican River in Nebraska and
Kansas. The ditch or the district, not the individual landowners, typically holds the
water right under which lands for the entire district are irrigated.141 Districts make
corporate decisions about system maintenance and the irrigation calendar.
At the operational level, individual landowners make daily calls for water
from the reservoir or main canal headgate during the irrigation season, and district
managers and ditch riders respond to those calls, route water deliveries, and
account for them. The operational realities of surface-water irrigation require a high
degree of coordination to ensure that water is delivered efficiently and on a timely
basis. This coordination takes place among individual irrigators within one district
and among adjacent districts as well. The Associated Ditches of Kearny and Finney
Counties in Kansas, which irrigate from the Arkansas River, provide a good
example of coordination among legally distinct, but hydrologically connected,
surface-water irrigation companies. For all of their internecine battles, they have
operated under a series of consent decrees dating back to the nineteenth century,
which include provisions for routing water through each other’s ditches.142
Third, surface-water irrigation communities are intended to be permanent.
They hold water rights that are real property rights. The high capital costs of
building and maintaining surface-water irrigation projects could not be justified if
their water supply was not dependable over time. That is especially the case with

139. E-mail from Kenneth Nelson, Superintendent, Kan. Bostwick Irrigation Dist., Courtland,
Kansas, to author (Nov. 26, 2014) (on file with author).
140. For example, the Southern Pacific Railroad controlled more than 100,000 acres of the
Westlands Water District in 1979, where less than three percent of all farms controlled 31 percent of the
land. Kelley & Benson, supra note 107, at § 41.03(a) n.71.
141. For example, the Republican River Compact recognized the rights of the Pioneer Irrigation
Ditch on the North Fork of the Republican River. That became necessary because the Pioneer Ditch
diverted water within Colorado, but put it to beneficial use in Nebraska; the Compact recognized the
decision in Weiland v. Pioneer Irrigation Co., 259 U.S. 498 (1922), granted to Colorado the exclusive
power to regulate diversions from the ditch, and allocated to Nebraska the amount of those diversions.
Republican River Compact, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86, 89 (1943); see also TYLER, supra note 109, at 105–
108. The priority date of KBID’s water right was formally recognized by the compacting states in 2002.
See Final Settlement Stipulation, supra note 22, at 25–26; see also infra note 246.
142. See generally Arkansas River Surface Water Distribution Plan, KAN. DEP’T AGRIC.,
http://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/interstate-rivers-and-compacts/kansas-coloradoarkansas-river-compact [https://perma.cc/9ZSM-XNTZ] (expand “Arkansas River Surface Water
Distribution Plan” menu).
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Reclamation projects, which stress their permanent irrigation and flood-control
benefits to justify their substantial subsidies.143 Alongside that fiscal reality is the
requirement that irrigated land be forever tied to its water rights, despite the efforts
of speculators to sever them.144 While this requirement lapsed for private irrigation
districts long ago, it remains valid for Reclamation projects.145
Fourth, surface-water irrigation communities tend to be legally
conservative. They support the fundamental principles of classic western water law,
primarily because they hold senior water rights in their water neighborhoods.
Likewise, they tend to oppose legal changes that may undermine their ability to
exercise the priorities and other rights they enjoy. The entrance of Reclamation did
not substantially alter this conservatism, because the Reclamation Act has
consistently deferred to state water law. Indeed, Reclamation projects effectively
made the federal government a guarantor of the districts’ water supply.146
Finally, surface-water irrigation communities are under threat across the
Great Plains because they have become vulnerable to both the hydrologic impact
and the political power of groundwater irrigation. The reservoir inflows upon
which they depend have gradually declined over the last several decades due to
excessive groundwater pumping, despite the senior priority of their water rights.
Moreover, groundwater irrigators have purchased and retired part or all of the
water rights of many ditch companies and irrigation districts, while those that
remain have been unevenly protected by state engineers.147
II. GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION COMMUNITIES AND THEIR
POLITICAL CULTURE
A. The Groundwater Revolution
Reclamation applied a progressive social vision to the ancient technology
of surface-water irrigation. By contrast, groundwater irrigation communities owe
their existence to modern technology—the high-capacity, centrifugal water pump,
propelled by electricity or internal combustion, which can pump thousands of
gallons per minute from the vast and previously unexploited aquifers of the West,

143. In describing the benefits of its projects, Reclamation usually makes a point that its reservoirs
have saved hundreds of millions of dollars in flood damage. As of 1998, for example, Reclamation
calculated that the reservoirs in the Bostwick Project had saved $281 million. See KEVIN E. RUCKER,
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BOSTWICK DIVISION: PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM 36-37 (Brit
Storey ed., 2009), https://www.usbr.gov/projects/index.php?id=502 [https://perma.cc/T2UW-FTHB]
(follow “Bostwick Division Project History” link).
144. MEAD, supra note 1, at 346–47.
145. For example, one early Kansas statute held that any water right severed from the land was
considered abandoned. See Act of Mar. 10, 1891, ch. 133, art. II, § 5, 1891 Kan. Sess. Laws 223, 227;
see also MEAD, supra note 1, at 290. The requirement that water rights remain fixed, or appurtenant, to
the irrigated lands of Reclamation projects remains valid federal law. See 43 U.S.C. § 372 (2012).
146. Many of the legal disputes between landowners in Reclamation projects and the Bureau of
Reclamation revolve around who is eligible to receive project water and under what terms. See generally
Kelley & Benson, supra note 107, §§ 41.05, 41.06.
147. See infra Parts III.B and III.C.
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especially the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer.148 This technological breakthrough
took place at the very time that Reclamation’s Great Plains projects were coming
on line during the 1950s.
At first, irrigating with groundwater required little more than a decent well
and a powerful pump to flood the fields; later, center-pivot systems made irrigation
more versatile, precise, and efficient. The impact of the pump and pivot can hardly
be overstated.149 More than the tractors of the “great plow up,” groundwater
irrigation sharply reduced the need for farm labor. Where one industrious farm
worker could surface-irrigate little more than 200 acres by opening ditches with a
shovel or using siphon tubes and gated pipe, an equally industrious farmer
operating an early center pivot could water a full section—640 acres.150
Center pivots also vastly expanded the reach of irrigated agriculture across
the Great Plains. Compared to gravity-fed, flood-irrigation systems, center pivots
can distribute water more evenly and much more precisely, applying water as well
as fertilizer according to the specific needs of the crop and the moisture content of
the soil. They are also more efficient, delivering a higher percentage of water to the
root zone of the crop: where flood irrigation systems are at best 65 to 70 percent
efficient, modern center pivots with drop nozzles and draglines raise that level to
90 percent. Groundwater irrigators have exploited this increase to expand irrigated
acreage and intensify crop density, raising yields.
Center pivots also conquer gravity: their motorized wheels can crawl over
sloping and uneven uplands, enabling the irrigation of millions of acres of
previously unirrigable land. And the finely modulated spray of their nozzles allows
effective irrigation of both coarse and sandy soils without washing them away. As a
consequence, lands formerly considered unfit for farming, such as those above the
southern banks of the Arkansas River in southwestern Kansas, now yield more than
three hundred bushels of corn per acre.
For all of these reasons, modern groundwater irrigation has transformed
much of the Great Plains from risky dryland farms and spotty shortgrass rangelands
into a large portion of the most dependably profitable irrigated land in North
America. Only a Luddite would fail to appreciate this transformation. Groundwater
irrigators on the Great Plains are among the most technologically adept farmers in
the world. Across the Ogallala, irrigators can monitor their fields and control their
center-pivot irrigation systems remotely through their smartphones.151
The technology of groundwater irrigation, together with the huge volumes
of the Ogallala Aquifer, enabled anyone who owned land above it to irrigate.
148. In deference to common usage, this Article refers to the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer simply as
the “Ogallala Aquifer.”
149. See generally CHARLES BOWDEN, KILLING THE HIDDEN WATERS 99–125 (1977); DONALD E.
GREEN, LAND OF THE UNDERGROUND RAIN: IRRIGATION ON THE TEXAS HIGH PLAINS, 1919–1970
(1973).
150. JAMES AUCOIN, WATER IN NEBRASKA: USE, POLITICS, POLICIES 39 (1984) (summarizing
William E. Splitter, Center-Pivot Irrigation, SCI. AM., June 1, 1976, at 90).
151. See, e.g., a typical advertisement for such technology, at Field Net, ZIMMATIC,
http://www.zimmatic.com/fieldnet-1 (last visited Feb. 11, 2017). This does not imply that surface-water
irrigation systems remain trapped in the age of tube siphons and gated pipe. Where feasible, most of the
farmers using these systems have converted to sprinklers with similar gains in both labor and water
efficiency.
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Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, everyone appeared to have enough
groundwater, which is protected and in many places immune from annual
variations in precipitation. Up to a point, groundwater irrigators could compensate
for drought by pumping more. As a result, groundwater irrigation has enabled the
overexploitation of water resources in a way that is not possible with surface water.
B. The Legal Response to the Groundwater Revolution
Because groundwater behaves differently than surface water, the
groundwater revolution created fundamental challenges to western water codes.
Unlike the annual fluctuations of streams and rivers, which vary according to
precipitation, aquifers fluctuate far less, and the effects of pumping-induced
depletions to groundwater can lag behind the pumping itself for decades. The
Ogallala Aquifer, which is mostly unconnected to the streams and rivers of the
Great Plains, is only affected by pumping; its waters are thousands of years old and
effectively unreplenishable.152 Mostly unaware and relatively unconcerned with
these groundwater sources, the architects of western water law did not foresee
whether the water could be tapped out. After all, the right to use water assumes that
there is water to use.153
Across the states of the Republican River Basin, the groundwater
revolution and the unique features of the Ogallala Aquifer produced basic changes
in western water law and policy. The sheer size and drought-proof dependability of
the aquifer encouraged irrigators, regulators, and policy makers to ignore the
inevitable reckoning inherent in the prior appropriation doctrine. Starting in the
1950s, state legislatures amended their water codes to encourage the development
of groundwater without setting a limit on the depletion of the aquifer. The
opportunity to exploit the Ogallala Aquifer was too good to pass up, and the
problems of depletion could be put off until later. Some states withdrew Great
Plains groundwater sources from the public domain and placed them under local
control, creating a new type of water-based public in the process.
These changes raised a fundamental question: was groundwater a public
resource? In Colorado, the answer seemed to be yes, and to rest on constitutional
bedrock. The waters of any “natural stream” and the “waters of the state” were
public resources subject to prior appropriation; hence, it seemed reasonable to
conclude that groundwater sources were “waters of the state.”154 The groundwater
revolution, however, produced legislation that redefined those waters. In 1969, the
Colorado Legislature defined the constitutional meaning of “waters of the state” to
include groundwater supplies that were tributary to natural streams, but to exclude

152. See sources cited supra note 3.
153. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(f) (2015).
154. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6 (1876); Act of Feb, 19, 1879, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94108; Safranek v. Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951).
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other types of groundwater.155 Tributary groundwater would be governed by prior
appropriation and receive the same protection as surface-water rights.156
The other major type of groundwater was labeled “designated
groundwater”—groundwater that did not underlie a flowing stream, such as the
aquifers of eastern Colorado, where pumping did not quickly affect surface water
and water rights.157 Because strict application of the prior appropriation doctrine
would frustrate the development of these groundwater supplies, Colorado limited
the doctrine: senior water rights would be entitled to “reasonable groundwater
pumping levels” but not to the “maintenance of historical water levels.”158
Economic development came at the policy price of withdrawing a substantial
portion of Great Plains groundwater from the public sphere, and compromising the
doctrine of prior appropriation.159
From a different origin, Kansas arrived at a similar decision. Kansas
originally followed two legal water doctrines. Eastern Kansas adhered to the
riparian doctrine, where the reasonable use of water was an attribute of riparian
property.160 Higher, drier, western Kansas followed the prior appropriation
doctrine.161 These doctrines coexisted with increasing unease until 1943–1944,
when Kansas water law suffered two major blows. In the second iteration of the
interstate conflict between Colorado and Kansas over the Arkansas River, the
Supreme Court in 1943 again declined to apportion the river.162 The Court’s final
rationale for not effecting an apportionment in that case was that Kansas’s
bifurcated legal system prevented Kansas from making the necessary showing
“with respect to the right of non-riparian owners to appropriate waters against
objection by other such owners.”163 One year later, the Kansas Supreme Court
ruled that Kansas water law did not grant the state the power to regulate

155. Act of June 7, 1969, ch. 373, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200-01 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §
37-92-103(13) (2016)).
156. Colorado Ground Water Management Act, ch. 319, §148-18-36, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1246,
1265 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137 (2016)).
157. Colorado Ground Water Management Act, ch. 319, § 148-18-2(3), 1965 Colo. Laws at 1247
(codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103 (2016)).
158. Colorado Groundwater Management Act, ch. 319, § 148-18-1, 1965 COLO. LAWS AT 1246
(codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102 (2016)).
159. It should be noted that the alluvial supplies of the South Platte and Arkansas Rivers remained
within the “waters of the state.” Two other categories of groundwater—nontributary and not
nontributary—include the stacked aquifers within the Denver Basin, which supply water to the newer
communities along the suburban Front Range. Due to their high economic value as municipal water
sources, the Colorado Legislature did not apply the doctrine of prior appropriation to them; ownership of
these resources is connected to the overlying land and assumes a hundred-year depletion period. See
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-102(2), -103(10.5) to (10.7) (2016).
160. See Shamleffer v. Council Grove Peerless Mill Co., 18 Kan. 24, 31–32 (1877) (applying
Eastern Kansas riparianism). That riparianism was later modified slightly to allow riparian owners to
divert water from a stream for irrigation purposes. See Clark v. Allaman, 80 P. 571 (Kan. 1905).
161. See Act of Feb. 19, 1886, ch. 115, 1886 Kan. Sess. Laws 154 (enacting a notice-posting statute,
making clear that as between appropriators, “the one first in time is the first in right.”).
162. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
163. Id. at 400.

30

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 57

groundwater.164 By 1944, it was clear that Kansas water law could neither fully
quantify the state’s total water rights, nor protect owners of individual surface
water rights against impairment caused by groundwater pumping.
These two decisions prompted a comprehensive review of Kansas water
law, which focused largely on these two issues: the problem of Kansas’s bifurcated
water law, which made it difficult to quantify available water supplies; and whether
groundwater was a public resource subject to appropriation and regulation under
the jurisdiction of the chief engineer.165 Kansas resolved both issues decisively in
1945 by enacting the Kansas Water Appropriation Act (KWAA).166 The KWAA
dedicated all of the waters of Kansas, including groundwater, to the people of the
state, subject to prior appropriation as enforced by the chief engineer.167 A central
tenet of the KWAA is a basic rule of prior appropriation: if a junior water right
impaired a senior right by affecting its access to or use of water, the chief engineer
had the statutory duty to administer, or curtail, the use made under the junior
right.168
The groundwater revolution soon forced this basic and decisive rule to
yield to a compromise. Like their neighbors in Colorado, Kansas policy makers
recognized that the widespread pumping of Ogallala groundwater would soon
impair senior rights by lowering the water table, giving the holders of those rights
the power to invoke their priority, thus requiring the chief engineer to shut off
junior rights and prohibit further groundwater development.169 The economic
potential of the Ogallala Aquifer demanded that prior appropriation be
compromised, and so the Kansas Legislature redefined impairment accordingly. In
1957, the hard hydrological definition of impairment gave way to a softer
economic one: applications for junior rights could henceforth be granted even if the
use of those junior rights reduced groundwater levels, so long as the reduction did
not go “beyond a reasonable economic limit.”170 Yet in the same session, the

164. See State ex rel. Peterson v. Kan. State Bd. of Agric., 149 P.2d 604 (Kan. 1944) (holding that
no statute authorizes the Division of Water Resources to regulate, allocate, distribute, or otherwise
interfere with the use and consumption of underground waters).
165. See generally Henry S. Buzick, Jr. et al., The Appropriation of Water for Beneficial Purposes,
37 J. OF THE AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 601 (1945).
166. Kansas Water Appropriation Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 to 745 (2015). For discussions
of the act, see John C. Peck, The Kansas Water Appropriation Act: A Fifty Year Perspective, 43 KAN. L.
REV. 735–56 (1995); Burke W. Griggs, Beyond Drought: Water Rights in the Age of Permanent
Depletion, 62 KAN. L. REV. 1263–1324 (2014).
167. Act of Mar. 26, 1945, ch. 390, § 6, 1945 Kan. Sess. Laws 665, 666 (codified at KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 82a-706 (2015)).
168. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-706b (2015).
169. KAN. WATER RES. BD., REPORT ON THE LAWS OF KANSAS PERTAINING TO THE BENEFICIAL
USE OF WATER 91 (1956).
170. Act of Apr. 8, 1957, ch. 539, § 16, 1957, Kan. Sess. Laws 1075, 1080 (codified at KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 82a-711 (2015)); compare the original KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711, which required the chief
engineer to reject a water-rights application if “the water sought to be appropriated would impair vested
rights, prior appropriations, or be detrimental to the public interest”. See Act of Mar. 26, 1945, ch. 390,
§ 11, 1945 Kan. Sess. Laws 665, 668. However, while the Kansas Legislature softened the standard for
granting new water rights applications, it is important to note that the KWAA retains the original 1945
standard for protecting senior water rights from impairment by junior rights during times of
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legislature also boosted the legal status of a water right, defining it explicitly as a
real property right.171
These amendments, together with a liberal policy of granting water rights
applications, resulted in a massive—but fully legal—overappropriation of Ogallala
groundwater in Kansas.172 People did not seem to mind. Even Kansas chief
engineer Guy Gibson believed that “water rights were like belly buttons: everyone
ought to have one.”173 Groundwater levels across the Great Plains of Kansas began
to decline as a consequence, creating something of a paradox: groundwater
pumpers gained the legal right to permanently diminish the Ogallala, even as that
property right explicitly attained the legal status of permanence.
As for Nebraska, groundwater had never been considered a statewide
public resource, so fewer adjustments were necessary to accommodate the
groundwater revolution. Although it enshrined prior appropriation in its state
constitution, Nebraska never extended that doctrine to groundwater, which it
regulated instead by the doctrine of reasonable use.174 Alongside this legal and
doctrinal distinction between surface water and groundwater was a jurisdictional
one: Nebraska has always maintained that local governments should exclusively
regulate groundwater supplies.175
The legal and jurisdictional gap between surface water and groundwater in
Nebraska is intentional and longstanding. As John Riddell, a Nebraska assistant
attorney general, told his Kansas colleagues in 1944, “As to ground water,
practically speaking, we do not have any law. There is no question but what in the
future something will have to be done about that, probably the sooner the better.”176
Later statutes have clearly stated that groundwater is connected to surface water,
but the Nebraska Supreme Court has consistently refused to protect the holders of
senior surface water rights from impairment by groundwater pumpers according to
the priority doctrine.177
administration: see KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-717a, 82a-716. The distinction is articulated well in
Garetson Bros. v. Am. Warrior, Inc., 347 P.3d 687 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015).
171. Act of Apr. 8, 1957, ch. 539, § 1, 1957 Kan. Sess. Laws 1075 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §
82a-701(g) (2015)).
172. Water-rights applications under the original KWAA numbered just 334 between 1945 and
1950. By contrast, the Kansas Division of Water Resources recorded 5,730 applications during the
1950s, 6,433 during the 1960s, and 16,226 in the 1970s, mostly for irrigation rights from the Ogallala
Aquifer in western Kansas. John C. Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas: A Brief History and
Assessment, 15 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 443 (2006).
173. Letter from Scott Ross, Water Comm’r of the Kan. Div. of Water Res., to author (Aug. 14,
2012) (on file with author).
174. See Osterman v. Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 268 N.W. 334 (Neb. 1936); In re
Metro. Util. Dist. of Omaha, 140 N.W.2d 626, 637 (Neb. 1966). For recent misgivings expressed by the
Nebraska Supreme Court on this issue, see Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005).
175. See infra text accompanying notes 189–191.
176. Transcript of Remarks of John Riddell, Neb. Assistant Attorney Gen., at Conference of the
Governor’s Committee on the Appropriation of Water in Kansas, Topeka, October 16–17 1944, at 95
(1944) (on file with author).
177. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-703(1) to (4) (2004); see, e.g., Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d
116, 126–27 (Neb. 2005); In re Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 699 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Neb.
2005); Cent’l Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist. v. North Platte Nat. Res., 788 N.W.2d 252, 261 (Neb.
2011).
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C. Local Publics and the Creed of Local Control
The second change wrought by the groundwater revolution was political.
If groundwater was not a statewide public resource, who should exercise
jurisdiction over it? State legislatures answered this question largely by delegating
jurisdiction to local districts or by enhancing the powers of existing ones. In so
doing, they created a new type of water-related public, one that placed the local
economic benefits of groundwater irrigation above concerns about the
sustainability of supplies. Where Reclamation had stressed basin-wide planning
and federal involvement, local control became the creed of groundwater irrigators
across the Great Plains.
Colorado has delegated the control of designated groundwater to local
irrigators. While a state agency, the Colorado Ground Water Commission, issues
well permits, it is dominated by “resident agriculturists” who live in the designated
basins.178 The power really rests in local groundwater-management districts, which
can “exercise all regulatory and administrative authority” over irrigation wells.179
And in the event that a well owner places a priority call against others in his waterrights neighborhood, neither the commission nor the state engineer can administer
those rights; instead, the Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that the local
groundwater-management district must do the job.180 The implication of this
decision is clear: when enforcing priorities—typically the job of the state
engineer—is most at issue, local control is exclusive. That is in marked contrast to
the long-established system for surface-water and tributary groundwater, which
makes no local compromises.181
Despite its central state control over groundwater, Kansas also created
local groundwater districts. After a false start in 1968, Kansas enacted the
Groundwater Management District Act in 1972.182 This legislation sought to
establish some local control over regulating and developing groundwater rights by
forming local groundwater-management districts, or GMDs.183 Five GMDs were
formed in western Kansas, overlying the state’s Ogallala supplies. They can assess
taxes on their membership, which is limited to landowners and holders of
groundwater rights.184
Allied with farm and agribusiness interests that support groundwater
pumping at its current levels, Kansas GMDs have become a powerful force in state
water politics, one that the chief engineer must reckon with on a regular basis.185 In
178. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-109 to 143 (2016); see also id. § 37-90-104(3)(b). The
state engineer is the executive director of the commission. See id. § 37-90-104(6).
179. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-111.5, -130(2)(j).
180. Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993 P.2d 1177, 1186 (Colo.
2000).
181. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301 (2016).
182. Act of Mar. 20, 1968, ch. 403, 1968 Kan. Sess. Laws 827-36, repealed by Act of Mar. 17, 1972,
ch. 386, §§ 1–16, 1972 Kan. Sess. Laws 1416-30 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1020 to 1042
(2015)).
183. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1020.
184. See id. § 82a-1030.
185. Kansas is the only state where the Division of Water Resources is under the Department of
Agriculture, a situation that compounds the problem. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-506a (2015). Some of
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partnership with the chief engineer, they have established well-spacing rules and
closed large areas to new water rights, largely to protect current levels of
groundwater pumping under existing water rights. However, the problem of overappropriation remains, while the regional impairment of wells is getting worse.186
In response to these concerns, local GMDs led a successful effort to
amend the GMD Act in 1978 to allow for intensive groundwater-use control areas,
or IGUCAs. This amendment was intended to enable local irrigators to take the
lead in reducing groundwater depletion by convincing the chief engineer to reduce
pumping, even to sustainable levels, and even if these cutbacks conflicted with
prior appropriation by reducing senior as well as junior rights.187 Across western
Kansas, GMDs and the chief engineer have established eight IGUCAs, reducing
water rights to restore balance to closely connected surface-water and groundwater
supplies. But above the mostly nonrenewable supplies of the Ogallala farther west,
the tool has proven to be too powerful to use. Neither the GMDs nor the chief
engineer have sought to establish any IGUCAs in these areas, where the hardest
depletion problems exist.188
The absence of an IGUCA over the nonrenewable supplies of the Ogallala
Aquifer reveals the irony of local control in Kansas. The GMD Act gave local
districts substantial power to reduce groundwater depletion, but by choosing not to
exercise that power, the GMDs have effectively returned it to the chief engineer,
whose power and duties regarding an IGUCA arouse suspicion from local
irrigators. If the chief engineer began proceedings to establish an IGUCA over the
Ogallala Aquifer on his own, the GMDs would almost certainly oppose him.
Because Nebraska has never claimed central authority over regulating
groundwater, the state has never needed to delegate that authority; local control of
groundwater has always been the law. While the Nebraska Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) controls surface water and water rights, groundwater is governed
by a different set of laws, which are administered by natural resource districts
(NRDs), which are large, multi-county state subdivisions.189 As Nebraska law
states, “Local entities are the preferred regulators of activities which may
contribute to ground water depletion.”190 The growth in groundwater irrigation in

the most important decisions of the chief engineer, a classified employee under Kansas civil-service
laws, are subject to review by the secretary of agriculture, a political appointee. Id. § 82a-1901(a)
(2015).
186. See Michael K. Ramsey, Kansas Groundwater Management Districts: A Lawyer’s Perspective,
15 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 522 (2006).
187. See Act of Apr. 14, 1978, ch. 437, §§ 2, 4, 1978 Kan. Sess. Laws 1713, 1715–16 (codified as
amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1036, -1038 (2015)); see also Leland E. Rolfs, Comparing and
Contrasting the Roles of the Division of Water Resources and the Groundwater Management Districts
in Groundwater Management and Regulation, 15 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 505, 505–09 (2006).
188. For a summary of Kansas IGUCAs, see Intensive Groundwater Use Control Areas (IGUCAs),
KAN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansas-waterresources/intensive-groundwater-use-control-areas [https://perma.cc/8NFN-S9AM].
189. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 61-206(1) (2009): “The Department of Natural Resources is given
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to water rights for irrigation, power, or other useful purposes
except as such jurisdiction is specifically limited by statute.” For the NRDs, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 23213(1) (2007).
190. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-702 (2011).
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Nebraska has brought a commensurate increase in the power of the NRDs. Each
NRD has its own taxing authority and grants, administers, and regulates
groundwater permits. State involvement in groundwater regulation depends on
local NRD approval of state policies through local rules and regulations.191 As a
result, the managers of the local NRDs collectively exert much more power over
irrigation than does the DNR.
D. The Political Culture of Groundwater Irrigation Communities
Groundwater irrigation appeals to farmers because it enables them to
access water without expensive dams and canals and without federal intervention
and regulation.192 Across the Great Plains, the groundwater revolution produced
irrigation communities that are markedly distinct from their surface-water
counterparts. Regardless of the different state water codes under which they
operate, these communities have secured substantial local control over
groundwater. They have generated a distinct political culture that is inextricable
from groundwater itself. That culture has five principal characteristics.
The first and most important characteristic is their economic dominance.
For example, since 1970, the amount of surface-water-irrigated acreage in
Nebraska has remained relatively constant at roughly 1 million acres; by contrast,
groundwater irrigation in the state expanded from about 500,000 acres in 1950 to 7
million in 1990.193 Because irrigated agriculture is far more productive than
dryland farming, it yields greater secondary economic benefits. The expansion in
groundwater-irrigated acreage has generated economic growth in industries which
supply irrigators with capital, insurance, irrigation-related farm machinery, seed,
chemicals, and power for the pumps. Most of these suppliers have an economic
interest in continuing groundwater irrigation at maximum levels, even if it reduces
the long-term water supply beneath the irrigators’ land.
Second, groundwater irrigation communities are more dispersed than
surface-water ones. Where a surface-water community is necessarily organized
around the structures of the irrigation project and its limitations, groundwater
communities have no such constraints. There is no common water storage or
delivery system, so groundwater irrigation communities lack the corporate structure
and operation of their surface-water counterparts. Most farmers in surface-water
irrigation communities receive the same allotment of water per acre as their
neighbors. By contrast, groundwater supplies on the Great Plains are highly
variable. Some irrigators in southwestern Kansas have enough groundwater to
enable them to pump eighteen inches of water per acre every year for a hundred
years, while others nearby may be struggling to irrigate fully now and may be out
of water in ten years.194
So groundwater irrigation communities are not as physically recognizable
as surface-water ones. They are communities of atomized individual irrigators:
191. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 2-3201 to 32,115 (2014).
192. AUCOIN, supra note 150, at 36.
193. Vincent H. Dreeszen, Water Availability and Use, in FLAT WATER, supra note 84, at 82.
194. See High Plains Aquifer Interactive Atlas, KAN. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://www.kgs.ku.edu/
HighPlains/HPA_Atlas/InteractiveAtlas.html (last accessed Jan. 29, 2017).
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while their farms may lack a common physical connection to the water supply, they
share a common orientation to the regulatory structures that control that supply.
Groundwater irrigation communities are thus more abstract than surface-water
ones, but they are no less real; indeed, they are ably represented by their
groundwater districts.
Third, groundwater irrigation communities are comparatively
impermanent and mobile. Surface-water power and irrigation projects, especially
Reclamation projects, are capital-intensive and designed to be permanent—to
“endure as long as time endures.”195 While the investment required for groundwater
irrigation is substantial, it is relatively inexpensive compared to surface-water
irrigation, and the equipment is depreciable as a capital expense. If conditions
change, the irrigator can move that equipment to another tract or sell the
equipment. Major groundwater irrigators such as dairies and feedlots have moved
during the last several decades in response to changes in groundwater levels and
regulations.196
Yet groundwater irrigation communities are also strongly marked by a
fourth characteristic—their close connection to their local economies and markets.
In Kansas at least, the power of these local economies and markets helps explain
their communities’ quiescent approach to prior appropriation. Senior water-rights
holders can protect themselves by requesting that the chief engineer administer
junior water rights, but groundwater irrigation communities in Kansas have not
behaved according to the administrative assumptions of prior appropriation. As
individuals, farmers with senior groundwater rights have generally refrained from
making calls to protect their wells against impairment by nearby junior wells.197 As
communities, they have long pursued a deliberate policy of inaction to avoid the
consequences of reducing junior groundwater rights.
This action may seem economically irrational over the long term, but there
are good reasons for it. It can be much more complicated to identify well-to-well
impairment in a groundwater-dominated system than in a surface-water one.198
Regarding new applications for groundwater rights or changes to existing ones, is
the impairment beyond a reasonable economic limit?199 Answering this question
requires time and analysis. The administration of prior appropriation rights in a
surface-water system has immediate and predictable consequences; but in a
groundwater system, especially one such as the Ogallala Aquifer, the effects of
administration are delayed and uncertain, and can be too wide-ranging and
draconian for many groundwater irrigators to consider. Making a groundwater call
can also have greater impact than making a surface-water one: largely because the
water-rights neighborhoods across the Ogallala Aquifer are severely overappropriated, protecting a senior groundwater right at its fully authorized quantity
may require many nearby junior rights to be shut down for a long time.
Groundwater irrigation communities in Kansas are acutely aware of this potential
195. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 132, at 9.
196. Dairies are a good example of the mobility of groundwater irrigators. See WILLIAM
ASHWORTH, OGALLALA BLUE: WATER AND LIFE ON THE HIGH PLAINS 58–60 (2006).
197. Griggs, supra note 166, at 1299–1300.
198. See KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-4-1, 5-4-1a (2010).
199. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-711, 82a-708b (2014).

36

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 57

consequence, and so few major irrigators have filed impairment complaints with
the chief engineer; even fewer have taken their neighbors to court.200
This collective and deliberate inaction is a tribute of sorts to groundwater
irrigation communities, but it also reveals the way their individually held water
rights relate to their local economic situation. A typical groundwater irrigator in
Kansas grows corn, soybeans, and grain sorghum and sells those crops to feedlots
and ethanol plants, which usually have substantial water rights of their own. Any
administrative or legal action that might recalibrate local groundwater rights
according to the actual (and declining) water supply threatens to upset this
economic system, treating its participants disproportionately according to the
priority of their water rights.201
This inaction also reveals the final characteristic of groundwater irrigation
communities: their wary attitude to classic western water law and regulation.
Surface-water irrigation communities tend to be legally conservative because their
senior water rights enjoy strong property-rights protections under state water law
and—where applicable—the Reclamation Act. Groundwater irrigation
communities do not generally enjoy this protection. And because administering
groundwater rights according to the prior appropriation doctrine may produce
unpredictable results, groundwater irrigation communities usually view water law
not as something that protects property rights, but rather as governmental
regulation that limits and interferes with their water use. Acting through their
groundwater districts, they have significantly curtailed the influence of state
engineers and the prior appropriation doctrine.
And where surface-water irrigation communities prize their valuable
senior rights during water shortages, groundwater communities typically stress the
need to treat all groundwater irrigators equally to reduce water use.202 Indeed, many
groundwater irrigators have argued to abandon prior appropriation altogether by
comparing groundwater to any other mineral resource that should be mined without
regard to sustainability. One hundred and sixty years after California blessed the
analogy of mining customs to water use, these irrigators have forced that analogy to
its logical extreme: no one in his or her right mind keeps gold in the ground.

200. Griggs, supra note 166, at 1299–1300 (reporting just 16 impairment claims filed in Kansas
between 2006 and 2008, out of approximately 40,000 groundwater rights). A recent Kansas Court of
Appeals decision, Garetson Bros. v. Am. Warrior, Inc., 347 P.3d 687 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015), upheld a
senior groundwater right holder’s injunction against a junior groundwater right. The case is notable as
the first reported decision concerning a senior groundwater pumper’s right to enjoin junior rights which
are impairing the senior right, pursuant to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-717a (2016).
201. Indeed, that is a powerful disincentive for considering a groundwater adjudication across the
Ogallala. See Griggs, General Stream Adjudications as a Property and Regulatory Model for the
Ogallala Aquifer, 15 WYO. L. REV. 413, 428–29 (2015).
202. See DIV. OF WATER RES., KAN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ORDER OF DESIGNATION APPROVING THE
SHERIDAN 6 LOCAL ENHANCED MANAGEMENT AREA WITHIN GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT
NO. 4, 17–18 (2013), http://www.gmd4.org/SD6/SD6-Order-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4Z5-KL34].

Winter 2017

POLITICAL CULTURES OF IRRIGATION

37

III. THE COLLISION OF POLITICAL CULTURES IN THE
REPLUBLICAN RIVER BASIN
The overdevelopment of groundwater across the Great Plains began to
reduce the region’s stream and river flows as early as the 1960s.203 By the 1980s,
interstate conflicts over these declining river systems started to reach the Supreme
Court, which decides interstate disputes.204 Texas sued New Mexico over the Pecos
River, and Kansas sued Colorado over the Arkansas.205 These lawsuits followed the
typical pattern of interstate water litigation: the downstream state sues the upstream
state (or states), alleging that excessive upstream use, usually caused by underregulated groundwater pumping, is violating its rights by depleting supplies
downstream.
A. The Conflict on the Surface
The fight over the Republican River Basin is no exception. It began with
excessive groundwater development. By the end of the 1970s, Colorado and
Kansas had responded to groundwater declines by closing their portions of the
Basin to new wells, limiting their number to about 4,000 in each state. By contrast,
Nebraska did not impose restrictions. As a result, the number of wells in Nebraska
increased by more than 50 percent, from around twelve thousand to more than
eighteen thousand, and irrigated acreage increased even more.206 This increased
pumping intercepted groundwater base flows that would have otherwise supported
the surface waters of the Basin. Inflows to the tributaries and mainstem of the river,
as well as lakes and reservoirs, declined accordingly. Figure 2 shows how this
increase in irrigated acreage and groundwater pumping caused a drop in the Basin’s
largest reservoir, Harlan County Lake, which supplies water to irrigators in the
Nebraska Bostwick Irrigation District (NBID) and KBID.
While inflows can vary according to annual fluctuations in precipitation,
the overall trend is undeniable: the increase in groundwater pumping beyond
sustainable levels produced a significant decline in both surface flows and
groundwater levels in Nebraska’s portion of the Basin. In Perkins, Chase, and
Dundy Counties, groundwater levels have fallen more than fifty feet.207

203. By 2009, groundwater pumping had dried up most of the previously perennial streams of
Kansas west of the hundredth meridian. Kansas Geological Survey, supra note 18.
204. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (placing original jurisdiction over
interstate disputes with the Supreme Court of the United States).
205. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983); Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001).
Texas v. New Mexico, No. 65 Orig. (1974–89), contested New Mexico’s violations of the Pecos River
Compact, while Kansas v. Colorado, No. 105 Orig. (1984–2009), contested Colorado’s violations of the
Arkansas River Compact. For an excellent account of the Pecos River litigation, see G. EMLEN HALL,
HIGH AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE FOR THE PECOS RIVER (2002).
206. See Final Report, supra note 37, at 18.
207. See Predevelopment to Spring 2015, GROUNDWATER-LEVEL CHANGES IN NEB. ARCHIVE,
http://snr.unl.edu/csd-esic/GWMapArchives/2015GWMaps/Pred_Spr2015.jpg [https://perma.cc/6AJFSZBY].
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Figure 2
The declines in reservoir inflows reached a critical point during the 1990s.
In 1998, Kansas sued, alleging that groundwater pumping in Nebraska had
deprived Kansas of the water to which it was entitled under the Compact.208 The
Compact, however, contained a problem: enacted decades before groundwater
pumping became significant, it did not mention groundwater. The Compact refers
neither to “surface water” nor to “groundwater,” but rather allocates the “virgin
water supply,” which is defined as “the water supply within the Basin undepleted
by the activities of man.”209 As a threshold issue, then, was groundwater even
included in the Compact’s allocation of the Basin’s water supply? Kansas alleged
that Nebraska’s many thousands of wells in the Republican River Basin and its
failure to protect surface flows had caused Nebraska to appropriate far more of the
“virgin water supply” of the Basin than the Compact allocated to Nebraska.210 Both
Nebraska and Colorado presented legal defenses which largely conformed to their
respective state water laws. Nebraska asserted that the Compact did not restrict
groundwater pumping, because it did not mention groundwater.211 Colorado
claimed that the Compact at most included alluvial groundwater, but excluded
Ogallala groundwater—a position consistent with Colorado’s statutory distinction
208. Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, Kansas v. Nebraska, 525 U.S. 1101 (May 1998)
(No. 126, Orig.). Kansas’s lawsuit was directed at Nebraska, but because Colorado is a party to the
Compact, it was necessary to include Colorado in the case.
209. Republican River Compact, ch. 104, art. II, 57 Stat. 86, 87 (1943).
210. See First Report of the Special Master, supra note 24, at 23–31.
211. Id. at 21.
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between tributary and non-tributary groundwater.212 The court ruled mostly for
Kansas on this issue, deciding that the Compact required an accounting of
groundwater pumping that caused depletions to the river’s flows.213 Following that
threshold decision, the states began to negotiate the remaining issues in the case.
These negotiations produced a comprehensive settlement agreement, the
Final Settlement Stipulation of 2002 (FSS). The FSS formally integrated the
Basin’s groundwater supplies within the allocations of the Compact. Through the
FSS, the states imposed a general moratorium on additional wells within the
Basin.214 They established accounting procedures to calculate groundwater
consumption according to the states’ respective Compact allocations.215 Assisted by
the United States Geological Survey as well as Reclamation, they produced a
computer groundwater model, the Republican River Compact Administration
Groundwater Model (RRCA Model), which estimates the impact of groundwater
pumping on streamflows across the Basin.216 The Court trumpeted this technically
intensive, negotiated settlement as superior to any result that litigation could have
produced.217 Interstate cooperation had apparently produced that rarest of things:
interstate comity, the Panglossian goal of every water compact.218
Yet despite the lawsuit, the Court’s approval of the FSS, and the FSS
itself, Nebraska did not reduce its groundwater pumping in the Basin. As Figure 2
reveals, Nebraska continued to increase its irrigated acreage even after the FSS was
signed in 2002. Dry years returned to the Basin, groundwater irrigators
compensated for drought by increasing their pumping, and Nebraska again violated
the Compact. In 2005 and 2006, Nebraska overused its allocations by more than
35,000 acre-feet per year.219 As a result, Kansas alleged, the long-term depletions
to surface-water supplies caused by groundwater pumping continued to increase in
both Nebraska and Kansas.220
In 2010, Kansas returned to the Court to enforce the Compact and the
FSS, seeking a combination of legal and equitable remedies.221 It sought monetary
damages to compensate Kansas for its losses for Nebraska’s 2005–2006
noncompliance.222 Alternatively, Kansas asked the Court to order the disgorgement
of Nebraska’s gains from that noncompliance. Nebraska’s sustained overpumping
of groundwater upstream in the Basin had created long-term depletions to
streamflows, exacerbating transit losses on streams and creating lagged depletions
212. Id. at 42; for the Colorado distinction, see supra text accompanying notes 155–159.
213. Second Report of the Special Master at 36, Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (Apr. 16, 2003)
(No. 126, Orig.); Kansas v. Nebraska, 530 U.S. 1272 (2000) (denying Nebraska’s motion to dismiss).
214. Final Settlement Stipulation, supra note 22, at 9–11.
215. Id. at 17-25, C1-C114.
216. Final Report, supra note 37, at, at 6, 10–52.
217. Second Report of the Special Master, supra note 213, at 73–77.
218. Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (2003) (approving the Final Settlement Stipulation).
219. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S.Ct. 1042, 1053 (2015) (revolving around a dispute of 70,869 acrefeet over the 2005–2006 period).
220. Kansas Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Petition, Petition, and Brief in Support at
6-11, Kansas v. Nebraska, 562 U.S. 820 (May 3, 2010) (No. 126, Orig.) [hereinafter Kansas Motion for
Leave].
221. Id. at 11–13.
222. Id. This remedy was established in Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 8, 20 (2001).
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in groundwater baseflow.223 Because these losses accumulate over time, Nebraska’s
overuse exceeded Kansas’s water shortage; as a consequence, Nebraska’s financial
gains were “very much larger than Kansas’s loss, likely by several multiples.”224
After the settlement of the first round of litigation in 1998–2003, Nebraska fully
understood these impacts, but failed to take adequate steps to insure against
noncompliance.225 As Special Master William J. Kayatta Jr. concluded, “Nebraska
hoped to comply, but knowingly failed.”226 He found that a partial disgorgement of
Nebraska’s gains was an appropriate remedy for the noncompliant years of 2005–
2006, the only years at issue in the case; however, if Nebraska failed to comply in
the future, it could be forced to disgorge all of its profits gained by
noncompliance.227 The Court approved the Special Master’s recommendation,
finding that Nebraska had “recklessly gambled with Kansas’s rights” and should
therefore pay $5.5 million in damages and disgorgement accordingly.228 The Court
put Nebraska on notice that if it were to relapse again into noncompliance, it “may
again be subject to disgorgement gains—either in part or in full, as the equities
warrant.”229 The Court’s award of disgorgement gains established a landmark
precedent in the history of interstate water litigation, one that other states are
already seeking to exploit.230
Kansas also sought a dramatic equitable remedy: the reduction of 170,000
acres of groundwater pumping within Nebraska’s portion of the Basin.231
According to Kansas’s chief engineer, this was the minimum amount of retirement
necessary to restore hydrological balance to an over-pumped and over-stressed
groundwater system.232 Such a remedy would interfere substantially with
Nebraska’s longstanding plan to comply with the Compact through a series of
Integrated Management Plans (IMPs).233 The IMP’s provide an interlocal
mechanism between Nebraska’s NRD’s, which exercise local control over
groundwater pumping, and Nebraska DNR, which exercises centralized control
over surface water rights.234 Nebraska has also enacted statutes defining the terms
“over-appropriated” and “fully appropriated” for its compacted river basins, with
corresponding regulatory requirements.235 Neither the Special Master nor the Court
adopted this remedy: they did not intervene to change Nebraska’s compliance
223. Report of the Special Master at 106, Kansas v. Nebraska, 134 S.Ct. 981 (Nov. 15, 2013) (No.
126, Orig.).
224. Id. at 178.
225. See id. at 106–12.
226. Id. at 112.
227. See id. at 103–87.
228. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S.Ct. 1042, 1056–58 (2015).
229. Id. at 1059.
230. The State of Mississippi’s Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint in Original Action,
Complaint, and Brief in Support of Motion at 21, ¶ 55, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S.Ct. 2916 (June
16, 2014) (No. 143, Orig.).
231. Kansas Motion for Leave, supra note 220, at 12; id. at C1-C10 (offering a statement by Kansas
Chief Engineer David W. Barfield).
232. Id. at C10.
233. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-715(1) (2011); see also infra text accompanying notes 236–244.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 189–191 supra.
235. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-713(3), -713(4)(a) (2011).
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policy. The IMP’s survived Kansas’s attack, largely because the Court was
satisfied with these statutory changes; the Court was convinced that Nebraska had
“significantly restructured its regulation of groundwater pumping.”236
B. The Deeper Conflict over Future Compliance
Will Kansas’s legal victory be enough to protect its portion of the Basin’s
water supplies? While the Supreme Court awarded monetary damages to Kansas
and threatened Nebraska with disgorgement in the future, it did not overrule
Nebraska law and order reductions in the state’s groundwater pumping. (On the
contrary, it allowed Nebraska’s groundwater pumping to increase.237) The Court
may have just postponed the interstate legal fight for another day, allowing
Nebraska (and Colorado) to figure out how best to comply with the Compact in the
meantime.
The fight is by no means over; the decision has highlighted the issue of
future compliance. Colorado and Nebraska, where groundwater interests dominate
their portions of the Basin, have devised Compact compliance plans that protect
their current groundwater pumping levels by shifting the burden of compliance to
surface-water irrigation projects. In Nebraska, surface-water irrigation communities
have sued their parent state in state and federal court, sought help from
Reclamation, and even assisted the state of Kansas to obtain protection from these
compliance plans.238
The interstate legal fight over the future of the Republican River has thus
generated a series of proxy wars between surface-water and groundwater irrigation
communities within Nebraska. And due to the dominance of groundwater interests
there, the future probably holds a paradoxical end, where legal compliance with the
Compact comes at the expense of the river itself and the surface-water communities
that depend upon it. This is not what the Compact’s framers intended; they believed
emphatically in a perpetual river with secure surface water supplies.239
236. Report of the Special Master, supra note 223, at 112–19.
237. Nebraska secured an important victory in the case. It based much of its counterclaim on the
assertion that the RRCA Accounting Procedures contained an error which the Court should correct.
Specifically, Nebraska alleged that the procedures erred by counting certain return flows from irrigation
in the Platte River Basin, flows which cross the hydrological divide and seep as baseflow into the
Republican River Basin, as part of the Republican River Compact’s “virgin water supply.” The Court
accepted this argument, and accordingly ordered an alteration in the accounting procedures it had
previously approved by decree in 2003, thereby lessening the compliance burden on Nebraska. See
Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S.Ct. 1042, 1059–64 (2015). The issue of whether the Court could order the
modification of the FSS and its Accounting Procedures produced a deeply divided set of opinions. Id. at
1064 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts joined Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito in this
regard, who stressed that the States did not make a mistake in the accounting procedures, and so the
contract remedy of reformation was not available; indeed, the “terms of the Settlement are thus crystal
clear. . . . “ Id. at 1071 (Thomas, J., dissenting). “If there is any mistake in this Settlement [the FSS], it is
not a mistake in writing, but in thinking. The parties knew what the methodology was and they
expressly agreed to that methodology. They simply thought the methodology would work better than it
did. Even though the methodology they agreed upon was imperfect, a writing may be reformed only to
conform with the parties’ actual agreement, not to create a better one.” Id. at 1072.
238. See infra text accompanying notes 268–273, 369–394.
239. Republican River Compact, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86–87 (1943); see supra text accompanying notes
127–139.
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Both Colorado and Nebraska have struggled to comply with the Compact
because their excessive groundwater pumping has depleted surface flows and
groundwater baseflows across their portions of the Basin. To achieve compliance
over the long term, these states have a choice. They can reduce groundwater
pumping to correct this hydrologic imbalance, but that option will significantly
reduce the amount of acreage irrigated by groundwater. Instead, they have chosen a
more complicated option that is engineered to protect groundwater pumping from
forced reductions. This option obtains the water necessary for Compact compliance
from elsewhere: by sacrificing water supplies devoted to surface-water rights, and
by pumping distant groundwater and then piping that water directly into the
river.240
Nebraska’s approach to compliance lies in its IMPs.241 While these plans
involve coordinating Nebraska’s segregated laws for surface water and
groundwater, that coordination remains largely under local control.242 As a result,
the IMPs have not seriously addressed the problem of excessive pumping. While
they do include provisions that plan to reduce groundwater pumping from peak
levels, and require pumping reductions as a last resort, in practice they have
sacrificed surface-water supplies when water has run short.243 In dry years, when
Nebraska needs to reduce water use, the IMPs have effectively required that all
surface-water rights in the Basin be administered before shutting off any
groundwater wells.244
During the water-short years of 2013 and 2014, that is just what Nebraska
did. Rather than reduce groundwater pumping, the Nebraska DNR issued closing
notices for all surface-water rights in Nebraska’s portion of the Basin, including
those held by Reclamation projects.245 These projects went without water for much
of 2013 and 2014, while Nebraska groundwater irrigators did not suffer pumping
reductions. In the name of integrated water management, Nebraska has chosen to
sacrifice its surface rights.246
This choice reveals the stark power divide in Nebraska water law. While
Nebraska DNR has the legal duty to protect senior surface-water rights according

240. See infra text accompanying notes 249–264.
241. Because there are four NRD’s in Nebraska’s portion of the Republican River Basin, each NRD
has its own IMP, jointly developed with Nebraska DNR. The most recent IMP to be approved is that
between the Lower Republican NRD and Nebraska DNR. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., LOWER REPUBLICAN
NAT. RES. DIST., INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT PLAN (2016) [hereinafter LRNRD Integrated
Management Plan], http://dnr.nebraska.gov/Media/iwm/republican/20151210_LRNRD_FInal_IMP.PDF
[https://perma.cc/EEU3-NUAH].
242. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-719 (2011).
243. While the IMP’s call for a 20 percent reduction in groundwater pumping, they use the pumping
volumes from 1998–2002 as the baseline—some of the highest on record. LRNRD Integrated
Management Plan, supra note 241, at 5–6.
244. Id. at 7–8.
245. NEB. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., IN THE MATTER OF WATER ADMINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLICAN
RIVER BASIN 2 (2013), http://dnr.ne.gov/republican-river-basin-compact-call-year-in-effect-2
[https://perma.cc/FFJ5-JRQQ]; NEB. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., IN THE MATTER OF WATER ADMINISTRATION
OF THE REPUBLICAN RIVER BASIN 2 (2014), http://dnr.nebraska.gov/orders-order-for-republican-rivercompact-call-year-2 [https://perma.cc/Z5YF-US86]. See also infra text accompanying notes 311-342.
246. See infra text accompanying notes 311-342.
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to the prior appropriation doctrine, neither that duty nor that doctrine extends to
groundwater. Because Nebraska DNR has no jurisdiction over groundwater
pumping, it cannot order the local NRDs to reduce pumping in dry years. As a
result, Nebraska’s principal response to the cause of its noncompliance with the
Compact—excessive groundwater pumping—is to shut down the very rights most
affected by that pumping—senior surface rights. The architects of the IMPs have
decided that cutting off senior water rights during shortages is preferable to
curtailing junior groundwater pumpers.
Nebraska has singled out surface-water rights because they fall under the
jurisdiction of the state through the DNR. As a result, in dry years, when the legal
protections afforded by the Compact matter most, the IMPs transform the
reservoirs of federal irrigation projects, such as the Frenchman-Cambridge
Irrigation District (FCID) and NBID, into little more than large holding ponds to
deliver water to Kansas.247 In late 2013, after holding unused water in Basin
reservoirs for nearly a year, the DNR ordered Reclamation to flush water out of
Harlan County Lake so it would flow down into Kansas to meet Nebraska’s
Compact requirements. The DNR ordered the release even though that water could
not be put to beneficial use in Nebraska or Kansas: irrigation season had ended
months earlier, and the flush drained water supplies that had been stored in 2013
for irrigation use during 2014.248 Groundwater irrigators, meanwhile, pumped
throughout the year at their usual levels. The DNR does not regulate them.
The power of Nebraska’s groundwater irrigation interests dwarfs that of
its surface-water irrigation projects.249 Groundwater irrigators have secured local
control through the NRDs; the NRDs have gained control over the IMPs; and the
IMPs protect groundwater pumping at the expense of surface-water irrigators.
Groundwater interests in Nebraska have exploited the legal segregation of surfacewater and groundwater to control the state’s Compact compliance strategy.
The IMPs clearly reflect the political realities of water in Nebraska. State
political leaders—governors, attorneys general, and directors of natural resource
agencies—are often tempted to disregard their compact obligations to other states,
rather than face the political consequence of making the unpopular decision to
reduce groundwater pumping.250 A state supreme court can also be a formidable
obstacle to state regulation of groundwater pumping; indeed, that is what has
sometimes happened in Colorado, despite its more sophisticated approach to
groundwater.251

247. LRNRD Integrated Management Plan, supra note 241, at 6–8.
248. NEB. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., NEBRASKA SENDS REPUBLICAN RIVER WATER DOWNSTREAM
AFTER KANSAS REJECTS DEAL TO AID ITS WATER USERS, (2013), http://dnr.nebraska.gov/Media/PDF/
NewsRelease20130503.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BME-AS9N].
249. See Dreeszen, supra note 193.
250. See, for example, the work of the incomparable Steve Reynolds, New Mexico state engineer.
HALL, HIGH AND DRY, supra note 205, at 108–29.
251. See First Report of the Special Master at 118–19, Kansas v. Colorado, No. 105, Orig., 1994 WL
16189353 (U.S. July 29, 1994). Colorado attempted in the 1960s to regulate groundwater pumping on
the Arkansas River, and the Colorado Supreme Court overcame and/or reversed these efforts. It took
Kansas’s lawsuit against Colorado to force the state either to curtail post-compact groundwater
development or replace the depletions caused by over-pumping. The fact that the waters of the Arkansas
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Groundwater interests in Colorado have taken major steps to eradicate
surface water irrigation from their portion of the Basin. Groundwater districts have
purchased surface water rights that once diverted water from the North Fork and
the South Fork of the Republican River and retired them permanently.252 Financed
by its own substantial irrigated land and water right assessments253 and assisted by
a low-interest loan from the State of Colorado, the Republican River Water
Conservation District (RRWCD) had spent around $51 million by 2011 to purchase
and retire water rights.254 On the South Fork, Colorado has taken a more dramatic
step by draining Bonny Reservoir, a Reclamation project where it holds all the
water rights. See Figure 3.
These surface-water rights are not connected to an irrigation project;
Reclamation conceived of one to operate in tandem with private ditches that
predated the reservoir, but never built it. Rather, the rights in Bonny are
recreational ones, dedicated to fishing, wildlife, and boating. Due to upstream
groundwater pumping, streamflow on the South Fork has been declining for
decades, reducing the level in the reservoir. By 2000, Colorado faced a choice with
Bonny: reduce upstream groundwater pumping to preserve and possibly restore it,
or drain it to free up water for groundwater pumping.255 By choosing the second
option, Colorado no longer suffers the evaporative and seepage losses that count
against its Compact allocations.
Subordinating surface-water supplies to groundwater pumping is the
necessary first step in these Compact compliance plans, but it is far from sufficient.
The second step consists of a series of “augmentation plans,” in which Colorado
and Nebraska have invested hundreds of millions. The augmentation plan
originated in Colorado, where it has become a popular water-management tool. It
enables junior groundwater pumpers to secure their water rights and keep pumping
during shortages as long as they have a legally binding plan to “augment” the water
supply—to provide substitute water to senior rights holders that are affected by outof-priority pumping.256 By the time the Compact was litigated in 1998,
augmentation plans had spread across Colorado’s eastern river basins. At a late
River Basin in Colorado are classified as tributary groundwater and thus within the jurisdiction of the
state engineer only emphasizes this point.
252. These include rights to the Pioneer Ditch on the North Fork and the Hale and Newton Ditches
on the South Fork. For the Pioneer Ditch, see supra note 141.
253. See Water Use Fees, REPUBLICAN RIVER WATER CONSERVATION DIST., http://www.republican
river.com/RRWCDInfo/WaterUseFees/tabid/105/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/DP67-KQ6Y]. The
annual assessment is $14.50/acre for land irrigated by groundwater.
254. MARTHA O. PAGEL, IN RE: NON-BINDING ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE FINAL
SETTLEMENT STIPULATION, KANSAS V. NEBRASKA AND COLORADO, NO. 126 COLORADO, COLORADO
COMPACT COMPLIANCE PIPELINE DISPUTE: ARBITRATOR’S FINAL DECISION 5 (2010) (summarizing
Colorado’s 2010 testimony about the costs of water rights retirements in its portion of the Republican
River Basin for the purposes of compact compliance).
255. See Deb Daniel, Compact Compliance Pipeline Dedicated, JULESBURG ADVOCATE (Sept. 6,
2012),
http://www.julesburgadvocate.com/ci_21482136/compact-compliance-pipeline-dedicated
[https://perma.cc/2GUN-KE88]. According to Mike King, executive director of the Colorado
Department of Natural Resources, draining Bonny Reservoir was the hardest choice he ever made. Id.
256. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-103(9) (2014); see also Cache La Poudre Water Users
Ass’n v. Glacier View Meadows, 550 P.2d 288, 293-94 (Colo. 1976); see also Kelly Ranch v. Se. Colo.
Water Conservancy Dist., 550 P.2d 297, 304 (Colo. 1976).
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point in the settlement negotiations, Colorado introduced the concept of
augmentation plans at the interstate level, and the RRCA agreed to allow them.257

Figure 3: The Draining of Bonny Reservoir, 2011
Photo by Author

257. Final Settlement Stipulation, supra note 22, at 15.
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Envisioned as a limited exception to the states’ moratorium on
groundwater development, augmentation plans are becoming the dominant tool by
which Colorado and Nebraska plan to comply with the Compact. These
augmentation projects pump groundwater from supplies that are hydrologically
more distant from the Republican River, such as the Ogallala Aquifer. Pumping
from these more distant sources creates a smaller effect on the Compact accounting
than pumping from wells closer to the river, such as alluvial wells. The projects
then pipe that groundwater to tributaries and dump it there, where it augments
streamflows. This artificial transportation of more distant groundwater
compensates for depletions to streamflow caused by groundwater pumping closer
to the tributaries and mainstem of the river, which has a correspondingly greater
effect on the Compact accounting. It is important to note that these plans do not
augment the water supply of the Basin; rather, they use low-impact groundwater
pumping (as determined by the RRCA accounting procedures and the RRCA
Model) to offset the effects of high-impact groundwater pumping (also as
determined by the same procedures and model).258 Put another way, interstate
augmentation plans solve the legal and accounting problem of a diminished river
by replumbing it—by connecting it to distant groundwater sources.
In the wake of the 1998–2003 litigation, Colorado established the
RRWCD, a local political entity with substantial powers and discretion in devising
means of complying with the Compact.259 The RRWCD includes several
groundwater-management districts, and contains nearly half a million irrigated
acres. Colorado then loaned the RRWCD millions of dollars at low interest rates to
develop a compliance plan. The RRWCD used $51 million to retire surface
rights.260 Next, it spent more than $20 million to build the Colorado Compact
Compliance Pipeline, or CCP. This project pumps as much as 25,000 acre-feet of
Ogallala Aquifer water annually from a battery of high-capacity wells, pipes it to a
point just west of the Nebraska border, and then dumps it into the North Fork
Republican River. As that water flows past the state line gage, it compensates for
Colorado’s groundwater overuse under the Compact. All told, the RRWCD has
spent nearly $100 million on the project, which should enable Colorado to comply
with the Compact while allowing most irrigators to maintain their groundwater
pumping at current levels.261
For the retained believers—the leaders of the RRWCD, their engineers,
their lawyers, and their state officials—the CCP is a clinical and perfectly legal
solution to an intractable problem: the limitations of the hydrologic cycle. These
experts point out the reality of accumulated groundwater depletions. Even if
Colorado stopped all groundwater pumping in its part of the Basin, it could not
comply with the Compact for decades without the CCP; the river system is that far

258. Final Settlement Stipulation, supra note 22, at 17–25, C1–C114; Final Report, supra note 37, at
App. A (RRCA Model DVD). The RRCA Model has been regularly updated since 2003, see
www.republicanrivercompact.org [https://perma.cc/CPF4-JMVU].
259. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-50-101 to 142 (2016).
260. See supra text accompanying note 254.
261. The Pipeline, REPUBLICAN RIVER WATER CONSERVATION DIST., http://www.republican
river.com/Pipeline/tabid/101/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/S8V4-J8LR].
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out of balance.262 The CCP may well provide its backers with more than a century
of water; time will tell. From a layman’s perspective, Colorado’s approach to
compliance may seem odd, and even upside-down. It drains a federal reservoir on
the South Fork, while pumping nonrenewable Colorado Ogallala groundwater into
a pipeline on the North Fork—so that Colorado can pump more groundwater. The
approach officially sanctions the dewatering of northeastern Colorado under the
legal cover of augmentation, ultimately replacing a real if struggling river with a
bad replica of one.
Yet the only perspective that really matters is local. In 2007, the Colorado
Division of Water Resources proposed draft rules requiring the curtailment of
groundwater wells in the RRWCD; these rules faced withering opposition and were
promptly and permanently shelved.263 Dennis Coryell, a leader and former
president of the RRWCD, speaks plainly about the interests and assumptions of his
groundwater irrigation community. “We were given two tasks. One was to assist
the State in reaching compact compliance. The other was to sustain the
agricultural-based economy in the Basin,” he said. Given those goals, the only
option was to drain Bonny and tap the Ogallala Aquifer. “No one wants to pump
our precious groundwater and send it down the river, but we have no other choice,”
he explained.264 For Coryell and his fellow groundwater irrigators, the
“agricultural-based economy” is the current situation of groundwater irrigation at
its present pumping levels; they are not inclined to acknowledge any other kind.
Reduced levels of groundwater irrigation are not politically possible given the
amount of irrigation water that corn requires in eastern Colorado. As long as corn is
king across the Ogallala Aquifer, neither sustainable irrigation levels nor dryland
farming will be an acceptable option.
And so Colorado had no other choice but to drain Bonny Reservoir, and
the RRWCD had no other choice but to build the CCP. These are not decisions
based on water supply. They are grounded in the economic expectations of
irrigated agriculture—rates of return, purchases of agricultural equipment and
supplies, and tax revenues, all which support a belief that the present value of
money exceeds the future value of water. Keep these expectations in mind, and the
CCP makes sense.
Where Colorado has concentrated its augmentation efforts on one large
pipeline, Nebraska has built two so far and may build more. The first pumps
between 15,000 and 20,000 acre-feet of Ogallala Aquifer water annually and pours
it into a dry streambed high on Rock Creek, a remote tributary of the Republican
River. From there the water seeps and flows into the main channel of the river
above Swanson Reservoir; whatever water enters the river from this pumping
project counts as a credit to Nebraska under the Compact.265

262. PAGEL, supra note 254, at 7.
263. Transcript of Testimony from Dennis Coryell, President, Republican River Water Conservation
Dist., at Non-Binding Arbitration pursuant to Final Settlement Stipulation, at 14–15, Kansas v.
Nebraska, 134 S.Ct. 981 (October 2, 2013) (No. 126, Orig.).
264. Daniel, supra note 255.
265. Water Begins Flowing in Rock Creek Augmentation Project, MCCOOK GAZETTE, Feb. 28,
2013, http://www.mccookgazette.com/story/1945715.html [https://perma.cc/SCB7-72PS].
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A second pipeline, the Nebraska Cooperative Republican-Platte
Enhancement Project, or N-CORPE, can pump 65,000 acre-feet of deep
groundwater every year from beneath the Platte and Republican River Basins to
meet the state’s multiple interstate obligations. On the Platte, the groundwater helps
ensure compliance with an interstate agreement with Wyoming, Colorado, and the
United States to protect endangered species by setting minimum instream flows.266
On the Republican, N-CORPE pours the pumped groundwater into Medicine
Creek, shoring up Nebraska’s accounting balance under the Compact.267 The Rock
Creek and N-CORPE projects pumped nearly 65,000 acre-feet of water into the
Republican River system in 2014.268
These projects are expensive, but they pay for themselves, because they
enable the augmenting states to keep pumping groundwater at present or nearpresent levels. N-CORPE cost approximately $130 million.269 Yet without it and
the Rock Creek Project, Nebraska’s compliance obligations would require the state
to force the retirement of approximately 330,000 acres in its portion of the Basin,
forcing farmers into dryland farming and causing a commensurate decline in
assessed land values of between $500 and $900 million.270
The impact of these augmentation plans has been substantial. With a
combined annual capacity of approximately 110,000 acre-feet, these three
augmentation plans can compensate for significant groundwater over-pumping in
Colorado and Nebraska under the Compact.271 Hydrologically, they rely upon and
deplete largely nonrenewable groundwater; ironically, they cause their own,
additional depletions to streamflows, which in turn must also be offset under the
Compact accounting.272 These hydrological facts aside, augmentation plans have
already made a significant impact on the way in which states manage their
Compact allocations. Unlike delivery compacts such as the Colorado River

266. See PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, https://www.platteriver
program.org [https://perma.cc/5XAQ-E7RR].
267. See About N-Corpe, N-CORPE, www.ncorpe.org/about [https://perma.cc/SEH2-E2BS].
268. See Russ Pankonin, Augmentation Pumping from Lincoln County Project Complete, IMPERIAL
REPUBLICAN, Apr. 9, 2015, at 1 (noting that more than 20,000 acre-feet were pumped from the Rock
Creek project in 2014); Kamie Stephen, N-CORPE Ceases Republican River Compliance, NORTH
PLATTE TELEGRAPH, (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nptelegraph.com/news/local_news/n-corpe-ceasesrepublican-river-compliance/article_036cd71f-bb18-5c85-883a-f98e3506d3d8.html [https://perma.cc/
85JK-BY3L] (noting more than 42,000 acre-feet were pumped from the N-CORPE project in 2014). NCORPE pumped approximately 45,000 acre-feet in 2014. Hearing on L.R. 323 Before the Nat. Res.
Comm., 2015 Leg., 104th Sess. 3-5 (Neb. 2015) (statement of Senator Mike Groene). For more
information on the N-CORPE project, see http://www.ncorpe.org [https://perma.cc/9HAS-DCW6].
269. See Republican River Compact Arbitration, Direct Testimony of Dr. Jasper E. Fanning Re: NCORPE Augmentation Plan 3 (2002), http://dwr.kda.ks.gov/NCORPE_Trial_Exhibits_All/Nebraska/NE
%20Exhibits/NCORPE_N30000.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GF2-QKZE] (estimating the total land and
construction costs of the N-CORPE pipeline as $120 to $130 million).
270. Overview,
N-CORPE,
http://www.ncorpe.org/overview
[https://perma.cc/F773-A845].
Nebraska’s estimate of 330,000 acres that would be required to be retired absent these projects is nearly
twice the estimate Kansas provided to the Court in 2010 (170,000 acres). See Kansas Motion for Leave,
supra note 220, at C1-C10 (statement by Kansas Chief Engineer David W. Barfield).
271. Republican River Compact, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86, 88 (1943) (allocating 54,100 acre-feet and
234,500 acre-feet of consumptive use to Colorado and Nebraska respectively).
272. Final Settlement Stipulation, supra note 22, at 15, 25.
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Compact or the Rio Grande Compact, the Republican River Compact effectively
adopted something like the precautionary principle: it allocates the Basin across its
various sub-basins, and requires retrospective accounting.273 These features
encouraged a certain amount of conservatism in how the states planned their water
consumption. The groundwater revolution sorely tested this conservatism, and the
states mostly failed it. By contrast, augmentation not only enables augmenting
states to replace surface water supplies with increased groundwater pumping; it
also enables them to retime the river’s flows across the Basin. Augmentation has
thus changed the dynamics of compliance from one dependent upon the Basin’s
natural hydrology to one built upon an engineered water delivery system.
Because the Nebraska augmentation projects pipe groundwater to
streambeds far upstream from Kansas, something has to be done to shepherd that
water downstream. To that end, augmentation in Nebraska contains a distinct twist.
Even though this water technically qualifies as surface water under Nebraska law,
senior surface-water rights holders in Nebraska cannot divert it to satisfy their
rights; that is expressly forbidden.274 Augmentation water thus creates a cruel
spectacle for Nebraska surface-water irrigators. After seeing streamflows decline
for decades due to groundwater pumping, they can only watch as this augmentation
water flows downstream past their headgates, and irrigators who depend on
Reclamation reservoirs can only watch that water evaporate until Nebraska sends it
downstream to Kansas.275 From the augmentation wells to the state line, no surfacewater irrigators can divert that water in dry years, even if their priorities date to
1890. First in time, last in right.
Caught between the pincers of augmentation and surface-water rights
curtailment, surface-water irrigation communities in Nebraska have come to the
grudging conclusion that they cannot rely upon their parent state to protect their
water rights. The Nebraska DNR has effectively ceded control of the Republican
River to the NRDs, whose IMPs subordinate surface water to groundwater. In a
state where groundwater irrigates seven times more land than surface water does,
the Nebraska Unicameral will probably not offer relief. Since 1986, the states have
known that the Court will not tolerate the efficient breach of an interstate
compact.276 Upstream states have instead chosen a potentially more efficient use of
their respective water supplies—but at the expense of their federal irrigation
projects, which require surface flows.
Left unprotected, some of these communities took the bold step of
supporting Kansas in the 2010–2015 litigation—or at least its efforts to reduce
excessive groundwater pumping. In the 2012–2013 trial in Kansas v. Nebraska, one
of the largest irrigation districts on the Republican River in Nebraska testified in
support of Kansas. The FCID stores about 145,000 acre-feet of water in four
reservoirs, and routes that water through nearly four hundred miles of canals and
laterals to 66,000 acres. It holds forty-one different Nebraska water rights, whose
273. Republican River Compact, ch. 104, arts. III-IV, 57 Stat. 86, 87–88 (1943).
274. NEB. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., IN THE MATTER OF WATER ADMINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLICAN
RIVER BASIN 2 (2014); see also infra text accompanying notes 314, 322-325.
275. LRNRD Integrated Management Plan, supra note 241, at 6–8.
276. See generally Report of Special Master, Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (July 29, 1986)
(No. 65, Orig.).
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priorities date back to 1890.277 Over time, depletions due to the overdevelopment of
groundwater irrigation reduced the amount of water flowing into the district,
harming canals which depend on regular use, and reducing return flows upon
which certain district lands depend. More recently, the IMPs have made that
situation worse by shutting down the district in dry years. At the trial, the FCID
also provided testimony showing that groundwater development had substantially
reduced the amount of land the district could irrigate, and that Nebraska DNR had
also excluded surface-water irrigators from the IMP process.278 Officials from
Reclamation provided similar testimony, arguing that Nebraska’s overdevelopment
of groundwater, as well as its IMPs, threatened the long-term water supply for
Reclamation facilities in Nebraska.279
Nebraska vigorously opposed this testimony, offering a different vision
altogether. From a hydrological perspective, it argued that long-term declines in
reservoir inflows were primarily the consequence of upstream conservation
practices, such as watershed dams, field terracing, and more efficient irrigation
methods.280 From a legal perspective, Nebraska viewed its obligations under the
Compact and the Reclamation Act as distinct and severable; and the former,
pursuant to Hinderlider, always trumped the latter.281 For Kansas and Reclamation,
the security of Reclamation’s water supplies and Nebraska’s ability to comply with
the Compact were legally, historically, and hydrologically inseparable.282 Faced
with such a choice, Nebraska surface-water irrigation communities within the
FCID assisted Kansas to protect the district’s Nebraska water rights—ones held by
Reclamation.283
The litigation alliance between the State of Kansas and Reclamation
districts in Nebraska during the 2010–2015 litigation reveals how the conflict
between surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities has substantially
supplanted state-based allegiances with water-based ones. The interstate conflict
over the Republican River has generated a proxy war between these communities,
and it does not observe political borders.284 Neither does the river: it responds to

277. See Frenchman-Cambridge Division, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, https://www.usbr.gov/
projects/index.php?id=454 [https://perma.cc/XW5W-QKS2].
278. Pre-filed Testimony of Kansas Witness Brad Edgerton, at 5-22, Kansas v. Nebraska, 134 S.Ct.
981 (July 13, 2012) (No. 126, Orig.).
279. Pre-filed Testimony of Kansas Witness Marvin Swanda at 12-23, Kansas v. Nebraska, 134
S.Ct. 981 (July 13, 2012) (No. 126, Orig); Pre-filed Testimony of Kansas Expert Aaron Thompson at
16-27, Kansas v. Nebraska, 134 S.Ct. 981 (July 15, 2012) (No. 126, Orig.). At the time he testified, Mr.
Swanda had retired from Reclamation.
280. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT SETTLEMENT CONSERVATION COMM. FOR THE
REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT ADMIN., IMPACTS OF NON-FEDERAL RESERVOIRS AND LAND TERRACING
ON BASIN WATER SUPPLIES at x-xi, 128–36 (2014).
281. State of Nebraska’s Post-Trial Brief at 33–37, Kansas v. Nebraska, 134 S.Ct. 981 (Sept. 24,
2012) (No. 126, Orig).
282. Kansas’ Post-Trial Brief (Corrected) at 64–68, Kansas v. Nebraska, 134 S.Ct. 981 (Sept. 25,
2012) (No. 126, Orig).
283. See supra notes 278–279.
284. The Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation District has also sought relief from the Nebraska DNR in
court, so far unsuccessfully. See Frenchman Cambridge Irrigation Dist. v. Neb. Dept. of Natural Res.,
801 N.W.2d 253 (Neb. 2011); see also infra Section III.C.
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the different effects of groundwater and surface-water irrigation across the Basin.
The discrepancy between political boundaries and hydrological reality has created a
parallel discrepancy between the sovereignty of the states and the hydrological
integrity of the Basin as a whole.
Just how these discrepancies are resolved will probably determine the
future of the Republican River. Colorado and Nebraska have made their sovereign
decisions to over-pump groundwater, dry up the river, and replace its flows with
water pumped from the Ogallala Aquifer. Kansas, along with surface-water
irrigation communities in Nebraska, have traditionally objected to these decisions
because they upset the dependability of river flows upon which its irrigators
depend. The states answer to their respective publics; in the Colorado and Nebraska
portions of the Basin, groundwater irrigation communities have appropriated theirs.
Barring federal intervention, they may well prevail in the long run, regardless of
what the Supreme Court holds.
C. The Fragmented Basin
1. Nebraska’s Compliance Approach
To recap: since the onset of the litigation in Kansas v. Nebraska in 2010,
Nebraska has remained steadfast in its general approach to compliance with the
Compact during times of shortage. The state has become substantially reliant upon
augmentation projects financed by its Republican River Basin NRD’s, to deliver
water into Harlan County Lake.285 Nebraska DNR has repeatedly curtailed all
surface diversion and storage water rights in the Republican River Basin, largely to
protect water pumped from its augmentation projects from being diverted by
Nebraska surface-water irrigators.286 It has ordered releases from Harlan County
Lake outside of the irrigation season, sending stored water downstream to shore up
its account balances under the Compact accounting procedures of the FSS, thereby
preventing both NBID and KBID from carrying over that water supply for the next
year.287 Left largely unattended is the hydrological cause of its repeated
noncompliance: excessive groundwater pumping.288
Nebraska’s approach to Compact compliance has produced a conflict
within federal law between the law of the Compact and Reclamation law. That such
a conflict might arise seems at first unlikely, given how cooperative federalism
permeates the Compact. Its provisions repeatedly emphasize joint action between
the compacting states and the United States, to promote the most efficient
“beneficial consumptive use” of the waters of the Basin.289 Article VI grants

285. See supra text accompanying notes 265–270.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 245–248.
287. See supra text accompanying note 274.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 241–251.
289. Republican River Compact, ch. 104, art. I, 57 Stat. 86 (1943) (stating as Compact purposes and
objectives the most efficient use of the waters of the Basin for multiple purposes, the most efficient
utilization of those waters for beneficial consumptive use, and the promotion of joint action by the states
and the United States for the efficient use of water); id. 57 Stat. at 88 (assigning the states’ respective
allocations for beneficial consumptive use); id. 57 Stat. at 89; id. at 90 (asserting the paramount
importance of beneficial consumptive use and stating that no exercise of power or right that would

52

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 57

downstream states undeniable rights to the use of federal reservoirs constructed in
upstream states.290 Article X states that nothing in the Compact shall be used to
impair the rights of the United States in and to the waters of the Basin.291 The
United States insisted upon Articles X and XI in the wake of President Roosevelt’s
veto of the penultimate version of the Compact.292
Reclamation law permeates the Compact as well—if not explicitly so.293 A
principal purpose of the Compact was to secure federal irrigation and flood-control
infrastructure in the Basin.294 As a consequence, the Compact’s provisions evince
many of the same concerns which figure prominently in the protections afforded
Reclamation projects under federal law. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902
generally defers to state law, but with two conspicuous exceptions: “the right to the
use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the
right.”295 Later amendments to the 1902 Act have reaffirmed these appurtenance
and beneficial use requirements, either verbatim or by explicit reference.296 Both of
these requirements are specific congressional directives which displace state law.297
The 1944 Flood Control Act prohibits the Corps from making releases from Corps
reservoirs if those releases would conflict with the beneficial consumptive use of
the released waters.298 It should therefore come as no surprise that these federal
statutes regarding the use of Reclamation water supplies and the operation of
federal reservoirs correspond well with the multiple statements regarding the
efficient beneficial consumptive use of the waters of the Basin, as set forth in
Articles I, IV, VI, and XI of the Compact.299 These provisions were contained in
the original 1902 Act, and they remain in effect.300

interfere with “the full beneficial consumptive use of the waters of the Basin shall be made except upon
a determination, giving due consideration to the objectives of the compact and after consultation with all
interested federal agencies . . . that such exercise is in the interest of the best utilization of such waters
for multiple purposes”). Compact compliance is not one of these multiple purposes. Id.
290. Id. at 89 (“the right of any . . . lower state to construct, or participate in the future construction
and use of any storage reservoir . . . in an upper state for the purpose of regulating water herein allocated
for beneficial consumptive use in such lower state, shall never be denied by an upper state. . . . “).
291. Id. at 90.
292. See H.R. DOC. NO. 690, at 2 (1942) (veto message); see supra note 128.
293. For contemporary compacts which do refer explicitly to Reclamation Projects, see Rio Grande
Compact, ch. 155, 53 Stat. 785, 786 (1939) (providing for the Rio Grande Project); Arkansas River
Compact, 63 Stat. 145–146 (1949) (providing for the use and management of John Martin Reservoir).
294. For an extended discussion of this issue, see Transcript of Remarks of John Riddell, supra note
176.
295. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, 390 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383
(2006)).
296. 43 U.S.C. § 485h-4 (regarding repayment contracts for Reclamation water supplies); see also
id. § 390b(c).
297. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 670, 671, 679 (1978).
298. See 33 U.S.C. § 701-1(b) (2012). See also Kansas v. United States, No. 00-4153-DES, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21021, at *8–9 (D. Kan., Sept. 29, 2000) (applying 33 U.S.C. § 701-1(b)).
299. See supra note 289.
300. For an extended discussion of Section 8 and its litigation history, see Kelley & Benson, supra
note 107, at §§ 41.04, 41.05, 41.06(b).
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Nebraska’s compliance approach thus raises several potential legal
problems. The first problem concerns whether it accords with the Compact itself.
Nebraska’s imperative is to comply with the allocation limits of the Compact and
the FSS, through a combination of forecasting methods and regulatory controls
which emphasize surface water rights curtailments.301 This approach focuses on the
allocation limits set forth in Article IV of the Compact and the FSS, but it has
created what is arguably a condition of effective noncompliance with less
prominent provisions of the Compact—the requirements for efficient and beneficial
use of the compacted water supply, for interstate cooperation regarding the
management of upper-state reservoirs, and for the protection of federal
infrastructure.302 The second problem concerns whether Nebraska’s approach
violates the Reclamation Act. To deliver augmentation water to Harlan County
Lake and to balance its compliance ledger, Nebraska has decided to override the
long-established operation of federal reservoirs. It has prohibited the diversion,
storage, and beneficial use of water within Reclamation districts located within
Nebraska, allocating those water supplies to its compliance ledger, all while
allowing groundwater pumping to continue.303
Nebraska’s compliance approach raises similarly vexing operational
problems, given the interstate structure of Reclamation’s Bostwick project and
Harlan County Lake, which supplies water to both NBID and KBID. When
Nebraska’s closing notices prohibited NBID from accessing water in 2013 and
2014, they effectively bifurcated the Bostwick Project between NBID and KBID,
significantly complicating the longstanding water supply contracts for the
respective districts, as well as the FSS’s consensus plan for joint management of
the lake by both districts.304 These contracts assume joint usage and management of
project water stored in Harlan County Lake, allocating repayment obligations
according to the districts’ respective water usage. Thus, if NBID receives no water
under Nebraska’s compliance approach, KBID runs the risk of shouldering greater
repayment obligations. Nebraska’s delivery of water pumped from upstream
augmentation projects has also raised the issue of whether such water delivered to
Harlan County Lake constitutes “project water” or not.305 That issue is important.
For if augmentation water becomes project water, then it becomes generally subject
to Reclamation law, thus complicating Nebraska’s compliance approach, which
calls for the management of that water supply as a supply distinct from
Reclamation projects.306 The Reclamation Act generally defines “project” as a

301. LRNRD Integrated Management Plan, supra note 241.
302. See supra notes 289–291.
303. See generally Part III.C.2.
304. Final Settlement Stipulation, supra note 22, at K1–K10 (noting Harlan County Lake Operation
Consensus Plan between NBID and KBID).
305. For the states’ evolving positions on this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 323–324,
361, and 429–433. For a useful survey of the subject as a whole, see Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is
It? Private Rights and Public Authority over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 363
(1997).
306. See, e.g., LRNRD Integrated Management Plan, supra note 241. The Nebraska IMPs do not
mention Reclamation projects.
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federal irrigation project authorized by Reclamation law.307 Federal regulations
define “nonproject” water as water from sources other than Reclamation project
facilities.308 Yet KBID’s master contract with Reclamation defined project water as
“the total supply of water made available in any irrigation season” for the Bostwick
Project, “by or through the United States under the Federal Irrigation Laws. . . .”309
Under its compliance approach, Nebraska has asserted its control over the
disposition of augmentation water derived from upstream pumping sites and
shepherded downstream into Harlan County Lake, including the authority to order
releases to meet its Compact compliance requirements.310
2. The Showdown at Harlan County Lake, 2012-2013
Nebraska’s compliance strategy soon began to drive a wedge between the
Compact and the Reclamation Act. As Kansas v. Nebraska went to trial in the
summer of 2012, Nebraska was once again struggling to comply with the Compact
during another dry year in the Basin. That December, Nebraska DNR forecasted
that it would overuse its 2013 Compact allocation by approximately 23,000 acrefeet.311 Meanwhile, Reclamation computed the storage in Harlan County Lake to be
less than 119,000 acre-feet, thus triggering “water-short administration” under the
FSS.312 Under Nebraska’s IMP’s, that situation required “additional management
actions . . . to ensure compliance.”313 Nebraska DNR informed Kansas of its plans
to comply with the Compact: Nebraska would issue closing notices prohibiting the
diversion and storage of natural flow of surface waters within Nebraska’s portion
of the Basin, and it might be required to release water from Harlan County Lake
outside of irrigation season.314 As a consequence, that water would not be
beneficially used by KBID, and would not applied to its appurtenant lands—in
apparent violation of the Reclamation Act.315
Nebraska then placed the onus on Reclamation to develop a plan that
would allow for 2013 inflows to be re-regulated for KBID, while keeping Nebraska
in compliance with the Compact.316 Reclamation found itself caught between
Nebraska’s imperative to comply with the Compact and its duties to supply both
NBID and KBID with water pursuant to its own contracts. In an effort to avoid
307. 43 U.S.C. §§ 371(d), 390bb(8) (2012).
308. 43 C.F.R. § 426.2 (1996).
309. Contract Between the United States of America and the Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District No.
2, Contract No. 009D6B0120, at 4 (July 25, 2000), at art. 1, sec. m, p. 4 (on file with author).
310. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 314–342 (describing Nebraska’s threats to order
releases).
311. NEB. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., FORECAST OF ALLOWABLE DEPLETIONS IN THE REPUBLICAN RIVER
BASIN DURING 2013 AND 2023, 3 (2012).
312. Letter from Aaron Thompson, Area Manager, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, to the Dir., Neb.
Dep’t of Nat. Res., Chief Eng’r, Div. of Water Res., Kan. Dep’t of Agric., State Eng’rs, State of Colo.
Div. of Water Res. (Dec. 4, 2012) (on file with author) (discussing 2013 Harlan County Lake (HCL)
Water Supply Calculation).
313. NEB. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 311, at 4.
314. Letter from Brian Dunnigan, Dir., Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res., to David W. Barfield, Chief Eng’r,
Kan. Div. of Water Res. (Dec. 6, 2012) (on file with author).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 295–300.
316. Id.
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Nebraska’s closing notices to Reclamation reservoirs and projects, Reclamation
made a request to the Corps, which operates Harlan County Lake outside of
irrigation season. Specifically, it requested the Corps to deviate from its usual
management of Harlan County Lake, by making 20,000 acre-feet of water that was
dedicated to the sediment pool available to KBID as irrigation supply during the
2013 irrigation season—approximately the amount of Nebraska’s forecasted
noncompliance.317 Reclamation was seeking to buy time and flexibility for its
projects in both states. It requested Nebraska to condition its closing notices for all
federal reservoirs in Nebraska’s portion of the Basin until the Corps decided to
make the water available.318 Nebraska DNR agreed to Reclamation’s request. On
January 1, 2013, it issued closing notices for all surface water appropriations in the
Republican River Basin,319 but assured Reclamation it would seek to “work out an
agreement” that might reduce Compact-induced releases from Harlan County Lake,
provided the Corps allowed Reclamation’s deviation request to reallocate water
from the sediment pool to project water.320 Reclamation was also concerned with
water supplies for NBID, which shares Harlan County Lake supplies with KBID:
releases from the lake would prevent both districts from putting those supplies to
beneficial use.321
As winter turned to spring in the Basin, negotiations between Nebraska,
Reclamation, and the Corps began to break down. Nebraska’s plan to place its
Compact commitments above and against Reclamation’s operation of federal
reservoirs and deliveries to its irrigation districts was meeting with federal
resistance. By mid-March, 2013, the Corps had not yet agreed to Reclamation’s
deviation request; Nebraska DNR thus notified the Corps that it would soon order
releases of water stored since that January in all federal reservoirs in the Basin,
including Harlan County Lake.322 Nebraska objected to federal efforts to allocate
project water stored in Harlan County Lake between NBID and KBID. Given
Nebraska’s Compact compliance requirements and its IMP’s, Nebraska stressed
that no water stored in Harlan County Lake since January 1, 2013 could be
allocated to NBID: its use of project water would increase Nebraska’s consumptive

317. Letter from Aaron M. Thompson, Area Manager, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, to Col. Anthony
J. Hoffman, U.S. Corps of Eng’rs, Kan. City Dist. 1 (Dec. 18, 2012). As with most federal reservoirs
dedicated to Reclamation purposes, storage in Harlan County Lake is allocated according to the water
level. The lowest level holds a supply dedicated to controlling sediment; the intermediate level holds the
irrigation water supply; and the top level holds the flood control supply. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS,
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, HARLAN COUNTY LAKE, REPUBLICAN RIVER, NEBRASKA
app. III (1997).
318. Letter from Aaron Thompson, Area Manager, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, to Brian Dunnigan,
Dir., Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res. 1 (Dec. 21, 2012) (on file with author).
319. STATE OF NEB., DEP’T OF NAT. RES., IN THE MATTER OF WATER ADMINISTRATION OF THE
REPUBLICAN RIVER BASIN, ORDER 2 (2013).
320. Letter from Brian Dunnigan, Dir., Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res., to Aaron Thompson, Area Manager,
Neb.-Kan. Area Office, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 1 (Jan. 4, 2013) (on file with author).
321. Letter from Aaron Thompson, Area Manager, Neb.-Kan. Area Office, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, to Col. Anthony J. Hoffman, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 1-2 (Feb. 28, 2013) (on file with
author).
322. Letter from Brian Dunnigan, Dir., Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res., to Col. Anthony J. Hoffman, U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs 1 (Mar. 15, 2013) (on file with author).
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use under the Compact, undermining Nebraska’s compliance plan under the
IMP’s.323 Asserting Nebraska’s sovereign right to prohibit a Nebraska irrigation
district from storing and diverting water, Nebraska DNR made its position clear:
Reclamation could not allocate water to NBID under Reclamation water-supply
contracts, because those contracts “are subservient” to Nebraska’s need to comply
with the Compact.324 On March 22, 2013, and in light of Reclamation’s position
and Nebraska DNR’s compliance plan, Nebraska repeated its threat to the Corps
that it would order the release of all water stored in Reclamation reservoirs in the
Basin between January 1 and March 31, 2013, including Harlan County Lake.325
The Corps pointedly avoided taking a position between Nebraska and Kansas.
Instead, it recommended that the RRCA change its accounting procedures to allow
water which Nebraska had delivered to Harlan County Lake for compliance
purposes to be held there for subsequent use.326 In the meantime, the states
appeared to be on their own.
If the water in Harlan County were to be released in March, it would flow
down into Kansas, but KBID would be unable to put it to beneficial consumptive
use as the Compact intended: irrigation season was months away, and its Kansas
storage facility, Lovewell Reservoir, was mostly full.327 Aware of that situation,
Kansas DWR had been negotiating in parallel with Nebraska, Reclamation, and the
Corps. One week after Nebraska DNR had threatened to release water out of
Harlan County Lake, Kansas DWR notified the Corps of its own position. Whereas
Nebraska had stressed that its Compact commitments trumped those of
Reclamation to its irrigators in Nebraska and Kansas, Kansas argued that the
purposes of the Compact and those of Reclamation were intertwined; therefore, the
Corps and Reclamation should not release water from Harlan County Lake until
KBID was able to put that water to beneficial use during irrigation season.328
Nebraska agreed to a short-term compromise: on April 1, 2013, it ordered water
stored in federal reservoirs upstream of Harlan County Lake since that January to
be released, but excepted Harlan County Lake from the order.329
By that time, the state’s respective positions regarding Reclamation’s
management of water stored in federal reservoirs had become clear—and clearly
opposed. Nebraska placed its Compact commitments above Reclamation’s federal
commitments to both NBID and KBID, whereas Kansas continued to view the two
federal commitments as coequal. Consequently, Nebraska DNR refused to
authorize Reclamation to hold over water delivered to and stored in Harlan County

323. Letter from Brian Dunnigan, Dir., Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res., to Aaron Thompson, Area Manager,
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 1–2 (Mar. 22, 2013) (on file with author).
324. Id. at 2, n.1.
325. Id. at 2.
326. Email from Matthew P. Jeppson, Assistant Dist. Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Kan.
City Dist., to Justin Lavene, Deputy Chief Attorney Gen., State of Neb. (Mar. 29, 2013) (on file with
author).
327. Letter from David Barfield, Chief Eng’r, Kan. Div. of Water Res., to Col. Anthony Hoffmann,
U.S. Corps of Eng’rs 1 (Mar. 29, 2013) (on file with author).
328. Id.
329. STATE OF NEB., DEP’T OF NAT. RES., STORAGE RELEASE NOTICE (2013) (ordering releases
from Swanson Lake, Enders Reservoir, Hugh Butler Lake, and Harry Strunk Lake).
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Lake in 2013—with the express purpose of meeting Nebraska’s Compact
balance—for use within NBID in 2013 or 2014, because such beneficial
consumptive use within Nebraska would “threaten Nebraska with non-compliance
in 2013 and beyond.”330 Nebraska again placed the burden upon Reclamation and
Kansas to provide a management plan for the reservoir that would hold Nebraska
harmless for any Compact violations resulting from a hold-over of water from one
year to another.331 Kansas initially refused, and so Nebraska again threatened to
release water stored in Harlan County Lake on May 1, 2013.332
The states continued to negotiate this difficult issue. Kansas proposed a
compromise based on its view of the Compact and Reclamation law as legally and
operationally interdependent authorities.333 Under Kansas’s proposal, the states,
Reclamation, and the Corps would agree to establish a Kansas-exclusive irrigation
account in Harlan County Lake over which Kansas had exclusive control, separate
from the water supply for both NBID and KBID; but Reclamation’s determination
of available project water dedicated to both districts would continue, according to
Reclamation’s contracts and the Consensus Plan of the FSS.334 If Kansas were able
to obtain such an exclusive account, it would agree to modify the Compact’s
accounting procedures so that water stored in and released from the Kansasexclusive account would not count as water consumed by Nebraska.335 The Kansas
offer was focused on reservoir management and accounting, and sought to strike a
balance between the states’ and the United States’ respective interests, but it made
no bones about Kansas’s position. According to Kansas, the crisis over Harlan
County Lake stemmed from double intransigence on Nebraska’s part: its decision
not to reduce excessive groundwater pumping—the source of Nebraska’s
forecasted noncompliance—and its equally steadfast decision to prevent
Reclamation from collecting and storing water in the lake.336 Kansas continued to
assert that the latter decision violated the Compact, based on its interpretation of
Article VI, which, in Kansas’s view, made it “illegal for an upstream state to
interfere with the ability of a downstream state to use its Compact allocation
beneficially by means of storage and delivery of its water through a federal
irrigation storage project.”337
Nebraska rejected Kansas’s offer. It did so because Kansas refused to
provide a waiver of liability to Nebraska for any Compact violations that might
result from Nebraska’s delivery of augmentation water to Harlan County Lake for
330. Letter from Brian Dunnigan, Dir., Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res., to David Barfield, Chief Eng’r, Kan.
Div. of Water Res. 2 (Apr. 15, 2013) (on file with author).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Letter from David Barfield, Chief Eng’r, Kan. Div. of Water Res., to Brian Dunnigan, Neb.
Comm’r, Republican River Compact Admin. 1–2 (Apr. 19, 2013) (on file with author).
334. Id.
335. Id. at 2.
336. Id. at 4.
337. Id. Article VI of the Compact states that “the right of any person, entity, or lower state to
construct, or participate in the future construction and use of any storage reservoir or diversion works in
an upper state for the purpose of regulating water herein allocated for beneficial consumptive use in
such lower state, shall never be denied by an upper state; provided, that such right is subject to the rights
of the upper state.” Republican River Compact, ch. 104, art. IV, 57 Stat. 89 (1943).
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Kansas’s benefit, and because Kansas had failed to coordinate, to Nebraska’s
satisfaction, with Reclamation and the Corps.338 Having rejected the offer,
Nebraska provided a counter-proposal. Water it delivered to Harlan County Lake in
2013 would be assigned to Kansas and KBID; Nebraska would be allowed to count
water delivered through April 15, 2014, to meet its Compact accounting balances
for 2013.339 In return, Nebraska would not order releases from Harlan County Lake,
provided Kansas hold Nebraska harmless for any noncompliance caused by “strict
application of the Compact accounting . . . .”340 If Kansas did not accept this
proposal, Nebraska would order releases from Harlan County Lake on May 1,
2013.341 Nebraska flatly disagreed with Kansas’s legal position that Article VI of
the Compact prevented Nebraska from monopolizing control over Harlan County
Lake to the detriment of Kansas: because Kansas “in no way participated” in the
lake’s construction, the Article “simply does not apply.”342
3. Reclamation’s Response to the Conflict over Compact Compliance
a. 2013–2015: The Warren Act as Reclamation’s Bridge between the Compact and
the Reclamation Act
The showdown over Harlan County Lake in 2012–2013 caught
Reclamation between its own duties under the Reclamation laws and Nebraska’s
threat to order releases for Compact compliance purposes.343 As Kansas and
Nebraska exchanged threats, proposals, and counter-proposals during the spring of
2013, Reclamation proposed a mechanism to break the stalemate: a supplemental
water-supply contract between Reclamation and Kansas pursuant to the Warren
Act.344 An early amendment to the Reclamation Act,345 the Warren Act enables
Reclamation to enter into contracts for the use of excess stored water346 and excess
storage capacity347 in Reclamation reservoirs. The logic behind Reclamation’s offer
seemed reasonable. Reclamation had been working with both states “to provide the
most efficient and beneficial use of water within the Republican River Basin for
Reclamation water users”—a clearly implied but unattributed reference to the

338. Letter from Brian Dunnigan, Dir., Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res., to David Barfield, Kan. State Eng’r
1 (Apr. 29, 2013). (on file with author).
339. Id. at 2–3.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 4.
342. Letter from Brian Dunnigan, Dir., Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res., to Aaron Thompson, Area Manager,
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 1 (Apr. 29, 2013) (on file with author).
343. Neither the United States nor Reclamation is a party to the Compact.
344. Letter from Aaron Thompson, Area Manager, Neb.-Kan. Area Office, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, to David Barfield, Chief Eng’r, Div. of Water Res., Kan. Dep’t of Agric. 1–2 (Apr. 23,
2013) (on file with author).
345. Act of February 21, 1911, ch. 141, 36 Stat. 925 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 523-525 (2012)). For
a useful discussion of the Warren Act, see Richard Roos-Collins, Voluntary Conveyance of the Right to
Receive a Water Supply from the United States Bureau of Reclamation, 13 ECOLOGY. L. Q. 773, 838–39
(1987).
346. 43 U.S.C. § 521.
347. Id. § 523.
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Compact348—but the parties had been unable to reach an agreement to store water
in Harlan County Lake for KBID.349 Given the looming threat of a May 1, 2013
release, Reclamation believed that Kansas could “exercise Article VI of the
Republican River Compact” and protect water for KBID by entering into a Warren
Act contract for the storage and carriage of up to 30,000 acre-feet in Harlan County
Lake, which Reclamation would control.350 If Kansas did not enter into such a
contract, then Reclamation asserted that it would coordinate with the Corps “to
comply with any lawful order” from Nebraska DNR for the release of water from
Harlan County Lake on that date.351 Through this offer, Reclamation believed that
it could reconcile the states’ respective rights and commitments pursuant to the
Compact while complying with Reclamation law as well.
Unfortunately, Reclamation’s belief that a Warren Act contract with
Kansas could stave off the crisis proved poorly founded. As a threshold matter, the
Warren Act itself does not allow such contracts to be made with states, a fact which
Reclamation had apparently not considered.352 Nebraska promptly wrote
Reclamation to point this out, but also to attack Reclamation’s belief that Kansas
could invoke Article VI of the Compact to participate in the management of Harlan
County Lake supplies.353 Because the lake was located in Nebraska, Nebraska law,
and apparently only Nebraska law, controlled the lake.354 Nebraska thus demanded
that Reclamation withdraw its offer to Kansas immediately.355
Whether chastened or corrected by Nebraska’s response, Reclamation
dropped the matter and focused on KBID, effectively forcing it to enter into a
series of Warren Act contracts. A May, 2013 contract between Reclamation and
KBID succeeded in keeping the water in Harlan County Lake; the parties
subsequently executed two similar contracts.356 In each case, the purpose of these

348. See Republican River Compact, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86 (1943), at art. I (stating that a major
purpose of the Compact is to “provide for the most efficient use of the waters of the Republican River
Basin . . . for multiple purposes . . . .).
349. Letter from Aaron Thompson, supra note 344, at 1.
350. Id. Warren Act contracts provide for the “carriage” of water through Reclamation
infrastructure. 43 U.S.C. § 523.
351. Letter from Aaron Thompson, supra note 344, at 2.
352. 43 U.S.C. § 523 (limiting Warren Act contracts to “individuals, corporations, associations, and
irrigation districts organized for or engaged in furnishing or in distributing water for irrigation”); see
also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 17 (1995).
353. Letter from Brian Dunnigan, supra note 342, at 1. See also Republican River Compact, art. VI,
57 Stat. at 89 (1943); Letter from Aaron Thompson, supra note 344, at 1 (referencing Article VI of the
Republican River Compact, art. VI, 57 Stat. at 89).
354. Letter from Brian Dunnigan, supra note 342, at 1 (citing Articles VII and VIII of the
Republican River Compact, arts. VII, VIII, 57 Stat. at 89).
355. Letter from Brian Dunnigan, supra note 342, at 1–2.
356. Contract Between the United States of America and the Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District No.
2, Contract No. 009D6B0120, at 4 (July 25, 2000); Excess Capacity Contract Between the United States
of America and Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District No. 2 For the Use of Excess Capacity Service in the
Bostwick Division, Contract No. 14WR630075 (May 10, 2013); Excess Capacity Contract Between the
United States of America and Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District No. 2 For the Use of Excess Capacity
Service in the Bostwick Division, Contract No. 14WR630034 (Jan. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Excess
Capacity Contract No. 14WR630034]; Excess Capacity Contract Between the United States of America
and Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District No. 2 For the Use of Excess Capacity Service in the Bostwick
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contracts was to secure water supplies in Harlan County Lake provided by
Nebraska’s augmentation pumping—which Nebraska DNR had shepherded
downstream to the lake using its closing notices—and then to protect those supplies
from release orders which might be issued by Nebraska DNR to stay within its
Compact allocation. The contracts explicitly identified this water supply as nonproject water, and dedicated its use exclusively to KBID for irrigation purposes
pursuant to Nebraska’s Compact commitments.357 KBID agreed to pay for up to
30,000 acre-feet of this augmentation water, and apparently agreed further to
Reclamation’s definition of it as non-project water—in addition to its existing
contract payments for project water.358 In the event Nebraska ordered a release
from Harlan County Lake to meet its Compact commitments, the non-project,
Warren Act water supply would be released before the project water supply.359 As
the second Warren Act contract was set to expire at the end of 2014, KBID was
faced with another threat from Nebraska DNR to order releases from Harlan
County Lake outside of the irrigation season in early 2015; to protect against that
possibility, KBID entered into a third Warren Act contract just as 2014 ended.360
KBID subsequently protested against the use of the Warren Act for this
situation, but it clearly had no choice in the matter if the district were to secure
water supplies for 2014 and 2015. In a letter to Reclamation sent shortly after the
execution of the second contract, KBID outlined its objections.361 It questioned the
legality of the Warren Act mechanism in a situation where the district’s irrigation
requirements had not been met under its master project water contract.362 It
complained that the contracts unfairly penalized KBID for Nebraska’s compliance
actions: if Nebraska was “using Reclamation infrastructure to send pumped
groundwater down to KBID,” then Nebraska and its Reclamation districts should
pay their share of the freight.363 KBID explicitly objected to the notion that KBID
was purchasing Warren Act water so that Nebraska could comply with the
Compact.364 (In correspondence concerning negotiations over the Warren Act
contract, Reclamation had repeated its mistaken assertion that “Reclamation could
also execute a Warren Act contract with the State of Kansas, the State of Nebraska,
or the Nebraska Natural Resource District for the purchase of water for compact
compliance.”365) Reclamation had repeatedly stressed that KBID could profit from
these contracts by marketing the contracted water supplies at a premium to NBID
and other Nebraska surface water users, thereby lessening the financial burden

Division, Contract No. 14WR630034, Amendment No. 2 (Dec. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Excess Capacity
Contract No. 14WR630034, Amendment No. 2].
357. Excess Capacity Contract No. 14WR630034, supra note 356, at 2.
358. Id. at 2–3.
359. Id. at 2.
360. Excess Capacity Contract No. 14WR630034, Amendment No. 2, supra note 356, at 1.
361. Letter from Kenneth Nelson, Superintendent, Kan. Bostwick Irrigation Dist., to Michael Ryan,
Reg’l Dir., U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 1 (Jan. 5, 2015) (on file with author).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Letter from Michael J. Ryan, Reg’l Dir., U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, to Kenneth Nelson,
Superintendent, Kan. Bostwick Irrigation Dist. 1 (Dec. 17, 2014) (on file with author).
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imposed by the contracts.366 KBID pointed out that such marketing was expressly
forbidden by the Warren Act itself.367 Clearly frustrated by Reclamation’s changes
in position about how it would respond to Nebraska’s threatened releases, but
facing little choice but to accede to the Warren Act contracts, KBID signed: “we
did this under duress in order to assure a water supply for 2015.”368 Chastised by
Reclamation for claiming duress, KBID sent a subsequent letter two weeks later,
apologizing for claiming duress and reaffirming its commitments to the contract.369
b. Reclamation’s Position Regarding Nebraska’s Compliance Approach
Reclamation has so far avoided making a formal entrance into Nebraska’s
intrastate conflict between groundwater and surface-water irrigation in its portion
of the Basin. Nonetheless, Reclamation has made its position clear regarding how
Nebraska’s compliance actions affect the use and management of Reclamation
infrastructure. On the eve of oral argument in Kansas v. Nebraska in September,
2014, Interior wrote Nebraska DNR to express its concerns about the legality of
Nebraska’s approach to Compact compliance, and to recommend that Nebraska
employ a “fundamentally different approach” to compliance that would abide by
both state and federal law.370 The letter complained of Nebraska DNR’s issuance of
closing notices on all surface water rights in the Basin during 2013 and 2014,
including the storage rights for Reclamation reservoirs and for Harlan County
Lake.371 These closing notices disproportionately affected surface water users,
forcing severe shortages upon them while leaving groundwater pumpers
unaffected; and the water supplied by Nebraska’s augmentation projects upstream
did not arrive in time for irrigation season.372
The letter remains Interior’s (and therefore Reclamation’s) most complete
statement of the United States’ legal position concerning Nebraska’s Compact
compliance strategy in the Basin. Interior asserted that curtailing surface water
rights while allowing groundwater users to irrigate violated Nebraska state law
requirements that these groups be treated equitably.373 Interior also alleged that
Nebraska DNR’s curtailments of surface water supplies violated the IMP’s of the

366. Letter from Kenneth Nelson, supra note 361, at 1–2.
367. Id.; see 43 U.S.C. § 523 (2012) (prohibiting any irrigation district from making any “charge for
the storage, carriage, or delivery of such water in excess of the charge paid to the United States except to
such extent as may be reasonably necessary to cover cost of carriage and delivery through their
works.”). Indeed, one thing upon which Nebraska and Kansas/KBID did agree during this period was
that Reclamation did not have a clear understanding of its own governing law. See also supra text
accompanying notes 352–353, 367.
368. Letter from Kenneth Nelson, supra note 361, at 1–2.
369. Letter from Kenneth Nelson, Superintendent, Kan. Bostwick Irrigation Dist., to Mike Ryan,
Reg’l Dir., U.S Bureau of Reclamation 1 (Jan. 20, 2015) (on file with author).
370. Letter from Anne J. Castle, Assistant Sec’y for Water & Sci., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to
Brian P. Dunnigan, Dir., Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res. 1, 3–4 (Sept. 30, 2014) (on file with the author).
371. Id. at 1.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 2 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-703, 46-714 (2016), and Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 691
N.W.2d 116 (2005) (construing these sections, and recommending a balancing of the equities between
groundwater pumpers and surface water users who share hydrologically connected water supplies
pursuant to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
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Republican River NRD’s, which contain precatory language appearing to require
such equitable treatment as well.374 These IMP’s were “fatally flawed,” because
none of them contained effective groundwater controls: instead, they contained
mere targets for reductions in pumping—targets that Nebraska was unlikely to
meet in any case.375
The letter then turned to federal law. Interior alleged that Nebraska’s
compliance strategy violated both the Compact and Reclamation law. It stressed the
Court’s 2002–2003 finding that the Compact requires Nebraska to account for the
impacts of groundwater pumping on surface water supplies. It went further by
finding in the Court’s decisions “the fact that Nebraska should be attaining
compliance with the Compact by curbing groundwater pumping in addition to
curtailing surface water users.”376 Just as groundwater pumping and surface water
diversions were connected, so too were “Reclamation’s rights and Nebraska’s
responsibilities:” the latter could not comply with the Compact in a manner that
injured the former.377 “Nebraska’s effort to put the burden [of compliance]
primarily on surface water users is inconsistent with the State’s obligations under
the Compact and the Supreme Court decision.”378 Interior finally alleged that this
imbalanced burden also impliedly violated the Reclamation Act. While Interior
conceded that Reclamation was generally bound to follow Nebraska state law and
the decisions of Nebraska DNR, that general deference had limits. Where Nebraska
DNR ordered Reclamation to release stored water, or prohibited the delivery of
stored water to Reclamation projects, even as Nebraska allowed junior groundwater
users to continue pumping with far fewer restrictions, such conduct “raises
questions as to whether state water administration is not just in violation of state
law, but contrary to federal law concerning federal projects and . . . the mandates of
the Reclamation program.”379 Providing augmentation water to Reclamation and
Corps reservoirs late in the irrigation season did not “optimize” beneficial use, but
defeated it instead.380 Like all demand letters, it closed with a threat of litigation;
like most such letters, litigation has yet to commence.
Interior’s formal allegation that Nebraska’s compliance strategy violates
both the Compact and the Reclamation Act shows how the conflict between
groundwater and surface-water irrigation across the Great Plains is placing a great
strain on long-established federalist governance systems for western water,
possibly to a breaking point. Nebraska DNR, together with the NRDs in the Basin,
have chosen to protect their groundwater irrigation communities at the expense of
their surface water ones; but Reclamation represents only the latter. As a
consequence, the conflict between these irrigation communities has generated a
serious conflict between state and federal interests in Nebraska’s portion of the
Basin, one where groundwater pumpers align with the State, while surface water
irrigators seek the assistance of Reclamation.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

Letter from Anne J. Castle, supra note 370, at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4 (citing United States v. California, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
Letter from Anne J. Castle, supra note 370, at 2.
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In defending itself against intrastate litigants and answering Reclamation,
Nebraska has consistently argued that it has the sovereign right to decide how to
comply with the Compact, and that the other states, as well as the United States,
must defer to those sovereign decisions as a well-settled rule of federal law.381 In
other words, Nebraska has claimed the Hinderlider defense—a defense that has so
far worked.382 Yet it remains uncertain whether Hinderlider can continue to
provide an effective categorical defense of Nebraska’s compliance strategy, where
the end of Compact compliance justifies the means of subordinating Reclamation
law. That is because the controversies are different. In Hinderlider, the central
issue was whether a state engineer could administer water rights senior to the La
Plata River Compact; under Colorado’s prior appropriation doctrine, administration
of such rights necessarily involved administering (and adjudicating) all junior water
rights in the basin as well.383 The Court’s resolution in Hinderlider was
unequivocal—no state water rights holder is entitled to use water to which the
parent state is not entitled—but it nonetheless rested on the assumption of a
comprehensive adjudication of water rights in the compact basin.384 Hinderlider
antedates the groundwater revolution and does not speak to the groundwatersurface water divide, especially Nebraska’s, where administration of water rights is
selective and in apparent disregard for the seniority of surface water rights
compared to groundwater permits.385
The situation in Hinderlider also seems legally and factually distinct from
the dispute over the Republican River. Hinderlider is a landmark case largely
because it demonstrated that the Court would defend interstate compacts, thereby
providing additional motivation for states to enter into them.386 The compact which
Hinderlider protected, the La Plata River Compact of 1925, was the first compact
enacted into federal law.387 As a compact predating later New Deal compacts, New
Deal Reclamation law such as the Pick-Sloan Act, and the age of federal
multipurpose reservoirs, it establishes commitments between Colorado and New
Mexico exclusively, without regard for federal and Reclamation interests. The
Republican River Compact, by contrast, fully embraces contemporary Reclamation
law, albeit impliedly so.388
4. Litigating the Irrigation Divide within Nebraska
The most frequent challenges to Nebraska’s approach have arisen within
Nebraska itself, in numerous lawsuits brought by surface-water irrigation districts
and their members against Nebraska DNR. The plaintiffs’ allegations, as well as
381. See supra text accompanying note 281.
382. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). For additional
discussion of the Hinderlider defense applied to Nebraska’s compact compliance approach, see infra
text accompanying notes 405-422.
383. Id. at 98–99.
384. Id.
385. See Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation Dist. v. Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 801 N.W. 2d 253 (Neb.
2011).
386. See supra text accompanying notes 120–121.
387. Act of Jan. 29, 1925, ch. 110, 43 Stat. 796 (1925) (enacting the La Plata River Compact).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 289–300.

64

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 57

the courts’ dispositions of the lawsuits, reveal the extent to which Nebraska’s
compliance approach has produced a profound and lasting conflict between the
surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities within Nebraska’s portion
of the Basin.
After failing to obtain relief from the IMP’s in 2011,389 FCID joined with
NBID to bring suit in federal court to enjoin Nebraska’s augmentation pumping
and to protect the districts’ Nebraska surface water rights.390 The districts sued
three parties: the Upper Republican Natural Resources District (URNRD), the chief
sponsor of the N-CORPE augmentation pipeline; Nebraska DNR; and Reclamation.
Against URNRD, the surface district plaintiffs alleged that the N-CORPE pipeline
violated the Compact; but perhaps more importantly, they alleged that the pipeline
subverted their prior appropriation rights established under the Nebraska
Constitution, by “unlawfully prioritiz[ing]” groundwater pumping over senior
surface water diversions.391 Against Nebraska DNR, the plaintiffs alleged that
pumping groundwater to supply the pipeline upset the hydrologic connection
between groundwater and surface water, endangering the long-term water supplies
upon which the districts depended; and they alleged further that Nebraska DNR’s
approval of this conduct violated their duties to manage the waters of the Basin.392
Against Reclamation, the plaintiffs alleged that it had breached the districts’ watersupply contracts, and had thereby failed to both supply the districts’ projects and to
protect their senior surface water rights.393 In essence, the plaintiffs’ allegations
resembled those which Kansas had brought against Nebraska in its 2010–2015
Supreme Court case.394
The defendant parties based their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional,
immunity, and justiciability grounds. All defendants moved to dismiss for lack of
federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.C.P. 12(b)(1).395 The URNRD
and Nebraska DNR also moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Fed.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), based on the Eleventh Amendment immunity defense that
both of these state agencies acted as an “arm of the state” working jointly to
comply with the Compact; they also argued that the court should not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over what was essentially a state law claim.396 Nebraska
DNR further contended that the districts lacked standing to pursue their claims.397
Reclamation asserted that, as a federal agency, it had not waived its sovereign
immunity.398

389. Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 801 N.W. 2d at 259 (finding FCID’s allegations of potential injury
insufficient to be justiciable).
390. Frenchman Cambridge Irrigation Dist. v. Heineman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270 (D. Neb.
2013).
391. Id. at 1273.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. See supra text accompanying notes 220–236.
395. Heineman, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 1270–71.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1271.
398. Id.
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The court dismissed the case, largely according to the defendants’
motions. It first granted Reclamation’s motion on two federal grounds: first, it
found that the Reclamation Act’s limited waiver of sovereign of immunity did not
apply in this case;399 and second, that because this case did not concern a
comprehensive stream adjudication of the Basin in Nebraska, the McCarran Act did
not provide a waiver for sovereign immunity.400 Based on those findings, the court
declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, dismissing the URNRD and
Nebraska DNR as well; as a consequence, it did not address the remaining issues of
standing and Eleventh Amendment immunity.401
The dismissal is notable for three reasons. First, the court stressed that it
was not exercising its supplemental jurisdiction because the case “involves novel
and complex state law issues”—issues concerning the legal relationship between
surface and groundwater rights under Nebraska law, then pending before Nebraska
DNR.402 Second, having asserted that the “Republican River Compact is only
peripheral to the controversy,” the court then recommended that the districts seek
to intervene in Kansas v. Nebraska—even though trial had already concluded in
that case, and Special Master Kayatta issued his report shortly thereafter.403 Finally,
the court made clear that it based its dismissal of Reclamation on the grounds that
Reclamation had no obligation to sue Nebraska on behalf of its districts; thus, their
claim was not cognizable under federal law.404
Undeterred by this setback in federal court, irrigators within FCID
pursued Nebraska DNR in state court. In Hill v. Nebraska Department of Natural
Resources, they brought an inverse condemnation lawsuit as a class action, alleging
that Nebraska DNR’s refusal to regulate and curtail groundwater pumping in the
Basin, together with its 2013 closing notices, caused damages of approximately
$76 million for that year.405 Nebraska DNR moved to dismiss based largely on
Hinderlider: the state’s obligations to comply with the Compact entitled Nebraska
DNR to administer surface water rights as it saw fit, in order to remain within its
allocation limits; consequently, the state could not have taken water supplies to

399. Id. at 1280–81 (citing Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596 (2005)) (holding that jurisdiction
pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 390uu (2012) does not apply because that statute waives immunity only in cases
in which the United States is joined as a third party, rather than in the instant case)).
400. Id. at 1276–77 (holding that jurisdiction pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 666 does not apply).
401. Id. at 1281–82.
402. Id. at 1281.
403. Id. at 1280, 1281–82 n.7 (citing South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 267–68
(2010)). See Report of the Special Master, supra note 223, at 14.
404. Heineman, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
405. Order Sustaining Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and Granting Plaintiff’s Leave
to Amend at 1-3, Hill v. Nebraska, No. CI 14-68 (Neb. Dist. Ct. Mar. 24, 2015) [hereinafter “Hill I”];
Anthony Schutz & Sandra B. Zellmer, Takings Litigation on the Republican, 49 WATER L. NEWSL.
(Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Found.), no. 2, 2016, at 9–11. The damages figure of $76 million was
based on a water shortfall to FCID in 2013 of 38,379 acre-feet, valued at $2,000 per acre-foot—more
water, and far more money, than Kansas had claimed as damages against Nebraska for its 2005-06
noncompliance. Justin Lavene, Legal Landscape of the Republican River Basin, UPPER REPUBLICAN
NAT. RESOURCES DISTRICT, http://www.urnrd.org/sites/default/files/files/20/laveneurnrdwaterconf2016.
pdf [https://perma.cc/E49X-DA76]; see also supra text accompanying note 219.
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which the plaintiffs were not entitled under the Compact.406 Convinced, the district
court dismissed the case, but granted plaintiffs leave to amend.407 They filed an
amended complaint in which they added claims for the 2014 irrigation season,
alleging an additional $143 million in damages for suffering a water shortfall of
71,755 acre-feet for the 2014 crop year.408 Nebraska DNR then moved to dismiss
based on the argument that it does not have the statutory duty to regulate
groundwater; thus, the alleged failure to exercise such a nonexistent duty cannot
amount to a taking.409 The district court accepted that argument and accordingly
dismissed the plaintiffs’ first takings claim (Nebraska DNR’s alleged failure to
regulate groundwater) with prejudice; but the court also found that plaintiffs’
second takings claim (Nebraska DNR’s alleged over-administration of surface
water rights in the Basin) was legitimate and should proceed.410 Other irrigators
then filed suits making the same claim; Nebraska DNR filed a motion to reconsider
in Hill I, and motions to dismiss in the other suits. The court resolved these matters
together by granting Nebraska DNR’s motion to reconsider Hill I, as well as its
motions to dismiss.411 (Hill III is presently on appeal.412)
Although the decision in Hill III is on appeal, the conclusions of the
Furnas County district court describe several forbidding obstacles to protecting
surface-water irrigation rights in Nebraska. The first obstacle is the police power
claimed by Nebraska DNR pursuant to Hinderlider—a power allegedly so robust
that it forecloses any takings claims arising from the curtailment of surface-water
rights imposed to achieve Compact compliance.413 The second obstacle is,
paradoxically, powerlessness—a statutory impotence allegedly so complete that it
precludes Nebraska DNR from regulating groundwater pumping, even regulation
taken to achieve Compact compliance.414
The district court did not recognize the potential contradictions between
Nebraska DNR’s claim to police power on one hand and its defense of statutory
powerlessness on the other. Ultimately, it rested its decision upon a distinctive view

406. Hill I, supra note 405, at 10.
407. Id. at 14-16.
408. Order Denying in Part and Sustaining in Part Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss,
Hill v. Nebraska, No. CI 14-68 (Neb. Dist. Ct. Sept. 28, 2015) [hereinafter “Hill II”]; see also Zellmer,
supra note 405. Plaintiffs provided the same value of $2,000 per acre-foot in Hill II as they had in Hill I.
The water shortfall was more than twice that of Nebraska’s 2005–06 noncompliance in Kansas v.
Nebraska. Lavene, supra note 405; see also supra text accompanying note 219.
409. Hill II, supra note 408, at 5-7 (citing Spear T Ranch v. Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 699 N.W.2d
379 (2005)).
410. Id. at 2-7.
411. See Order of Dismissal, Hill v. Nebraska, Nos. CI 14-68 & CI 15-80 (Neb. Dist. Ct. May 19,
2016) [hereinafter Hill III]. Hill III provides a history of Hill I and Hill II: see id. at 1-5.
412. The plaintiffs appealed the case on May 31, 2016, and filed a petition to bypass the Nebraska
Court of Appeals so that the Nebraska Supreme Court could hear the case directly. The Nebraska
Supreme Court consolidated the same cases decided in Hill III on July 13, 2016. Appellants’ Opening
Brief at 1, Hill v. Nebraska, Nos. 16-558 & 16-560 (Consolidated) (Neb. Sup. Ct. August 31, 2016).
Oral arguments in the consolidated cases were heard on January 7, 2017. See Hill v. State of Nebraska,
NEB. JUD. BRANCH, https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/20646/hill-v-state-nebraska [https://perma.cc/
YRJ5-PRBW].
413. See supra text accompanying note 406.
414. See supra text accompanying note 409.
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of the property interest in the use of surface water. The court dismissed the case
largely on the conclusion that a compensable taking for curtailing a surface water
right can only arise when there is water available for diversion.415 Under the hard
and arid logic of prior appropriation, this reasoning seems unimpeachable: because
a water right is not a guarantee of sufficient water to supply that right, junior water
rights might receive no water supplies during times of actual water shortage.
However, the court applied that reasoning within an unusual administrative context,
in which Nebraska DNR, following the dictates of its IMP’s, determined water to
be unavailable for all surface diversions—even as it allowed groundwater pumping
to continue. “The right to use the property rights [i.e., surface water rights] incident
to an appropriation only arises when there is water ‘subject to capture,’ i.e., when
water is declared to be available.”416 And the determination of that availability lies
squarely with Nebraska DNR: until it declares that “water is available for
appropriation,” no protectable property right in surface water exists in Nebraska.417
Apply this logic to Nebraska groundwater permits, and problems soon
arise. The court stressed that a Nebraska surface water right does not grant an
“immediate right to use of the water because there is no discrete, continuously
existing corpus or physical thing that can be possessed or used by the
appropriator.”418 But what of groundwater? Some of the chief virtues of
groundwater are negatively implied in this assertion. Hydrologically, unlike the
variability of surface water supplies, groundwater tends to be a “continuously
existing corpus or physical thing” that can be withdrawn and used by Nebraska
irrigators, available for diversion long after surface streams have diminished.419
Administratively, the director of Nebraska DNR cannot find such groundwater to
be unavailable, because he lacks jurisdiction to curtail groundwater pumping; and
the IMP’s effectively rule out groundwater curtailments during times of shortage
anyway.420 When, given the hydrological conditions of groundwater pumping in
Nebraska, and given the administrative conditions of Nebraska’s Compact
compliance approach, would groundwater be declared to be unavailable for use?
Probably rarely, if ever; but if it were to happen, such curtailments would appear to
be compensable takings. According to the court’s reasoning in Hill III,
groundwater rights appear to be clearly superior property rights compared to
surface water rights—despite the priority and the constitutional status of the
former.421 First in time, last in right.422

415. Hill III, supra note 411, at 14–15.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 25.
418. Id. at 14–15.
419. Id. Indeed, the relative constancy and durability of groundwater supplies undergirds Nebraska’s
substantial investment in its augmentation projects; see supra text accompanying notes 265–270.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 242–247.
421. See supra text accompanying note 69.
422. Nebraska DNR stressed that the plaintiff irrigators in Hill III are not without a remedy: “if
[they] believe that excess groundwater pumping is interfering with their surface water appropriations,
they can attempt to hold groundwater pumpers accountable under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §
858 (1979) . . . .” Appellees’ Brief at 49, Hill v. Nebraska, Nos. 16-558 & 16-560 (Consolidated) (Neb.
Sup. Ct. September 30, 2016) , , (citing Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (2005)). But Dr. Ann
Bleed, former director of Nebraska DNR, has conceded that “Nebraska state law provides little legal
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5. Interstate Comity through Anti-federalism: the Resolutions of the
RRCA, 2014–2016
By the end of 2014, the governance structure of cooperative federalism in
the Basin had effectively broken down. Nebraska DNR’s compliance-driven orders
to release water from Harlan County Lake between 2012 and 2014 had created a
hostile relationship between Nebraska DNR and the United States over the
management of Reclamation infrastructure. They had also run the risk of
preventing KBID from storing water supplies for subsequent irrigation seasons.
Reclamation had responded to these threats by pressuring KBID into a series of
Warren Act contracts. These contracts solved the immediate crisis, but required
KBID to pay for water supplied by upstream augmentation pumping in Nebraska.
Nebraska’s IMP’s and the closing notices Nebraska DNR issued to FCID and
NBID had deprived surface-water irrigators in Nebraska of their water supplies,
forcing them to sue their parent state, so far unsuccessfully. Left unasked in the
correspondence and the contract negotiations was the underlying hydrological
question: what made the excess capacity in Harlan County Lake available? With
few exceptions, the answer was apparently too undiplomatic to be discussed: longterm declines in inflows resulting from excessive groundwater pumping.423
Between October 2014 and August 2015, the RRCA passed four
resolutions in rapid succession, temporarily resolving some of the states’ legal and
operational disagreements which had caused the showdown at Harlan County Lake.
They consist essentially of three shared positions taken against Reclamation.424
First, the states formally blessed the fact that Nebraska would be depending
substantially on pumped groundwater from its augmentation projects to comply

protection to assure the security of tenure rights for surface water users where surface water and
groundwater are hydrologically connected.” ANN BLEED & CHRISTINA HOFFMAN BABBITT,
NEBRASKA’S NATURAL RESOURCES DISTRICTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF A LARGE-SCALE LOCALLY
CONTROLLED WATER GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 59 (2015).
423. See supra text accompanying notes 278–279.
424. REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT ADMIN., RESOLUTION BY THE REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT
ADMINISTRATION APPROVING ACCOUNTING ADJUSTMENTS AND AGREEMENTS RELATED TO THE
OPERATION OF HARLAN COUNTY LAKE IN 2014, (2014) [hereinafter RRCA HCL Resolution of October
22,
2014]
http://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/iwi---republican-river-compact/ks_ne_
accounting_hcl_2014.pdf?sfvrsn=6 [https://perma.cc/P2ZV-6CUV]; REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT
ADMIN., RESOLUTION BY THE REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT ADMINISTRATION APPROVING
ACCOUNTING ADJUSTMENTS AND AGREEMENTS RELATED TO THE OPERATION OF HARLAN COUNTY
LAKE IN 2015 (2014) [hereinafter RRCA HCL Resolution of November 19, 2014], http://agriculture.
ks.gov/docs/default-source/iwi---republican-river-compact/ks_ne_accounting_hcl_2015.pdf?sfvrsn=2
[https://perma.cc/MF9M-LEL3]; REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT ADMIN., RESOLUTION OF THE
REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT ADMINISTRATION, ADDENDUM TO RESOLUTION APPROVING
ACCOUNTING ADJUSTMENTS AND AGREEMENTS RELATED TO THE OPERATION OF HARLAN COUNTY
LAKE IN 2015 DATED NOVEMBER 19, 2014 (2015) [hereinafter RRCA HCL Resolution of March 6,
2015], http://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/iwi---republican-river-compact/addendum-to-thenovember-2014-rrca-resolution_signed_final.pdf?sfvrsn=2
[https://perma.cc/64VX-NBDR];
REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT ADMIN., RESOLUTION OF THE REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT
ADMINISTRATION APPROVING ACCOUNTING ADJUSTMENTS AND AGREEMENTS RELATED TO THE
OPERATION OF HARLAN COUNTY LAKE FOR COMPACT YEAR 2016 (2015) [hereinafter RRCA HCL
Resolution of August 27, 2015], http://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/iwi---republican-rivercompact/resolution_hc_aug-credit_2016_08272015.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/RE7Y-57W2].
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with the Compact—by as much as 63,500 acre-feet for 2014 alone.425 The states
agreed to account for augmentation water generally as imported water under the
Compact’s accounting procedures, thereby subtracting it from the “virgin water
supply” of the Compact and the “computed water supply” of the FSS.426
Second, Nebraska obtained the blessing of the RRCA to control Harlan
County Lake, so that it could manage the water supplies derived from its
augmentation projects for Compact compliance purposes. Nebraska agreed not to
release or bypass water from Harlan County Lake—the principal threat it had
employed between 2012 and 2014.427 It also promised to deliver augmentation
water to the lake, and therefore to KBID and Kansas, in time for irrigation
season.428 In exchange, Nebraska extracted a second significant concession from
Kansas: Nebraska could extend its deadline for deliveries of water to Harlan
County Lake from the end of the year (as the Compact and the accounting
procedures of the FSS had required) through April and even June of the following
year—enabling Nebraska to shore up its accounting balances through supplemental
augmentation pumping.429
Finally, the states agreed to change the operation and management of
Harlan County Lake, with escalating opposition to Reclamation’s established
management role. The resolutions aspired to establish a storage account in Harlan
County Lake exclusive to the state of Kansas, separate from water allocated to
NBID and KBID.430 If the states and Reclamation could not establish such a
Kansas-exclusive account, then they would accept the ongoing Warren Act account
arrangements with KBID; if neither of those options obtained, then the stored water
would become “project water” shared between NBID and KBID.431 Less than a
month later, the states redefined “project water” as water exclusively dedicated to
KBID; the established memorandum of agreement between NBID, KBID, and
Reclamation for sharing project water and operations and maintenance costs was
specifically deemed to be inapplicable.432 Because water supplied by upstream
augmentation projects now counted as project water, and because NBID was
excluded from accessing that project water, the RRCA had effectively excised
NBID from the Bostwick Project during water-short years.433

425. RRCA HCL Resolution of October 22, 2014, supra note 424, at 1.
426. Id.; RRCA HCL Resolution of March 6, 2015, supra note 424, at 1; RRCA HCL Resolution of
August 27, 2015, supra note 424, at 1.
427. RRCA HCL Resolution of October 22, 2014, supra note 424, at 1.
428. RRCA HCL Resolution of August 27, 2015, supra note 424, at 1; RRCA HCL Resolution of
August 27, 2015, supra note 424, at 1.
429. RRCA HCL Resolution of November 19, 2014, supra note 424, at 1; RRCA HCL Resolution of
August 27, 2015, supra note 424, at 2.
430. RRCA HCL Resolution of October 22, 2014, supra note 424, at 1.
431. Id, at 1–2. The RRCA also agreed to allow Nebraska to store water for KBID under
Reclamation’s Nebraska water right for NBID in Harlan County Lake—a creative maneuver, but one
rife with potential legal problems. RRCA HCL Resolution of November 19, 2014, supra note 424, at 1.
432. RRCA HCL Resolution of November 19, 2014, supra note 424, at 2.
433. Id. at 1–2; RRCA HCL Resolution of March 6, 2015, supra note 424, at 2.
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The RRCA approved a longer-term resolution related to the operation of
Harlan County Lake in August 2016.434 It carries forward the principal elements of
the earlier resolutions, and captures well the RRCA’s current hostility to the
operational presence of the United States in the Basin. The resolution comprehends
“project water” as consisting of all of the flows of the Basin stored in Harlan
County Lake for use in both states, including augmentation water, without regard to
Reclamation’s definition of the term.435 It formally integrates Nebraska’s IMP’s
within the Compact’s administration, including their methods for forecasting
augmentation delivery volumes.436 The “natural flows” of the Basin now include
water pumped from Nebraska’s augmentation projects—even though these supplies
are counted as imported water supply credits, and thus deducted from the
“computed water supply” of the Basin under the accounting procedures of the
FSS.437
Tellingly, the long-term resolution seeks to effect this management by
creating new water accounts in Harlan County Lake without Reclamation’s prior
approval. Augmentation water delivered to the lake is expressly limited to use by
Kansas and KBID, without allocation or subsequent re-allocation to NBID.438 This
augmentation water is to flow into two different accounts: a “Kansas Account”
exclusively dedicated to KBID, including water supplies previously available under
its Warren Act contracts, and a “Kansas Supplemental Account” exclusively
dedicated for use by Kansas outside of KBID.439 Nebraska promises to make “good
faith efforts” to deliver augmentation water supplies to the Kansas Account by June
1 of each year, in time for irrigation season—apparently supplanting Reclamation’s
traditional duty to make water supplies available to both NBID and KBID.440 The
RRCA recognized that the United States has yet to recognize and establish these
two Kansas accounts in Harlan County Lake, and so committed itself to cooperate
with the United States toward that end.441 Therefore, the accounts which the RRCA
nominally established in this resolution are best understood as accounting workarounds, by which the states can compute compliance without participation by the
United States in the management of water stored in Harlan County Lake for both
NBID and KBID.
The resolution concludes with a striking statement: “compliance with this
Resolution constitutes compliance” with both the Compact and the FSS.442 By
creating new (and as yet still nominal) accounts in Harlan County Lake to hold

434. REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT ADMIN., RESOLUTION APPROVING LONG-TERM AGREEMENTS
RELATED TO THE OPERATION OF HARLAN COUNTY LAKE FOR COMPACT CALL YEARS (2016)
[hereinafter RRCA HCL Resolution of August 24, 2016], http://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/defaultsource/iwi---republican-river-compact/final_resolution_hcl_20160823.pdf?sfvrsn=4 [https://perma.cc/
2DC2-A5VH]. The resolution is effective for four years. Id. at 3.
435. Id, at 1.
436. Id, at 1–2.
437. Id, at 2–3.
438. Id.
439. Id, at 2.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 3.
442. Id.
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water delivered from Nebraska’s augmentation projects, and by changing the
accounting methods by which Nebraska supplies water to Kansas in water-short
years, the RRCA has transformed—at least for now—the essential function of
Harlan County Lake. The lake now serves as the delivery point for Nebraska’s
Compact obligations to Kansas during water-short years without apparent regard
for NBID, effectively transforming the Compact into a delivery compact—despite
Nebraska’s earlier protestations to the contrary.443 If Reclamation were to decide to
protect NBID from the consequences of the RRCA’s long-term resolution for
Harlan County Lake, the United States could sue Nebraska to protect its interests in
the Basin.444
6. Post-script: Whither Reclamation?
As of 2017, the interstate litigation between Kansas and Nebraska has
receded into the background. It remains an important and looming presence: the
Court’s 2015 decision awarding partial disgorgement and threatening complete
disgorgement of gains obtained by future noncompliance has justified Colorado’s
and Nebraska’s augmentation projects.445 But at present, the Basin is now
dominated by a proxy war between surface-water irrigation communities and
groundwater irrigation communities that is taking place on multiple fronts.
Through its IMP’s, Nebraska has committed itself to a strategy to comply with the
Compact by choosing to protect its dominant groundwater interests, represented by
Nebraska NRD’s, at the expense of its surface water interests, represented by
FCID, NBID, and Reclamation. That policy choice has forced litigation between
these districts and Nebraska, and open conflict between the State of Nebraska and
Reclamation. To protect itself from the consequences of Nebraska’s IMP’s, KBID
has agreed to Warren Act contracts; largely to protect KBID, Kansas has agreed to
accommodate the IMP’s in the recent resolutions of the RRCA. All three states,
apparently, have joined in a concerted fight against Reclamation, with co-operative
federalism as its principal casualty. The RRCA has transformed the administration
of an interstate river based on principles of cooperative federalism into one based
on an essentially anti-federal approach, where the States have purchased interstate
comity with a shared opposition to Reclamation.
Will Reclamation defend its traditional interests and its duties to its
districts under the Reclamation Act? Based on its legal position, it appears to be
prepared to do so.446 Or will Reclamation seek less combative means to regain cooperative federalism? It could potentially repurpose Reclamation reservoirs in the
Basin for the express purpose of Compact compliance—to reflect the operational

443. See State of Nebraska’s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 281, at 5–7; see also Letter from Brian
Dunnigan, supra note 330, at 1 (“the Compact is not a delivery compact”).
444. For a similar situation, see First Interim Report of the Special Master at 231-237, Texas v. New
Mexico, No. 141, Orig., (U.S. February 9, 2017) (recommending that the Court exercise its original but
non-exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (2012) to hear the United States’ claims
regarding the Elephant Butte Project against New Mexico).
445. See supra text accompanying notes 269–270.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 370-380.
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intent of other compacts, such as the Rio Grande or Arkansas River Compacts.447
That would amount to a tacit repudiation of the precautionary principle which
informed the Compact in the first place.448 It might also amount to a tacit admission
that Reclamation’s surface-water irrigation communities in Nebraska may no
longer be viable in dry years—the all-too-common conditions which brought
Reclamation to the Basin in the first place.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between Great Plains irrigation communities can end three
ways. If groundwater irrigation communities prevail—and if Nebraska continues to
prevail against its own surface-water irrigation districts—then their surface-water
counterparts will no longer be viable, as depletion transforms the water rights upon
which they depend into legal fictions. If surface-water communities prevail, then
groundwater communities will suffer substantial economic losses during the
decades of suspended or reduced pumping that will be necessary to restore the
hydrologic integrity of Great Plains river systems.449 The first result would
repudiate the states’ and Reclamation’s commitments to its surface-water irrigation
communities, while the latter outcome would suspend the use of billions of dollars’
worth of individual groundwater rights and their economic benefits. The first result
is entirely possible, if legally dubious; the latter outcome is politically impossible
and economically irrational.
There is room for compromise between these extremes. That compromise
must protect surface-water irrigation communities from the excessive groundwater
pumping that has harmed them for decades and threatens their future; but it must do
so without imposing overly severe reductions to the pumping upon which
groundwater irrigation communities presently depend. Colorado and Nebraska
have followed the lead of their locally-controlled groundwater irrigation
communities; but their compliance strategies are producing a Potemkin river, one
replumbed on the surface by Ogallala Aquifer groundwater, yet depleted of its
native flows.
Downstream and vulnerable, Kansas has sought repeatedly to restore these
flows by reducing groundwater pumping upstream. During the 2010–2015
litigation, its proposed compliance path accepted a diminished river, but one that
was at least intact as a hydrological system. The Supreme Court has now decided
the conflict between Kansas and Nebraska for a second time, but it has also clearly
decided to avoid the conflicts between these irrigation communities. Faced with
that avoidance, Kansas has resolved to accept its Compact partners’ compliance
plans; and so the RRCA has purchased interstate comity with a common hostility to
Reclamation. In any case, the Court will not decide the fate of the river. The river
lacks standing.450

447. See Rio Grande Compact, ch. 155, 53 Stat. 785, 786 (1939) (providing for the Rio Grande
Project); Arkansas River Compact, 63 Stat. 145–146 (1949) (providing for the use and management of
John Martin Reservoir).
448. See supra text accompanying note 273.
449. See supra text accompanying notes 262 and 270.
450. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–52 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The problem returns us to the original purpose behind Reclamation—to
build enduring irrigation communities across the rural West. For fifty years, the
groundwater revolution severely tested that purpose, and raised candid questions
about whether it was obsolete. Irrigation is above all a business, as the Reclamation
Reform Act of 1982 conceded.451 But the decline of the Ogallala Aquifer should
revive our interest in these communities. That is because this decline is both a
public crisis—the permanent loss of waters dedicated to the public—and a crisis
concerning the public itself, which must resolve the competing interests of its
surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities. Where pumping threatens
to separate groundwater baseflows from streamflows, the presence or absence of
those surface flows indicates whether the river as a hydrological whole can
sustainably withstand present levels of groundwater pumping—regardless of
whether that pumping is dedicated to irrigation or augmentation. If the river cannot
withstand that pumping, then the river cannot endure, and the different irrigation
communities that depend on its water supply cannot coexist. Will Reclamation
protect its water rights to the river systems upon which its projects depend? Or will
the states and Reclamation, in a most cynical act of cooperative federalism, walk
away from the projects and the public purposes behind them?
The drought has gone underground, and neither rain nor technology can
end it. On the other side of the groundwater revolution, there is no cycle—
historical, hydrological, or otherwise—to reverse. If groundwater and surface-water
irrigation communities are to survive and to coexist across the Great Plains, they
will have to accept what Powell and Mead made abundantly clear more than a
century ago: aridity requires a public that is committed to its rivers. To sustain the
wider public that connects these divergent communities, the arid West requires
more modest expectations from both of them and greater cooperation between
them. That may be more than they are willing to sacrifice. In that case—if the idea
of a durable water public across the Great Plains no longer deserves protection—
then the groundwater crisis will take care of itself.

451. For a discussion of this issue, see Kelley & Benson, supra note 107, at § 41.03, and see
generally MACDONNELL, supra note 132.

